Denver Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 4 Symposium - New Directions in Legal
Education and Practice

Article 12

January 1974

Vol. 50, no. 4: Full Issue
Denver Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
50 Denv. L.J. (1974).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOLUME 50
1973-1974

THIS ISSUE OF THE DENVER LAW JOURNAL
IS PROUDLY DEDICATED TO
ROBERT B. YEGGE
DEAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
COLLEGE OF LAW 1965-

SALUTE TO THE

Denver Law Journal

ON ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY
In the half century since the Denver Law Journalbegan publication, we have seen law explode into the most potent force our
society knows. On the one hand, law has fueled social change. On
the other hand, it has taken on an ever greater influence by chaning views of the people's needs and entitlements. The result has
been an escalating interaction: as people press the courts (the
most accessible instruments of the law) for quick, active response,
and as the courts deliver, the range of demands increases. In
short, as the law responds to social needs the people's awareness
of their needs and of the courts' capacities and willingness to
respond grows apace.
Throughout its years of publication, the Denver Law Journal
has attempted to reflect this interaction between law and social
circumstance. Where once student legal periodicals tended to be
speculative in approach and law-practice oriented, the emphasis
in periodicals such as this one has shifted to the social aspects of
the law.
This symposium probes a wide range of the most critical
aspects of our legal institutions, of our modes of delivering legal
services, and of our manner of educating for responsible professional activity, public and private. The editors have assembled
an impressive array of legal scholars. Their discussions have been
imaginatively planned so that they weave together into a tapestry
that promises to produce important new patterns of ideas. This
issue will make an important and, one can surely hope, enduring
mark upon the law by providing a broad, informed perspective on
what lies ahead for legal institutions and legal education.
Maurice Rosenberg
President, Association of
American Law Schools
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INTRODUCTION
CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION?-A RESPONSE
By

VED

P.

NANDA,*

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON**

The nature and kind of legal education American law schools
have traditionally offered and are presently imparting, and its
relevancy in meeting the needs of contemporary society, are currently under critical review.' Some highly skeptical observers
have challenged the whole range of operations associated with law
schools-admission requirements and selection procedures, curriculum, teaching methods, examinations, community participation, and research. And when a student's legal education is completed, the law student joins a profession whose role in meeting
societal needs has also come under critical attack. Increasingly,
questions of ethics and morality and professional responsibility
are being raised, especially in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, and warnings of an impending crisis are often heard.
Lawyers are by no means singled out as the creators or perpetuators of all the ailments prevalent in local, national, and international settings, but their special positions as the guardians and
regulators of many legal and human relationships call into question their use of authority and power to give proper and responsible leadership. Additionally, while lawyers as products of society
reflect societal values, as products of law schools they also reflect
the competence, skills, and values they have acquired in their law
schools. Thus the objectives of legal education, the means
adopted to accomplish these objectives, and the end results of
legal education are under severe criticism.
*Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.
**A.B., 1967, Kenyon College; Candidate for J.D., 1974, University of Denver College
of Law.
'See, e.g., Kinoy, The Present Crisis in American Legal Education, 24 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1 (1969).
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Among the critics of legal education and the legal profession
are some of the keenest and closest observers of social and legal
changes. They include social reformers, legal scholars, lawyers,
jurists, public-interest groups, and law students. Such criticism
is not new; however, its present intensity and depth are. In response, both law schools and the legal profession are appraising
their respective roles. Several recent studies show their willingness and capability to recognize their weaknesses and to be receptive to change. 2 This symposium issue, New Directions in
Legal Education and Practice, reflects this ongoing process of
appraising and evaluating the role of law schools and the legal
profession in contemporary society.
In his tribute to the Denver Law Journal, Professor Maurice
Rosenberg, the President of the Association of American Law
Schools, notes the shift in emphasis of some legal periodicals,
including the Journal, from the traditional law review's speculative approach and law practice orientation to concern with "the
social aspects of the law." The change in this journal's focus is
in fact a reflection of the progressive change the University of
Denver College of Law has experienced under the enlightened
leadership of its Dean, Robert B. Yegge. The trend at the College
of Law, as at many schools, is to focus on the interaction between
law and the social sciences, and the Journal will continue to
reflect the College's commitment to facilitate and encourage interdisciplinary work.
The first two essays in the symposium probe specific aspects
of non-traditional research in law schools. In the lead article,
Non-TraditionalLaw-Related Studies and Legal Education,the
President of the Council on Law-Related Studies, Professor
David F. Cavers of Harvard University, discusses the hurdles
faced by a law teacher in pursuing non-traditional research.'
However, he is optimistic about probable future changes in law
school curricula, foreseeing "a gradual multiplication of non'H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1973); Auerbach,
Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 549 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn ed. 1971); Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students,
59 VA. L. REV. 551 (1973); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn ed. 1971); Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why has it Failed?, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE
LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE (E. Kitch ed., Univ. of Chicago Conf. Series No. 20, 1970).
'See also Cavers, "Non-Traditional"Research by Law Teachers: Returns From the
Questionnaireof the Council on Law-Related Studies, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 534 (1972).
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traditional law courses in which both instructors and students
find themselves embarking on non-traditional law-related research." Professor Cavers believes that since clinical legal education has now achieved "academic acceptance to an impressive
degree," the next logical step is to make the necessary adjustment
in course requirements and class schedules to allow students full
participation in non-traditional social research within the law
school.
In the next essay, Law School "Law" and Sociolegal
Research, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., of Yale University
makes a timely contribution toward facilitating the integration of
law and the social sciences.' Professor Hazard focuses on one of
the barriers to such integration, "the divergence of professional
and intellectual responsibilities and aims as between law schools
and departments of social science," and suggests that "a shift of
emphasis in what law schools conceive themselves to be doing as
professional schools might reduce the divergence of aims." By
redefining and reconceptualizing the lawyer's role, he convincingly demonstrates that these divergences can be minimized.
Each of the four papers following Professor Hazard's essay
addresses specific aspects of contemporary legal education.
Gordon A. Christenson, the Dean of the Washington College
of Law at American University, provides a comprehensive framework within which to consider the role and function of law
schools, and suggests that "a central function of legal education
is to promote the possibility of principled action in the professional world." In this article, Studying Law as the Possibility of
PrincipledAction, he proposes to combine "both intellectual and
worldly perspectives" in law schools, thereby offering "to the new
generation the possibility of action based on principle." Dean
Christenson's comments on clinical legal education, especially his
recommendation that the role of clinical education be extended
"well beyond its practical origins," should be of special interest
both to proponents and critics of such programs.
The lack of enthusiasm for professional responsibility programs in many law schools is noted by Professor Edward J.
Kionka of Southern Illinois University in Education for Professional Responsibility: The Buck Stops Here. He finds this lack of
enthusiasm especially disquieting when the alternatives-self'See also Hazard, InterdisciplinaryCourses and Programs in Law and Social Work:
A Survey, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 423 (1972).
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education, education by example, and continuing legal education-are inadequate to instill a sense of professionalism and professional responsibility in the young lawyer. Professor Kionka
makes a compelling case for teaching and emphasizing professional responsibility in law schools. This is not mere exhortation,
for the author's careful analysis of the problem leads to concrete
proposals to be considered and implemented.
The disparity between prevailing perceptions and the reality
of the contemporary criminal justice system lead to the article
Discretionary Criminal Justice in Law School Education and
Legal Scholarship by Professor Harvey G. Friedman of the University of Detroit School of Law. He makes a strong plea for legal
education in criminal procedure to incorporate the "reality of the
informal disposition of criminal cases." Thus the emphasis of
both legal research and law school instruction should shift from
the prevalent model, that is a study of only the adversary system
of criminal justice, to a model of discretionary criminal justice.
Specific suggestions for reaching this objective are advanced, and
the effects of changes in research and teaching upon the actual
functioning of the criminal justice system are considered.
Professors Gerhard 0. W. Mueller and Freda Adler, of New
York University and the Medical College of Pennsylvania respectively, do not confine their remarks to legal education and legal
scholars. In National Manpower Mobilization for Criminal Justice in a Drug-Oriented Society they call for "the creation of a
vast national effort to deal with the criminal justice problems of
today and those of tomorrow." They pose the question of what
will be "the manpower needs, both quantitative and qualitative,
of tomorrow's criminal justice system." In answering this question, the authors describe current developments in the criminal
justice system, study and forecast trends, and inquire into the
training efforts necessary to meet future manpower requirements.
Their analysis is provocative and will hopefully be pursued further by legal scholars.
The final two papers in the symposium raise questions pertaining respectively to innovation in legal education and innovation in legal practice.
Professor Michael H. Cardozo, until recently the Executive
Director of the Association of American Law Schools, considers
the subject of progressive change in legal education within the
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context of accreditation requirements' in his article, Innovation
and Accreditation in Legal Education: Compatible or Polar?
While he finds the accreditation requirement to be the "most
obvious potential impediment" to educational innovation, he believes that no bona fide innovation has ever been denied by either
accrediting agency-the ABA or the AALS-when duly presented
and defended. He reminds the reader that the standard of "a
sound educational program," which both accrediting agencies
insist that a law school meet in order for approval, is a flexible
standard which invites rather than impedes innovation.
The final article, Is Anybody There? Notes onCollective
Practice, offers a fascinating account of one experiment in alternative legal practice. The Santa Barbara Legal Collective, a
group of lawyers and their associates motivated by a desire for
social change and adequate legal representation for all, presents
us with an inside look at their practice. They draw meager salaries, do their own secretarial work, and run an efficient law office
while representing their clients. Both the organization of the
collective and the daily workings of its members are discussed
and, while the authors admit that they are "frankly propagandistic," this does not detract from the validity of the article's message-that methods of legal practice may be resilient and are not
necessarily immune from non-traditional approaches.
This summary account of the comments that follow indicates
that the authors do not purport to resolve all or even most of the
current issues confronting legal educators and the legal profession. However, they bring into sharper focus some of the problems
we face by identifying and clarifying the assumptions underlying
these problems and offer many useful suggestions and recommendations. It seems to be a fair statement that law schools and the
legal profession are not complacent; most are introspective and
self-critical, sanguine and open-minded about criticism, and unafraid of change. Therein lies part of their strength and maturity.
The experimentation with new ideas and the implementation of
tested ones constitute a continuing process which provides them
with both the flexibility and the opportunity to improve and
grow. It is our hope that some of the ideas offered in the following
pages will be considered, tested, and on their merits, eventually
adopted.
'See also Cardozo, Accreditation in Legal Education, 49 Cm-KENT L. REv. 1 (1972).

NON-TRADITIONAL LAW-RELATED STUDIES
AND LEGAL EDUCATON
By DAVID F. CAVERS*
Traditional legal research and traditional law teaching have
long been recognized not only as compatible but also as mutually
reinforcing. Indeed, the resulting symbiosis has led to a justifiable
concern lest law faculty research concentrate so intently on questions lending themselves to classroom discussion as to leave wide
problem areas free from academic scrutiny. Moreover, the narrowing of the researcher's focus has exacted a price in terms of a
diminishing sense of discovery. The returns yielded by doctrinal
research are no longer as high as they were in the days of Wigmore
and Williston, and the law teacher who has published his first two
or three law review articles may grow restive as he views the
prospect of confining his contributions to learning to that
medium.
Unfortunately for him, non-traditional legal research and
traditional law teaching tend to be antagonistic. They make demands on the teacher that often conflict. Moreover, even though
non-traditional research may enlarge the law teacher's grasp of
the legal processes with which he deals in the classroom, the
specific subjects of his studies may have so little relation to his
courses' content that he cannot add their products to his course
assignments.
Non-traditional research, one must conclude, is likely either
to accompany or to support non-traditional law teaching, or, perhaps more frequently, to have no relation to the researcher's instructional responsibilities. Such a condition may be a commonplace in the Arts and Sciences but can still render law school
deans uncomfortable.
Before I attempt to comment further on these relationships
between law teaching and research, I ought to confess to a terminological problem. It is most sharply exemplified by research in
legal history. In this context, is such research to be viewed as
"traditional" or as "non-traditional"? Each classification would,
I am sure, have its champions.
*Fessenden Professor of Law, Emeritus, Law School of Harvard University; President, Council on Law-Related Studies; B.S., 1923, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B.,
1926, Law School of Harvard University; J.S.D., 1957, Suffolk University; LL.D., 1964,
Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan.
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My own view is that the proper classification will depend
largely on the objectives of each legal historian. One historian
may be concerned primarily about carrying the study of a line of
cases or statutes back toward their origins and setting the early
cases or statutes in their legal contexts. I believe such a study can
be properly labeled as traditional; legal scholars have been devoting volumes to this pursuit since the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary. However, a legal scholar may range more widely
and endeavor to trace the interaction over time of legal and other
social processes and institutions, seeking to cast light on the development not only of law but of society. At some point in this
process, I begin to think of the study as non-traditional and to
suspect that its direct impact in the traditional law course will
be limited, though perhaps important. Fortunately, however,
even this order of research is not likely to disrupt the pattern of
the legal historian's law teaching activities.
The problem of drawing a line between traditional research
in, and non-traditional research about, law is not restricted to
legal history. The application of economic analysis to legal materials, especially when accompanied by economic data, produces
a hybrid that is not easy to categorize. Obviously, the interlarding
of economic theory and materials in an article discussing antitrust cases may be so slight that one would have no difficulty in
preserving its traditional classification. However, increasingly
today we are observing the analysis of legal doctrines in terms
that are more familiar to the economist than to the legal scholar.,
We are also beginning to witness the construction of abstract
models employing techniques that threaten to debar from access
the nonmathematical majority among lawyers. Yet, as long as the
analyst is content to keep his models abstract and so is spared
the necessity of producing the data needed for their application
to concrete reality, his teachings are not likely to be interrupted
by the demands of his research. (I suppose abstract model building can be viewed as "research," at least for the purposes of
articles such as this and for deans' reports.)
The use by law teachers of concepts and theories from social
science sources is not, of course, confined to economics. Indeed,
we law teachers display a striking degree of eclecticism, especi'For a recent example of the new approach, more general in its reach than most, see
Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HAsv. L. REv. 797
(1973). At pages 801-02, Professor Heymann cites a number of noteworthy writings reflecting this approach.
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ally in the annotations to essentially legal articles and casebooks. The excursions into the learning of other disciplines that
are involved in the collection and occasional use of assorted
"other materials" seem consistent with traditional legal scholarship and a practice that is not likely to divert its practitioners'
law teaching far from the traditional pattern.
There are some law teachers who have devoted themselves
over the years to studies related to law in one or more of the social
sciences and have been able to overcome the rejection phenomenon that commonly follows any extensive introduction of nonlegal
materials into law courses. To name but two conspicuous examples of such teachers, I cite Alan Dershowitz of Harvard and
Joseph Goldstein of Yale, both of whom have pursued nontraditional but law-related studies over a period of years. Their
work, though having a common point of beginning, has diverged
in terms of the subjects with which they have been concerned:
Dershowitz with problems in the prevention of potentially harmful conduct and the use of prediction in aid of preventive measures; Goldstein with the contributions of psychoanalysis to the
understanding of man as evidenced in the fields of family and
criminal law.' Though each has engaged in some original studies,
their principal objective appears to have been to bring together,
analyze, and evaluate the relevant theories, insights, and data
yielded by the research and clinical experience of nonlawyers who
are experts in their respective areas of concern. The result has
been the emergence of non-traditional law courses. However, insofar as the teachers who adopt this method of broadening the
range of legal education are content to pursue empirical studies
vicariously, they escape the conflicts that extensive involvement
in field research of their own is likely to entail.'
'The principal products of their endeavors are a series of distinctive volumes of teaching materials: R. DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW (1962) (a second
edition edited by J. Goldstein and A. Dershowitz is in preparation); J. GOLDSTEIN & J.
KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1965); and J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITz,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967). (Their collaborator, Jay Katz, is a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst holding chairs in both the Yale Law School and the Yale Medical
School.)
Professor Goldstein, with the collaboration of Dr. Anna Freud, is at work on a volume
to be entitled Beyond the Best Interest of the Child. Professor Dershowitz has in progress
a book to be entitled Predictive Justice: Toward a Jurisprudenceof Crime Prevention,
several aspects of which have been treated in articles published over the last few years.
3A byproduct of law teaching with such an objective is the stimulation of research by
law students and sometimes by law graduates whose minds have been opened to the
nature and significance of the problems encountered in the classroom and to the need for
more systematic knowledge concerning them.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.

50

It is the law teacher's own field research that most often gives
rise to institutional problems, whether he himself is venturing
into the field or he is organizing and directing a team of researchers. There are two impediments to successful studies of law in
action other than the intrinsic difficulty of conceiving and designing a useful study. One of these obstacles is lack of time; the other
is lack of money with which to buy time.' The problem of time,
moreover, is not simply a question of how many hours the teacher
can devote to research. Class schedules and committee meetings
frequently prevent him from freeing the blocks of hours he needs
to accomplish his research objectives.Moreover, when he depends
on law student assistance, he finds much the same difficulty embarrassing student participation. Typically, a law school curriculum provides a checkerboard of class hours that results in, say, a
15-hour class schedule capable of tying a student down for nearly
all of a 35-hour work week.
If, moreover, the law teacher's own teaching schedule is comprised of traditional courses, he can seldom employ the product
of his field research for many hours in his instruction, whereas his
library research may sustain class discussion over one or more
sections of a casebook. As a result, the burden added by field
research may be more than the teacher believes he can carry-or
would be wise to assume-and so the research is put over until
the next summer or until a grant makes a research leave financially feasible. 5 Often, moreover, the consequence of dependence
on financing means that the teacher must substitute a research
project commissioned by some public or public-interest body for
the subject he would have preferred to pursue.
'In a survey of non-traditional research by law teachers, 220 researchers reported that
they had secured support for research time. They noted compensation for summer research on 174 occasions. The survey's findings with respect to economic support for research are summarized in Cavers, Non-Traditional Research by Law Teachers, 24 J.
LEGAL ED. 534, 554-61 (1972).
*See note 4 supra.
'1n the survey cited supra note 4, at 553, the respondents indicated that, of the
aggregate of 533 publications they reported, 97 represented "all or a part of a report to a
commissioning body." The fact that a scholar undertakes a study requested by some
public or private body that has need for the knowledge that hopefully the study can
provide does not render him an object of sympathy or condescension even though the
study's subject is not the one he would have chosen if he were financially independent.
The fact that studies had been commissioned may, as I have suggested in my report, mean
that they were "assured of some very attentive and responsible readers and may well have
had an impact on the decisions of the commissioning bodies." Id. Of course, such bodies
sometimes intrude improperly in the study process, an intrusion the researcher should be
prepared to resist.

1974

LA W-RELA TED STUDIES

These gloomy observations are not novel, but is there reason
to believe that the conditions observed are likely to change? I
believe so, though I doubt that the rate of change will be rapid. I
think we shall see a gradual multiplication of non-traditional law
courses in which both instructors and students find themselves
embarking on non-traditional law-related research. This has been
foreshadowed in various law schools by experimental courses and
seminars in which the students are expected to collect and present data bearing on the seminar subjects. Professor Reed Dickerson of Indiana for years conducted seminars in which each year
some problem area of modest dimensions-e.g., private swimming pools or trailer parks-was studied intensively with a view
to proposing legislation designed to protect against problems that
the studies had identified. A book presenting the seminar findings and proposals has at least on one occasion been the result.'
In response to the tendency of the last few years to loosen and
diversify the law curriculum, especially in the second and third
years, courses and seminars may be expected in which allowance
is made for a block of time-a day or even two days in the
week-in which field research may be pursued.8 Needless to say,
some cut in regular class hours is a necessary concomitant of such
an arrangement. However, now that we have reached a point in
our discussion of curricular change where a cutback in the entire
law course from three to two academic years can be viewed as
thinkable, the possibility of a time allotment of six, eight, or
twelve hours of field research in lieu of, say, four or six hours of
classroom instruction cannot be considered startling.
The offerings in clinical legal education present breaking
ground for such an innovation. The checkerboard course schedule
is probably an even more serious impediment to effective clinical
instruction than it is to student field research. However, because
the need is obvious and because clinical instruction has achieved
academic acceptance to an impressive degree, adjustments in
course requirements and class schedules to accommodate the
needs of a clinical program are more likely to win approval initially than are like concessions in the interest of non-traditional
'LEGAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING PRIVATE SWIMMING POOLS (F. Dickerson ed. 1961). The
seminar's objective is the study of legislation; the problem areas studied provided clinical
material for that objective.
'Presumably this would seldom be extended beyond a single semester. Some ingenuity must be exercised in scheduling courses in high demand so that students would not
be forced to an election between them and field research.
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research. Yet the power of precedent is strong: if adjustments can
be made to enable students to represent divorcing spouses and
oppressed debtors and tenants, should they be denied to students
who wish to examine the family court in action or to study the
workings of new laws designed to control rapacious creditors and
slumlords?
But would such concessions really be justified? Is experience
in the conduct of non-traditional law-related research sufficiently
rewarding to the law student participant to justify his being indulged a lighter-than-normal schedule of classroom instruction?
An obvious difficulty in responding to that question is the diversity in the forms of non-traditional research. It may require only
systematic observation unembarrassed by questionnaires or interviews. It may involve in-depth interviews with key people or,
instead, a survey by interview or questionnaire.The student participant may be one of a team or may be operating alone. Hopefully he will have had a hand in planning the project and designing its instruments, but he may have had to join the staff of a
study already in progress.
Is there any common reward which may be anticipated from
these diverse activities? If the student's appreciation of the reasons for the study has been awakened by his instructor before he
has had to embark on his undertaking, he will almost certainly
have been obliged to confront a social problem with legal aspects
very much more directly than the vicarious exposures in the classroom or library have required. Moreover, he will have become
aware of the difficulties encountered when one seeks to make an
objective evaluation of a condition as distinguished from formulating an adversary case. Each presents its peculiar problems of
method, but commonly the distinction is overlooked by those who
have been exposed to only one of the two species of inquiry. He
may also discover that reporting the facts found is a process that
can possess distinctive difficulties.
Sometimes a study will pose challenging problems of method
with the result that the student researcher, guided by his instructor, will become acquainted with a number of the instruments in
the social researcher's armamentarium.9 However, in this early
'The number of law teachers prepared to give such guidance is not large. Over the
period 1967-1972 their ranks were agumented by a program happily entitled "SSMILE"
(Social Science Methods in Legal Education), conducted at the University of Denver
College of Law with support from the Association of American Law Schools, the Law and
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stage of law student involvement in non-traditional research, one
must probably expect that most inquiries will be modest in objective and relatively simple in method. The candidate for the first
degree in law will seldom approach in his own research the level
of sophistication or the scale of effort that characterizes the work
of the able Ph.D. candidate in the social sciences. His goals, quite
properly, are more limited.
Student participation in non-traditional research may lead
to either or both of two other involvements. Today the subjects
of non-traditional law-related research are likely to be close to the
domain of action. The student researcher may have already had,
or may still be having, a share of that action in his law school's
clinical program. Moreover, the very conduct of the research itself
may sharpen public or administrative consciousness of the need
for reform and perhaps reveal an opportunity for effective political pressure or judicial intervention.' 0 Before or after graduation,
the student researcher may himself begin taking part in activities
designed to translate proposed solutions into actualities.
An alternative to activism may be the researcher's shift from
the student level to that of a staff role in some more ambitious
university or governmentally sponsored study. Indeed, we may
now be witnessing the emergence of a new specialty among the
legal profession's many specializations. Before long we may see
opportunities multiplying for the law-trained man or woman with
experience and skill in social research combined with an aptitude
for working effectively with scholars in other disciplines, as well
as with other professionals, officials, and businessmen.
As doubtless most readers of this paper are aware, the National Science Foundation has been developing a program of substantial dimensions entitled RANN-"Research Applied to National Needs." To the extent that those needs embrace needs for
the improvement in the institutions and processes of our society,
Society Association, the Meyer Research Institute of Law, the Russell Sage Foundation,
and, more recently, the National Science Foundation.
"In several of the studies of jails which were conducted under grants by the Council
on Law-Related Studies, the conduct of the research within the jails itself stimulated in
the jail authorities an interest in the improvement of their institutions. Relatively limited
surveys, moreover, pointed the way to more ambitious studies and action programs. In
some cases, the resulting changes rendered the initial findings obsolete and unpublishable.
But, even to a foundation, there are goals more important than publication.
The proliferation of pro bono publico law firms and lawyers is providing a new instrumentality for securing attention to research findings that reveal failures of officialdom to
discharge its own functions or to police private interests that ignore legal requirements.
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law is likely to be involved, and surely no lawyer is inhibited by
the prospect that the products of his research may be applied.
Though RANN, of course, is only a single body and its program,
however ambitious, can reach only a fraction of the law teachers
and graduates who are becoming interested in non-traditional
research, its creation is symptomatic of a trend that is likely to
grow." If that growth should take place, I think it fair to predict
that we shall witness in our law schools a corresponding growth
of non-traditional methods of law-related research associated
with non-traditional modes of legal education.
"An instrumentality that should serve to multiply research opportunities for law
teachers and their students is the Office for Law-Related Research, the funding of which
by the Council on Law-Related Studies and the Ford Foundation was announced in a press
release by President Maurice Rosenberg of the Association of American Law Schools on
March 6, 1973. The Office's administrator has yet to be appointed. A major development
in the same direction would be the creation of the National Institute of Justice, a body
for which plans are being developed by a committee of the American Bar Association.

LAW SCHOOL "LAW" AND SOCIOLEGAL RESEARCH

By

GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR.*

Whether and how to carry out interdisciplinary inquiries between law and the social sciences is a problem that has bedeviled
the legal academic community for some years.' Perhaps it also
bedevils the social science community. One senses that the law
people gaze at social scientists in envious anticipation that they
may have some insights (causal theories and explanations) that
will make more manageable the law's burdens of social stabilization and implementation of social goals. The social scientists
meanwhile gaze at the law in contemplation of its plenitude of
underexamined phenomena that might be illuminated by the
light that social science has generated, or would like to generate.
There is also the point that law and social science have a common
subject matter and that law people and social scientists find
themselves interested in many of the same problems. Hence the
mutual attractions.
Despite the mutual attractions, a marriage has yet to occur.
It seems likely that it never will, given the very different interests
that preoccupy law schools and social science departments. Yet
a "relationship" seems possible and desirable, and this essay is
written on that widely shared assumption. From that point of
departure the question becomes, "What are the barriers?" Many
have already been identified: status rivalry within and between
disciplines; poor interdisciplinary communication; inadequate
theoretical foundations in both law and social science; etc. One
factor often identified is the divergence of professional and intellectual responsibilities and aims as between law schools and departments of social science.' This paper seeks to articulate some
of the differences in intellectual style and outlook involved in that
divergence, concentrating attention on the milieu of the law
schools. A related aim is to suggest that a shift of emphasis in
*Professor of Law, Yale University; B.A., 1953, Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1954,
Columbia University School of Law.
'The most recent efforts to consider these problems are the Symposium on Social
Research and the Law, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1970), and the Symposium on Some New
Concerns of Legal Process Research with Political Science, 6 LAW & Soc. REv. 9 (1971). A
particularly suggestive discussion is in Harry Kalven's paper, The Quest for the Middle
Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAw INA CHANGING AMERICA 56 (G. Hazard
ed. 1968). Most of this paper is the product of reflecting on these sources.
'The most succinct characterization of this divergence I have seen is Ohlin,
Partnershipwith the Social Sciences, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 204 (1970).
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what law schools conceive themselves to be doing as professional
schools might reduce the divergence of aims. Such a reconceptualization could thereby facilitate the integration that has so
long been sought.
Law Schools as Law Offices
To state the diagnostic point quickly if elliptically, the difficulty with basing sociolegal research in law schools is that the law
schools are preoccupied with the study and teaching of law as a
professional discipline. Effectively performing these responsibilities creates an environment that is in many respects hostile to the
pursuit of sustained research of a scientific or theoretical character. There are some related distractions present in many law
schools, notably the opportunity for law faculty to engage in private legal consultation and the widespread practice of recruiting
law faculty to help government, including university government.
The distraction of private practice need not be elaborated. Service to government, like private practice, involves commitments of
time, maintenance of areas of confidentiality, and assumption of
responsibilities for practical results. It also inevitably involves
commitments to policy positions, and faithfulness to sources of
support for those positions, that make it difficult to consider the
policies de novo from the external perspective that the scientist
or theoretical analyst endeavors to adopt. This difficulty is not
unique to the law schools, for it is now clear that members of such
disciplines as economics, physics, and statistics become to some
extent politicized when they undertake not merely to explain
social reality for an audience at large but to give advice about how
to change that social reality. This politicizing effect is ever present in the law schools, however, given the pragmatic activities in
which their faculties are typically engaged.
Even if these distractions did not exist, however, the law
schools would be relatively inhospitable environments for sociolegal research. This is because as law schools they are supposed to
give their students the basic intellectual equipment required to
engage in being lawyers and to pursue doctrinal research in the
law. I believe the roles involved in performing these functions
tend to be in conflict with a successful role in sociolegal research.
The lawyer's pragmatic outlook is characteristically involved
even in the doctrinal research that traditionally has been the
scholarly work of law school faculties. Doctrinal research in law,
while not inherently incompatible with a scientific or theoretical
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approach to research in law, works out that way in practice. The
doctrinal analyst at work usually tends to perform a major judgmental function with regard to his material, as a method of shorthand if nothing else. In crude and direct form, the judgmental
task is performed through the medium of such terms as "wrong,"
"failure to take account of," or "lacking adequately principled
justification." Implicit in such judgments is the assertion that
some adaptation other than the one actually made by the
court/agency/legislature would have been more consistent with
established understandings as to right and wrong or with prudent
estimates of the public interest. In more subtle form, the task is
performed by making selective choice and synthesis among the
available doctrinal sources in such a way as to state the law as
"really" being consistent with more or less explicitly stated conceptions of right and wrong or the public interest. In either event,
the observer by his procedure of interpretation has become an
active participant in the behavioral transaction-the formulation
of legal rules-that he is undertaking to report. Indeed, he is often
expected to do this as a law person because omitting to do so
would be an unlawyerlike failure to "resolve" the problem under
consideration.
Hence, even the process of "conventional" legal research,
i.e., doctrinal analysis, has within it a heavy component of the
lawyer's professional technique-that of "resolving" legal problems. The idea of "resolving" legal problems is central to conventional legal education in American law schools. The process consists of purging the uncertainties posed in the law's value-laden
dilemmas by clarifying or restructuring those dilemmas in such
a way as to eliminate or to at least reduce uncertainty about them
to the point where a decision that resolves them can comfortably
be made. The technique of clarification and reconstruction with
a view to reaching a practical decision is what the legal process
is all about-as Harry Kalven has said of trials, a "system for
managing doubt."
The Legal Educational Process
Introduction to this professional technique is what the conventional law school is all about. The courses taught in first-year
law school are prototypical. These courses-torts, property, contracts, and procedure- center on some fundamental dilemmas of
the law. The dilemmas to which they are respectively addressed
are those arising in pursuing courses of action that may harm
others; in differentiating between "mine" and "thine" in domin-
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ion over material things; in creating voluntary obligations; and
in reaching decisions when the evidence is inadequate. These
dilemmas, and all other legal problems, are legal dilemmas-problems requiring some kind of ultimately authoritative
resolu-tion-precisely because in their intricacy there is no feasible way to resolve them by merely factual, logical, or consensual
procedures. The law consists of a variety of devices to accomplish
this task by something a little more appealing than naked force
or fiat. To know the law is to be familiar with these devices.
Law school is not only the place where these devices are
taught, but is also the vocational and intellectual nursery of the
faculty which teaches them. With relatively few exceptions, law
school faculty members are themselves products of an education
in which mastery of these devices was their salient intellectual/emotional experience. The education that most law faculty
members have received consists of liberal undergraduate education and professional legal education. "Liberal; ' undergraduate
education neither aims at nor succeeds in socializing students to
any particular vocational role or viewpoint. Undergraduate training in social or natural science may have had the effect of inducing a scientific outlook in a student, but few students who really
internalize the scientist's outlook thereafter abandon science for
law, let alone thereafter travel the course into law teaching. At
the same time, relatively few law teachers have had any advanced
training in which the legal process is viewed in purely scientific
or theoretical terms. Hence, the outlook of law faculties is predominantly the result of the intellectual orientation and professional socialization characteristic of the very teaching process in
which they themselves later become engaged.
The teaching process in conventional legal education creates
an emotional counterpart to the problem-solving orientation of
the legal process itself. The law student is required to proceed on
his own in study 'and in class and to be a solo diagnostician and
interventionist in the problems under consideration. His sense of
doubt is heightened by his isolation as a more or less anonymous
member of a large group, by the intense competition implicit in
the use of identical assigned materials, and by severe rationing
of positive reinforcement in the form of praise or confirmation
from the teacher. The total effect is of a highly uncertain subject
matter being explored in a highly uncertain setting.3 At the same
3
See Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392 (1971), and references cited therein.
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time, both subject matter and situation are presented as amenable to resolution with a double payoff. First, the legal problems
in the courses are "solved" through manipulations of the questions and possible answers in such a way as to fall within limits
of legitimacy and expediency determined by the teacher. Second,
mastery of this process of manipulation solves the student's situational problem because it gives him a method of analysis, a vocabulary, and a more or less combative style of personal interaction with which to cope with problematic situations. Moreover,
and of equal importance, both the solutions to the legal problems
and the technique of solving the situational problem are evolved
over a very short time span. The legal problems are investigated
and resolved in "cases" that are given relatively few hours of
consideration and sometimes are disposed of at the rate of several
an hour. Whole subject matters are regarded as exhausted after
a year or even a few months of treatment.
Mastery of the technique is often called "analytical rigorousness." Whatever it is called, the technique is indispensable in
most forms of law practice and at least highly useful in all of
them. Since law schools are places whose principal function is the
intellectual training and emotional preparation of students for
the practice of law, teaching the technique is entirely appropriate. And because the technique must be passed on to succeeding
generations of law students, proficiency in it is appropriately a
necessary qualification for membership on law school faculties.
The members of law school faculties spend their teaching
time engaged mostly in the exemplification and stimulation of
this technique. The technique continues to be used throughout
the three years of law school, and is carried over into small group
teaching situations, even though its usefulness rapidly diminishes. In small group situations, its form is modified to the extent
that somewhat more limited subject matter is pursued somewhat
more intensively and the medium of student expression is shifted
from talk to writing. The procedure in approaching problems,
however, remains essentially the same: a problem is defined as
an encounter that a legal practitioner might have; the thing to be
done with the problem is to "solve" it; and the method for solving
it is to work out some seemingly fair way of allocating the risks
of error, uncertainty, and irregularity among those involved in the
encounter. The successful teaching-learning experience is one in
which this task is performed quickly and with a sense of selfassurance.
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This is not all that all law schools do all the time. All law
schools have faculty who have other teaching procedures and
modalities. All have courses and programs that depart from the
type described either in the direction of more lifelike clinical
involvement, or in the direction of inquiry and study more comparable to the style of scientific or theoretical research and scholarship. Some law schools have a faculty whose teaching duties are
sufficiently light that they are more or less free of the domination
of teaching over their vocational identity. Nevertheless, the conventional law school teaching process largely establishes the character of the law school as an institution. It determines what most
of the students do most of the time they are at work, and it fixes
their reward system. It also does the same thing for the faculty.
The Lawyer's Frame of Reference
Maintenance of this milieu has great practical utility, as the
ubiquitous employment of lawyers attests. Yet it also involves a
peculiar and limiting frame of reference. Concepts of relevancy in
the law are tailored to formulating and deciding problems in the
short range and in terms of the defined responsibilities that are
implicit in the way a "legal problem" confronts a lawyer: "Who
has to pay?" or "How can that be done most expeditiously?" The
verbal manipulation involved in legal analysis and the rhetorical
devices characteristic of legal argument often serve to distort or
obscure a problem, so as to make its resolution in a particular way
more apparently easy or palatable (or, conversely, impossible or
totally repugnant). Above all, it is assumed that the problems of
the law are to be confronted from the situation of the active
practitioner and within the severe time limits under which he
must work.
The lawyer's role of course varies according to what kind of
lawyer is being thought of in relation to the "legal problems"
under consideration: there are very many lawyer roles. The range
runs from small town practitioner to government functionary to
captain of industry and cabinet officer. Common to all concepts
of the role, however, is the element that the occupant of the role
has a responsibility for making a reasonable and practical recommendation for taking immediate action to dispose of a problem.
Putting the point differently, while problems of law are simultaneously problems of history, philosophy, politics, economics, social relations, and psychology, "legal problems" are "legal" by
virtue of the role outlook from which lawyers regard them.
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It is quite evident that "legal" problems can be looked at in
some other ways. They can be thought of as puzzles for social
science and philosophy, as indeed they are by the social scientists
and thinkers who decide to study them.
If the law schools are to analyze and investigate problems of
law in a way congenial to the methodology of social science, they
can most readily do so if the frame of reference in which these
problems are considered is more nearly like that of the social
scientist. But such a change in frame of reference cannot be made
at the expense of introducing confusion or conflict into the professional training process in which the law schools are principally
engaged. The question, then, is whether problems of law can be
thought of in some way that makes them at the same time "relevant" to the process of legal education and susceptible of investigation according to the tempo and methodological imperatives
inherent in science. The key to such a reconceptualization is to
recognize that "the law" in law school has to be approached from
the lawyer's role-viewpoint-but to consider whether that viewpoint can be redefined. The remainder of this essay suggests such
a redefinition.
Law as a Problem of Administration
A rule of law, or a set of rules of law such as "the law of
contracts," may be conceived of as the normative skeleton of an
administrative system designed to realize the goals and to recognize the constraints specified or implied in the rule. This is the
way an administrator would think of a rule of law that he is
charged with implementing. Such an outlook or frame of reference resembles the lawyer's as conventionally conceived, in being
result-oriented and entailing personal responsibility for making
decisions. At the same time, a "good" administrator is concerned
not merely with clarification and pronouncement of a rule and
conjectures about its effects; he is concerned comprehensively
with knowing and understanding the operation of the rule in its
context, its collateral effects, and the factors that facilitate or
impede its desired implementation. Of equal importance, he is
concerned with a rule's consequences considered in quantitative
terms and from a long range perspective. The dimensions of his
needs for knowledge, ideally, are as comprehensive and of as high
an order of precision as is permitted by available techniques for
acquiring knowledge.
A legal problem thought of as an administrative problem is
susceptible of analysis along something like the following lines:
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1. What are the goals that are explicitly or implicitly sought
to be realized through the rule or set of rules in question? What
are the constraints that have to be reckoned with?
2. What is the situation of various people involved with the
rule's operation in the context in question? Who are they, what
are their relations to each other, what are their perceptions and
expectations in the situation, what will they probably try to get
for themselves out of the transaction?
3. What material resources are available- money, who has
it, who wants it, how can it be used efficiently, can more be made
available somehow?
4. What are the ideals and ideologies that have to be taken
into account in working out a program? What constitutencies
have to be consulted or mollified?
5. What is the information flow among the participants,
including the flow of information to the legal tribunal or body
that may ultimately assess the situation?
6. What kinds of control and responsibility can be expected
to be exercised by various persons, or by anyone, in the situation?
This list is indicative rather than exhaustive, but may serve
to suggest the kind of thing that is involved. The questions presented are ones often asked about legal problems, but it seems
unconventional to ask all of them as a matter of standard inquiry.
To ask such questions is to reveal the administrative program
implicit in a rule of law, or at least to indicate what must be
known to discover what that program is or indeed whether there
is any such program. To answer them requires formulation of
theories about social relationships and the development of techniques of investigation that are comparable in generality and
susceptibility to quantification to the theories and techniques
that are the implements of social science. Both questions and
answers involve dimensions of scale, time, and immediate responsibility for taking action that are much broader than "law practice" as traditionally conceived from the work of the social scientist and theorist but which are inherent in the administrative
viewpoint I have tried to describe. Hence they provide an agenda
that could be vocationally and intellectually relevant to the concerns of both social scientists and legal professionals. Such studies as those of Albert Reiss concerning police field practices,4 Leon
'A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE

PUBLIC

(1971).
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Mayhew concerning enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, 5
Alfred Conard and his associates concerning automobile reparations,!. and Stewart Macauley concerning automobile dealermanufacturer relations'-to cite only illustrative instances-thus
appear with equal verisimilitude to be the professional work of a
social scientist and that of an analyst of the law's administration.
The discrepancies in aims, methods, and responsibilities
that have interfered with relationships between law and social
science seem, on this view of the matter, to be minimal or nonexistent. Whatever impediments remain to the integration of legal
analysis and social science and social theory are ones about the
nature of man and his response to legal governance.' Perhaps the
next step is to begin explication of those premises.
(1968).
Conard ed. 1964).
Macauley, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Larger Corporationand
Those who Deal with It: Automobile Manufacturers,Their Dealers, and the Legal System,
1L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

'AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (A.
7

1965 Wis. L. REV. 483.
'See, e.g., S. LwsE" & E. LADD, ACADEMICS, POLITICS AND THE 1972 ELECTION (1973);
S. LiPSET & E. LADD, PROFESSORS, UNIONS AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973); Lipset,

Academia and Politics in America, in IMAGINATION AND PRECISION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

211 (T. Nossiter ed. 1972).

STUDYING LAW AS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRINCIPLED
ACTION
By

GORDON A. CHRISTENSON*

The study of law may be viewed as the critical analysis of a
system of logically coherent rules governing action. In the United
States, the responsibility for legal education has traditionally
fallen upon the law schools. Within the legal profession and law
schools a restive spirit now prevails, seeking to further clarify the
meaning of that responsibility.' Two responses appear in the law
schools, for good or ill.
First, there is the search for worldly skills. Evidence of this
direction is found in the development of clinical methods and in
concrete attempts to use professionals and the practical world for
education outside the classroom. 2 It seeks to use the practical or
professional world for preparation. Second, almost simultaneously there appears to be a turning inward, away from the world
of action. This withdrawal may be described as the search for
intellectual strength in the world of value and introspection.'
I shall attempt to show that proper perspectives in both
directions are essential to preparation in law. Moving from an
appraisal of the clinical mode, I shall consider the problem of
ethical consciousness associated with action, noting why it is
important to ask whether principled action is possible. Such pos*Dean and Professor of Law, The American University Law School, Washington,
D.C.; B.S., J.D., University of Utah; S.J.D., The George Washington University.
'See, e.g., TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: 1971, 1971 AALS
PROCEEDINGS, Part One, Section II (P. Carrington ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as the
Carrington Reportl; H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 48,
161 (1972) thereinafter cited as PACKER & EHRLICH]. Thinking in these reports about the
goals of legal education is pragmatic. Some goals are quality and availability of legal
services, access to power, social mobility, freedom and humaneness for students, better
understanding between lawyers and other professionals, intellectual inquiry, vigorous rationality, and use of secular values.
2
ABA APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE §§ 302, 306
(1973). This expression of the so-called "apprenticeship method" has appeared in many
forms during the brief history of legal education in the United States. Its struggle with
"academic" law training and the Jeffersonian model introduced in 1779 at William and
Mary is traced in II A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 173-223
(1965).
'Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: ProfessionalTraining in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Lasswell & McDougal].
While the contemporary focus has shifted since Lasswell and McDougal introduced a
comprehensive value-oriented jurisprudence based on human dignity, the concern for
thinking reflectively about choices based on explicit criteria appears the same.
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sibility, I conclude, requires the successful integration of proper
worldly skills with the best of intellectual powers.
I.

PREPARING THE NEW GENERATION

Every society which wishes to survive must continuously prepare the new generation. In the term "new generation" I include
all those who will most likely affect our future, not only the
young. Preparation is an act of faith. It expresses a belief that we
can equip our children and those yet unborn with the ability both
to lead full lives and to cope with problems expected and unexpected. Preparation is the function of all education. The special
function of education in law is preparing new lawyers with skills
and intellectual traits essential for acting within limits. The notion of reasoned limits to public and private action is in my view
essential to survival. It is the duty of legal education to make such
a notion possible. The long term self-interest of all requires this
possibility, which I call the possibility of principled action.
I use the term "possibility" further to clarify responsibilities
of academic lawyers. It is important that we consider the widest
range of possibilities of action for the common good according to
principles of law. This assumes law's creativity in shaping alternatives and rejects the idea that there is any single ideology which
ought to govern all conduct. Just as there are many possibilities
so also are there many principles. Some of these are settled; others may change; still others are logically inconsistent. The process
of change must be open ended and yet imply limits to action.' We
need not be concerned here about the mechanics of that process,
but we are in debt to legal reasoning for the perfection of common
principles through experience, in light of dissent and conflicting
authority.
Survival without law as we know it is a competing possibility
in preparing the new generation. Some think that behavioralism, 5
secularism,' and the seldom articulated jurisprudence called neorealism (held by many contemporary American lawyers) have
already collapsed faith in the possibility that law schools can
'Cf. Stone-de Montpensier, The Compleat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1001 (1966).
Stone-de Montpensier argues that "the law is a calculus having a logic of its own." Id. at
1002.
'PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 33.
'Id. at 34. Packer and Ehrlich state, "We believe seculiarization to be the prime
intellectual cause of the contemporary malaise in legal education." Id. They draw their
views on secularism largely from Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical
Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
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prepare the new generation in a tradition of reasoned limits.7
While the necessary condition of survival requires order, it does
not require a legal system based on the social contract notions of
liberty and equality with their judicially imposed limits on public
and private power. Such traditional limits very simply could be
eliminated. The profession of law could be shorn of its independent claim to hold "justice itself in trust."' Legal education under
this alternative could mean, as some believe has happened already, training the new generation of lawyers to be technical servants of public and private power, not officers of the court committed to the common good. Rules might be applied, but in different
ways under control of different institutions, without the necessity
of an independent process.
Socialization of all legal services is also a distinct alternative,' retaining the possibility of principled action only to the
extent that the state itself would allow. We could easily forego an
independent legal system in favor of a bureaucratic one. More
likely, some legal services probably will continue to move toward
socialization, such as no-fault insurance, welfare administration,
trust administration, and tax services, while others remain independent. Some legal services programs, when administered by
government, may lose independence or risk suffering loss of funds
for offensive independent action.
Classical radicalism is yet another response. Traditionally, it
7
Foreword to CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL. OF THE FUTURE (E. Kitch ed.,
Univ. of Chicago Conf. Series No. 20, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Kitchi.
'CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMUND CAHN READER 251-52 (L. Cahn ed. 1962).
It was our profession . . .that conceived and developed the moral pattern
of the trustee, the man who acts devotedly on behalf of another and who is
so exempt from the esurient ways of his society that he avoids even the
possibility of conflict between his trust duties and his selfish interests ...
Moreover, since the lawyer must conduct himself worthily as an officer of the
court, he has another and more imposing fiduciary obligation: the profession
holds justice itself in trust. Rightly then the humblest lawyer may preen
himself whenever a court does honor to its function; and by the same token,
all instances of corruption are at his cost and to his shame. What a radical
standard to erect in this our acquisitive and Philistine society!
Id.
'Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 31 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
37, 45-46 (1947). Smith recognizes the possibility of socialization, but is opposed to it. See
ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES-1972 (M. Paulsen
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen]; Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Process
Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and State of Legal Paraprofessionalism,
71 CoIAuM. L. REV. 1153 (1971). Dean Paulsen and Professor Brickman share the concern
first articulated by Reginald Smith in 1947 for adequate delivery of legal services by
private sources rather than by the government.
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has sought to smash the legal order or dissolve it through physical
migration or spiritual withdrawal. Ironically, in explaining a different radicalism inherent in the profession of law, Edmund Cahn
wrote:
Not one of these radicalisms admits of the possibility that men may
be transformed without either destroying or leaving their society.
This possibility-the possibility that a man may continue to participate in his social order and nevertheless become transformed-all
of them exclude. And it is this possibility on which we lawyers stake
our professional lives!' 0

We know from what lawyers in fact do that they legislate,
govern, and judge, in addition to serving clients. They provide
public service as well as private. They represent both public and
private interests. They are participants in the international legal
system. While the forms of legal services may change, we begin
with the conservative assumption that we are not willing to survive without law. Accordingly, society must prepare the legal
profession to preserve the possibility of action and change according to principle.

II.

THE CLINICAL APPROACH TO PREPARATION

Recent experience with legal education's concern for the
practical world has not yet demonstrated why programs now
called clinical are an essential part of law study. It is not enough
that clinical legal education is helpful or transitional to practice
or even useful pedagogically. Why are clinical legal education
methods or programs essential?" What is it in them which credibly can support the claims of both students and law teachers that
clinical education is a necessary complement to the traditional
method?2

As Bellow points out, the term "clinical" is ambiguous and
impedes inquiry. 3 In the technical sense it means learning by
"'CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMUND CAHN READER, supra note 8, at 253-54.
"COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION

FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SECOND BIENNIAL

1971-1972 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLEPR]. In the President's Report, William Pincus states:
CLEPR ... has always had human development through education as its
primary concern. We have also insisted that the service setting is essential
for this kind of education. This is because human development ... requires
the assumption of professional responsibility.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
"?For a presentation of some of the factors leading to these claims, see Pincus, Legal
Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 27, 28, 3133 (1973) ICLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT is hereinafter cited as CELS].
"Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some PreliminaryReflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CELS, supra note 12, at 374, 375.
REPORT,
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students under professional supervision, handling real problems
in relationship with a real client for academic credit. As a strategy
for maximizing intrusion into a particular curriculum, 4 control
over the conditions of experimentation and development, 5 or the
impact of modest grant funds, 6 this limited definition is highly
effective. However, use of the service setting demands a more
satisfactory reason for being essential; it demands integration
with the best of the analytic methods.
A.

Legal Services of Higher Quality and Lower Cost?
One justification for clinical programs is that law schools are
partly responsible for providing a better quality of legal services
at moderate cost.' Let us call this the socioeconomic responsibility of law schools, since it merges the quality of legal education
with socioeconomic goals. This justification is questionable on
two bases. The first lies in its economic assumptions. The second
results from its failure to distinguish utilitarian judgments about
social needs for lawyers from the method applied for their
supply."
First, it is assumed that, if law schools developed and used
clinical programs properly, the supply of quality delivery systems, integrating paraprofessionals and professionals, would automatically create markets for the services provided. Presumably,
competition would ensure wider market penetration, better service, and lower cost. 9 It is postulated that students would accept
such a liberal view in their payment of tuition and course
enrollment.
It is also argued that efficient private law firms could create
a market for teams of clinically trained lawyers and paraprofessionals. However, if the price of service is to go down, the law
firms will themselves have to become machinelike bureaucracies
in order to achieve economies of scale, and efficiency by itself
"Brickman, CLEPR and Clinical Educaton: A Review and Analysis, in CELS, supra
note 12, at 56, 61.
'"See Pincus, supra note 12, at 30-31.
"See Brickman, supra note 14, at 60.
7
' Id. at 65-66.
'"Cf. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 3 (1955). Rawls distinguishes the utilitarian need for a rule from the method used to apply it.
"See Kitch, supra note 7, at 39; Brickman, supra note 9. But see Paulsen, supra note
9, at 57-61. Posner clarifies the cost analysis based on competition to suggest that litigation for the poor and middle class might be a good strategy if lawyers were plentiful enough
to drive the price of legal services very low. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 346-47
(1972).
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surely will neither benefit the average citizen nor serve the interests of the poor. An increase in quality without a public market
is not likely to reduce price or to spread the benefits of
competition."

Economic priorities, either at present or in the foreseeable
future, are not likely to create much residual market for legal
services offered through law school clinical programs. Nor is
placement of graduates in legal services programs dependent on
any law school clinical program, except, perhaps, as a means of
producing lawyers who will be satisfied with less income. An unlikely alternative might be for the public to fund law school clinics as separate institutions. Teaching hospitals have survived by
claiming a large portion of health care funds. Law school clinics,
however, are not likely to sustain the same support.
Second, law schools should not confuse the legal service need
or market with their proper concern for what law schools do, nor
should they be too eager to imitate the health care strategy. Although some arguments for clinical programs are still drawn from
the battered analogy to the health delivery system," the forms
and quality of that system are highly questionable and should not
be used as valid analogies. 2 The health delivery system is supported by clinical medical training centered in urban or suburban
hospitals. Quality health care is provided through equipment and
services which are elaborate, sophisticated, and thoroughly integrated. It is quality at a price. This centralization- may have
diverted health care from the poor and the communities by making its cost prohibitive and by making medical resources dependent on teams of specialists and technicians in hospitals away
from community needs. Even when care in selecting medical students seeks to maximize the distribution of community services,
"See generally Paulsen, supra note 9, at 16-49. Dean Paulsen explores the consequences of group legal services, prepaid insurance, and specialization, and the results of
experiments with some of these forms of legal service in Louisiana and other states. The
leading study on prepaid legal services, he states, concludes that "'in general, legal
insurance cannot achieve the economies of scale possible through group legal services.' "
Id. at 37. He also indicates that specialization as a result of group legal services may
"prove to be a cost, rather than a cost saver, for the general public" as well as result in
presenting dangers of "lawyers becoming too narrow." Id. at 46. See also Kitch, supra note
7, at 39.
2
Creger & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal Education,
in Kitch, supra note 7, at 77. Stoltz, Packer, and Ehrlich all indicate it is a bad analogy.
PACKER & EHRICH, supra note 1, at 39; Stoltz, Clinical Experience in American Legal
Education: Why Has It Failed?, in Kitch, supra note 7, at 54, 70.
11R. COOK, THE YEAR OF THE INTERN (1972).
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medical technicians and doctors tend to work in hospitals, not in
the communities. Some states have stopped building hospitals on
the grounds that they reflect the wrong priorities for health care,
are serving the wrong people, and are too costly. 3
In other words, the questions of public priorities have not
been thoroughly considered in the simplistic application of the
analogy. Wider sharing of health or legal care does not necessarily
result from clinical training. It may well lead to the opposite
result. The reaction of the treated against the treatment received
at teaching hospitals, where patients are mere teaching objects,
is only beginning to surface. Additionally, some medical interns
are seriously questioning the quality of an education that follows
medical technique and lacks humanity.24
Let me rephrase my skepticism in another way. It may be
that the most efficient way of disseminating good legal care would
be to simplify our legal system. To do that, very high quality,
sophisticated lawyers, obviously concerned with human needs,
will be required. If our premise is that the existing legal system
is becoming more complex, and if we train lawyers and paraprofessionals to help cope with the existing complexities more efficiently and humanely, then such a choice could well solidify and
reinforce existing ills of the status quo, preventing the change and
simplification of law. A new bureaucracy and constitutency is
thus created, perpetuated by convenience which soon gains
claims to necessity.
However, the permanence of technical rules is not so easily
accepted for the good of society. What happens if a change in
public policy or technology should require changes in the rules?
Assuming that a change occurs over the objections of those it will
displace, who would be responsible for their obsolesence? 5 Who
would employ them or pay to retrain them? The vested interest
of forces of these kinds is hard to measure, but I would assume
that it creates a very great inertial draw upon our ability to
" Herbert Denenberg, Commissioner of Insurance of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has stated that present priorities of urban hospitals-all of which seem to be trying
to provide a functionally comprehensive facility regardless of need-cost the public millions in duplicative and underused services. Interview between Dick Cavett and Herbert
Denenberg, Dec. 18, 1973, broadcast by the American Broadcasting Corporation.
4
R. CooK, supra note 22.
"5 R. M. Hutchins views theoretical legal education as the most practical for preparing
lawyers for leadership in a changing world and for avoiding obsolescence. Hutchins, The
University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF ToMORRow 5, 7 (D. Haber & J. Cohen eds.
1968).
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change or simplify the legal system or to spread its benefits. As
professional as the tax bar and the Internal Revenue Service are,
how resistant is the tax code to simplification? How resistant is
the general bar to the elimination of "liability" or the patent bar
to a tougher standard of patentability?
In the total process of legal education as I have defined it,
the socioeconomic considerations are important for the Congress,
the bar, the services industries, and all citizens. Law schools
should also be concerned with responding in quality, but they are
neither social service agencies" nor formulators of the future
directions of manpower supply and demand. Their essential function is limited to preparing future professionals to practice in and
cope with a changing world. All other functions are important,
but they are incidental and flow from different assumptions. In
addition, the secondary functions depend largely upon the kinds
of skills learned in the study of law in its primary formulation.
B.

A New Synthesis of Theory and Practice?
Clinical legal education requires a sounder relationship with
the world of affairs before it can be accepted as an integral and
valuable part of law school curricula. Langdell and his heirs, as
everyone likes to point out, introduced the case method to provide
a synthesis between the actual world of judicial decisionmaking
and the scholarly world of intellectual or scientific inquiry into
legal principles.27 The method replaced presentation of legal principles through the use of lectures such as Blackstone's
Commentaries. It was a revolution in legal education, and it still
has a profound effect and role. The radical empiricism of case
study is compelling." Since that time, numerous modifications of
the case method approach have been proposed, all designed to
reach a better synthesis. Notable are the contributions of the
realists and the Columbia law faculty of the twenties and thirties.
Lasswell and McDougal in the area of policy-science also attempted to link the disciplines of the social sciences with law in
29
a comprehensive methodology.
Advocates of clinical legal education also claim a new synthesis of the world of action with intellectual inquiry, within a
service context. 0 Some see it as stimulating the only new thought
2"Kitch, supra note 7, at 48.
2See generally Stoltz, supra note 21.
2Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928).
21Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 3.
"It may be that the experience with clinical legal education will lead us back to the
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on legal education in the 100 years since Langdell.' Current arguments in support of this claim seem to be grounded in the social
science of the neorealists. Neorealism, as interpreted by Kitch,
views "law not as a cultural, but as a behavioral phenomenon,
'32
best understood through the techniques of the social sciences.
Judicial opinions are viewed as rationalizations for decisions
grounded in service of clients and little related to the reasons set
forth. The practice of law is seen as the art of maximizing the
client's interests using a panoply of clinical skills called service.
With its material and practical origin, neorealism lends itself
to clinical legal education. Law students can plunge into the
heart of legal practice by representing a client with a "just cause"
(indigent, popular, or powerful clients all have just causes). Divorced from a client's cause, clinical education simply teaches a
technique of service which, if coupled with critical thought and
substance, may indeed be a most valuable aid in offsetting a
3
tendency for ethical arrogance. 1
However, with whatever interpretation, the new movements
in clinical methods are not yet sufficient for an adequate connection of substantive reasoning with the world of action. Whether
classroom. Professor Bellow seems to say that pressures placed upon the student for
resolution of client problems in the clinical experience tend to push intellectual inquiry
aside in favor of practical solutions requiring psychological insights. Bellow, supra note
13, at 390-91. The clinical attempt to turn the study of law away from a self-contained
discipline also may have the opposite effect. Professor Stoltz states:
Clinical experience seems to value practical experience over intellectual abstraction and its incorporation into the curriculum would push students
away from interdisciplinary efforts back into the profession, thus tending to
make the law more of a self-contained discipline.
Stoltz, supra note 21, at 68.
3
"CLEPR, supra note 11, at 7-8.
"Kitch, supra note 7, at 9.
"Id. at 11. Kitch comments that "Neo-Realism is receptive to the idea of clinical
education." Id.
mThe concentration of Bellow's clinical methodology on human relations skills follows
the ideas of Erikson, Watson, and Stone to their logical conclusion. See text accompanying
notes 36-43 infra. But in so doing, the clinical methodology risks becoming detached from
substance. Clinical methodology is capable of using the power of psychological manipulation with law as an instrument in the service of any client in the world of affairs. Thus,
the synthesis achieved through action may confirm the cynicism of the neorealists. Claims
for the clinical method as outlined by Bellow do not seem to agree with teaching the
personal integration of fact, idea, and value through action as described by Jerome Hall
in his integrative jurisprudence. The achievement of such an integration requires teaching
methods which give one the possibility of forming a world-view and therefore the possibility of participating in conscious (ethical) action in the world of affairs. This integration
requires a methodology comprised of many perspectives. Bellow, supra note 13; J. HALL,
FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
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in law school or in practice, techniques in service of selected cases
are always tied to service commitments. Emotional or ideological
involvement with causes of community action, defense of indigents, distribution of legal services, assaults on poverty, or environmental or consumer crusades may impede, not aid education.
If the main function is to learn skills of service, then clinics supporting causes of the wealthy are as valid as those for the
poor-and they may be better if they involve more complex issues. If social justice is the main object of the clinical method,
then its justification is not education but service itself.
Clinical programs select clients to whom students are assigned representation for educational value under supervision.
The process for such selection necessarily reflects ethical decisions inherent in professional judgments and independence. The
ability to appraise such causes independently requires an intellectual foundation in the values of the profession and the legal
system in which it operates. Skepticism still warns us that skill
in service of any absolute ideology is suspect. Technique without
a conscious ethical base for choice can trick us into thinking that
the righteousness of client or cause is justification enough. And
we are left, as scientists are with the bomb, with a process external to our own premises.
C.

A Means to Provide Psychological Insights?
Then by what criteria should a sound linkage to the world of
affairs be measured in law school? If they be human or psychological insights into interviewing, negotiating, and adversary skills,
how can the clinical method achieve those ends more efficiently
than vicarious methods or problem methods concerning ends and
means? If they be personal insights into the risks of action on
behalf of particular clients, how can risk be countenanced (if we
are to learn from mistakes) in the commitment to the client's best
interests? Will supervision open or narrow insight? Knowledge of
what the law is still determines the main ethical base of the
lawyer. Even if the law itself is instrumental in manipulation, as
we have been led to believe by the neorealists and behavioralists,
substantive analysis and choice are required. How does a claim
of civil disobedience, for example, differ from a claim of ideological superiority to the law?3" How can the clinical method provide
a practical way to handle such questions?
3

1See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE §§ 69-74 (1971). Ehrenzweig attempts to infuse substantive questions such as these with worldly insights from
psychology. Ir his preface, he states:
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In his psychological studies, Erikson points out that human
biological maturation now occurs 3 to 4 years earlier than a century ago, while the modern educational system delays role commitments until much later. In addition, during the expanded
time, the resolution of personal identity is accompanied by a
transformation and crystallization of ideology. Watson's and
Stone's works add to the understanding we are acquiring of this
period in which a novice becomes a professional. According to
Stone, legal education's generalist tradition attracts those who
are undecided about their career choices.36 Modern students tend
to seek a personal commitment which will lend significance and
integrity to persorial identity and will be compatible with their
professional identity. Thus, Stone and Watson both conclude
that, to the extent that an occupational choice is made in law
school, legal education is involved in the student's struggle to
resolve identity. 37 Legal education becomes both a psychological
and intellectual transition into the professional world.
Traditionally, this ritual of entry takes place in the classroom through the Socratic method. Psychological analysis of legal
education exposes the aggression underlying the Socratic method.
It also offers evidence that the ritual combat can be displaced to
the world of action. This ritual at its best channels hostility into
academic inquiry. 38 At its worst, it can be self-destructive or dissipate into games.
Clinical education programs can serve as vehicles to carry
this ritual combat into the world of indictment, trial, verdict, and
sentence. These programs, however, are moving toward behavioral technique and away from combat ritual. As a consequence,
we are seeing the main thrust of the clinical method heading
toward human relations role playing-into the protective custody
of the psychologists and away from the world of action. Some
professors have translated what might be called preventive psyIt is to [today's young] that I shall try to prove that if their trust in a better
world is to bear fruit, they must shun the mere replay of the age-old debate
and trade the shop-worn tools of the "Schools" for those of a modern psychology which, with the help of semantic self-control, will separate conscious
reason from much of the subconscious irratio of the past. It will be for others
to forge the new tools. What I have hoped to do is to offer a key to the
toolshed.
Id. at 11.
"Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 H~Av. L. REv. 392, 398-400 (1971).
7
Id. at 440; Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism:A ContinuingPsychiatric
Analysis, in CELS, supra note 24, at 141-42.
"Stone, supra note 36, at 406-18.
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chotherapy into professional human relations education, teaching
interviewing, counseling, mediating, and negotiating. Bellow has
recently made such a logical extension from clinical education to
methodology. Sacks pioneered the effort. 9 Bellow sees the critical
areas of the clinical method as:
1) the student's assumption and performance of a recognized role
within the legal system; 2) the teacher's reliance on this experience
as the focal point for intellectual inquiry and speculation; and 3) a
number of identifiable tensions which arise out of ordering the
teaching-learning process this way. 0

Clinical legal education seems to yield easily to psychology,
and this may indeed be its strongest contribution to date. However, the psychological dimensions of legal education must be
distinguished from the use of psychology as a technique in clinics.
Bellow's suggestion of the centrality of role playing in the clinical
method, representing psychological adjustment in the professional world, and his analysis of its instructional counterpart, are
admittedly limited. Stone outlines the psychological dangers of
clinical education: that extraordinarily complex and bad emotional entanglements can result; that no intellectual guidelines
exist for avoiding emotional involvement; and that the romantic
call to put aside professional limits and "plunge into the human
relationship" is irresistible." We are beginning to see how costly
in time and professional development are the psychological involvements of the clinics even with the best of academic supervision. While law school clinics handle real cases, students as yet
have neither incentives to assume nor defenses against the risks
of the practical world and the disastrous consequences that can
occur. We do not know whether the clinical method is the best
way to establish a professional relationship from a psychological
point of view. 2 We have faith that refinements of clinical experience will lead to the self-critical learning of interviewing, counselling, and negotiating skills-human relations skills-prior to
emotional involvement with clients and their problems.43 If this
"Sacks, Human-Relations Trainingfor Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL ED.
316 (1959).
'"Bellow, supra note 13, at 379.
"Stone, supra note 36, at 392, 433-34.
"The danger lies in the lack of faculty commitment to clinical education as a legitimate and valuable activity, for, as Stone warns, without such a commitment "students
will perceive clinical work as no more than a therapeutic outlet." Id. at 427.
"See, e.g., Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism:A ContinuingPsychiatric
Analysis, in CELS, supra note 12, at 139; Watson, Professionalizingthe Lawyer's Role as
Counselor: Risk-Taking for Rewards, 1969 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 17; Watson, The Quest

1974

PRINCIPLED ACTION

end is to be achieved, however, a secure world-view is necessary,
especially for lawyers.
III.

WORLD-VIEW

In 1923, Albert Schweitzer considered the relationship between ethical consciousness and what he termed a "worldview."44 Schweitzer pointed out that stoic and Eastern spiritual
influence initially placed ethical efforts above material progress
in our tradition. 5 Then, "man's ethical energy died away, while
the conquests achieved by his spirit in the material sphere increased by leaps and bounds."" Scientific, technical, and artistic
achievements were mistaken for civilization, with no ethical
base. 7 Thinking we were on "firm ground at last," we sank helpless in the stream of events. Schweitzer concluded that the glorification of practical common sense causes man to turn from ethical
consciousness to the hubristic exultation of boys tobagganing
down a hill, not thinking what the next hill or turn might bring.
A practical person may be under the influence of opinions and
emotions created by the facts of the moment.4 8
for ProfessionalCompetence: PsychologicalAspects of Legal Education,37 U. CIN. L. REv.
91 (1968).
"A. SCHWEITZER, THE DECAY AND THE RESTORATION OF CIVILIZATION (1923).
"Id. at 39-40. Stoicism in ancient Greek philosophy exercised spiritual influence, as
did Chinese, Indian, and Jewish civilizations in placing ethical efforts above those of the
material. The Renaissance combined action and ethics for a time.
$Old.
In this way our own age, having never taken the trouble to reflect, arrived
at the opinion that civilization consists primarily in scientific, technical and
artistic achievements, and that it can reach its goal without ethics, or, at any
rate, with a minimum of them.
Id. Stated another way, the fact that an achievement is possible implies a neutral ethical
posture which tends to permit "progress" even if it does not espouse it. This statement is
similar to neorealism in contemporary law. See Kitch, supra note 7, at 9.
"See Letter from Holmes to Laski, June 1, 1919, in HOLMES-LASKI LErEas 210 (M.

Howe ed. 1953). Holmes writes:
When the Europe and Asia man said Europe has given us the steam engine,
Asia every religion that ever commanded the reverence of mankind-I answered I bet on the steam engine. For the steam engine means science and
science is the root from which comes the flower of our thought. When I have
seen clever women who have read all their lives go off into enthusiasm over
some oriental, pseudo-oriental, or spiritualistic fad it has struck me that all
their reading seems to have given them no point of view-no praejudicia-or
preliminary bets as to the probability that the sign turn to the left will lead
to a cul de sac.
Holmes' "point of view" approaches Schweitzer's "world-view." Both affirm science and
the world.
"A. SCHWEITZER, supra note 44, at 42-43. Compare Kayne's case studies of the same
exaltation felt by some clinical law students in anticipation of going to court for the first
time and of the dangers of the clinical program when it fails to prepare students ade-
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Schweitzer attempted to reestablish an ethical basis by
proposing ethical constructs for our convictions and for the ideas
we seek to stamp on reality. A world-view is thus derived from
personal expression of ethical choice reflected in restraint on
power and control of material change.49 Reawakening of the ethical spirit begins with a feeling of horror at the alternative, for
"progress" without regard for ethical values is not civilization.
It is a tradition of restraint, conscious choice, requiring a
cultural conception of law:
[It is] supremacy of reason over the dispositions of men [so] that
they, and the nations which they form, will not use against one
another the power which the control of these forces gives them, and
thus plunge one another into a struggle for existence which
is far
5
more terrible than that between men in a state of nature. 0

It is by now trite to say that the normative conceptions of law
5
have not kept pace with the prolific creativity of modern science. '
The enlightenment, which broke the hold of the church over the
moral concerns of men, forced orphaned ethical energy to fuse
with secular pursuits.52 The resulting tension between scientific
skepticism and moral imperatives rocked the world in the 20th
century in an eruption of totalitarianism in both East and West.53
Tension between reason and religious will, which has a long hisquately. Kayne, Cases IllustratingEthical Problems, in CELS, supra note 12, at 114, 11925.
"A. SCHWErrZER, supra note 44, at 64.
5"Id. at 37.
"See Lasswell, International Lawyers and Scientists as Agents and Counter-Agents
of World Public Order, 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 366, 372 (1971). Lasswell contrasts
the traditional training of lawyers to passive client-servicing with the need for training
them to mold public policy actively, especially in cooperation with scientists. Cf. Letter
from Laski to Holmes, Aug. 7, 1917, in HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS, supra note 61, at 96. Laski
writes:
I am in accord with your remarks on progress. I think we are mistaking
material advance for spiritual enrichment. The number of people who contentedly believe that we grow better as the clock slips by is really appalling.
I suspect the fact is that unless you are willing to cultivate an intellectual
detachment you grow into that lazy optimism as an excuse for the facts. I
can see real progress in scientific achievement but though it's added to the
comfort of the world I doubt whether as yet it has directed the desires of men
and women into socially productive channels ....
Until we go beyond the
stomach stage of civilisation I think the less we talk about progress the
better.
Id.

d5See M. POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 57 (1966).
"M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 109 (1951). "Why

did the contradiction between

liberty and scepticism never plunge the ancient world into a totalitarian revolution, like
that of the twentieth century?" Id.
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tory,54 "has kept Western thought alive" and has presented us
with infinite creative possibilities.5 5 The powerful combination of
the creativity of modern science and the normative traditions of
law similarly gives us the possibility of controlling change and
facing the future without despair."
Michael Polanyi, a scientist and thinker of this century, and
Wilhelm Dilthey, an historical philosopher of the 19th century,
shared Schweitzer's concern for the reconciliation of outward action with inner knowledge and value. Polanyi sought integration
of liberty and the scientific ideal through an epistemology of personal or tacit knowledge.57 His world-view requires the affirmative
integration of subjective knowledge and outward experience
which occurs in purposeful action. The expression of knowledge
and experience in act contains tacitly much more than the act
seems to require; the "tacit dimension" is the basis for expression
of the particular in creative action which is conscious but does not
explain everything.58 Similarly, the art of a lawyer always seeks
a new level for resolving a dispute or handling a concrete problem.
This new level generally restates or distinguishes the principles
at odds, reconciling them in decision, suspending them by settlement, or changing them by legislation.
Wilhelm Dilthey expressed a related view in his philosophy
of historical understanding.5 9 A world-view requires a whole understanding of a person's inner and outward experience. For Dilthey, "the course of a life preserves the relation between the outer
and something inner, which is the meaning of that life ..
5

A.

For a discussion of the rational development of the irrational in jurisprudence, see

EHRENZWEIG, supra note 35, §§ 121-75.
55
M. POLANYI, supra note 53, at 109-10.

"Modern thought is a mixture of Christian
beliefs and Greek doubts. Christian beliefs and Greek doubts are logically incompatible
and the conflict between the two has kept Western thought alive and creative beyond
precedent." Id.
51See Lasswell, supra note 51. Lasswell is concerned with this union in terms of its
consequences for world public order. Cf. O.W. HOLMES, Learning and Science, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 138, 139 (1920). On the tradition of the law, Holmes said, "But

the present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity." Id.

I'M.

PoLANYi, supra note 54; M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958).

5Polyani's world-view approaches that of Holmes, who once wrote, "The postulate of
science is that everything can be explained-but with the view of man that I take, this
perfectly well may not be so." Letter from Holmes to Laski, Feb. 22, 1929, in HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 61, at 1134.
"'See H. TurrLE, WILHELM DILTHEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1969).
"PATTERN & MEANING IN HISTORY: THOUGHTS ON HISTORY AND SOCIETY-WILHELM
DILTHEY 91 (H. Rickman ed. 1962).
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The ability to recognize the objective validity of one's own experience provides the basis for understanding the experience of another in a different time and place. This "historical understanding" implies the possibility of action affecting others, consciously
tempered by restraint and reciprocity. Such insights permit a
healthy connection with the world through legal analysis of cases
or self-critical examination of one's handling of a legal problem.
During the first half of the 20th century, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset also presented a view of individual authenticity, but a view in the context of the masses and the rise of
totalitarianism. It was characterized by his statement that "I am
I and my circumstance."'" The relevance of this concept for legal
education at this time in the profession's history is troublesome,
for the profession seems to make peace with a world of totalitarian ideologies. Ortega proposed that "there are as many realities
as there are points of view. The point of view creates the panorama.""2 The ability to structure these points of view or perspectives, which Ortega calls "culture," consists of the use of abstract
thought, allowing one to stand outside his circumstance, turn
back, look at it, and reabsorb it in a different fashion, thereby
grasping one's circumstance in the concrete and enabling the
possibility of authentic action. The resulting relationship with
the world allows the possibility of ordering, illuminating, creating, and controlling circumstances. Through evaluating one's own
circumstance in the profession or study of law and gaining
perspective, a student similarly may acquire the possibility of
conscious and authentic action. Such a world-view could also be
used to introduce a form of populism to the profession, as indeed
the clinics within law schools seem to imply. Within limits and
spaces, as in legal forms of action or procedure, there is conscious
or ethical shape given to particular legal disputes in the circumstances of decision by participants who know their identities.
Through understanding of the art of the law, students can
participate in a possibility that they may act on principle in the
world of affairs on behalf of a client or a public or private interest.
As in the structures of science, 3 music, and myth, 4 law is both
"See J.

MARIAS, JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET: CIRCUMSTANCE AND VOCATION 361 (1970).
"Id. at 172. The philosopher Spinoza, who also constructed a philosophy viewing the
world as a whole, said, " '[I]t
is of the nature of mind to perceive things from a certain
timeless point of view.'" B. RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WEST 201 (1959). See Lasswell &
McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362 (1971).
63See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
"See C. LEVI-STRAuSS, THE RAw AND THE COOKED 26-32 (1969).
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cultural and creative, operating on various levels of thought and
emotion. As myth resolves cultural tensions, music also reconciles
intellectual form and emotion. The law closely resembles the cultural expression of these arts, for it also uses the powers of reason
with the emotions of injustice and fairness." It deals with pain,
hurt, killing, and vengeance. We may also make it dance, if our
world-view is as healthy as Holmes'-or Zorba's."1
Legal education may not easily retreat from a world-view or
be completely captured by its compromises. The possibility that
the new generation in the profession can be prepared for principled action requires such a healthy view of the world. We can now
see that neither traditional legal education nor the introduction
of clinical modes are sufficient in themselves-though they surely
may become so-to overcome the nihilism of neorealism in the
preparation of the new generation."
"5See Christenson, In Pursuit of the Art of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1972).
"Watson made the application of Zorba's world-view to law "that for ideas to be
communicated effectively they must be danced .... " Watson, Professionalizing the
Lawyer's Role as Counselor, supra note 43, at 21.
7
" M. POLANYI, Perils of Inconsistency, in THE LoGIc OF LIBERTY 93 (1951). In his essay
Polanyi explains how freedom of thought destroyed itself in Europe when the conception
of liberty was pursued to its ultimate conclusion-nihilism, a destructive psychological
world-view leading to totalitarianism. He concludes, suggesting images of my interpretation in part I of this essay:
The downfall of liberty which follows the success of these attacks [by
the nihilistic intelligentsia of Central and Eastern Europe on Wilson's appeal
to law and reason] demonstrates in hard facts . . . that freedom of thought
is rendered pointless and must disappear, where reason and morality are
deprived of their status as a force in their own right. When the judge in court
can no longer appeal to law and justice; when neither a witness, nor the
newspapers, nor even a scientist reporting on his experiments, can speak the
truth as he knows it; when in public life there is no moral principle commanding respect; when the revelations of religion and of art are denied any
substance; then there are no grounds left on which any individual may justly
make a stand against the rulers of the day. Such is the simple logic of
totalitarianism. A nihilistic regime will have to undertake the day-to-day
direction of all activities which are otherwise guided by the intellectual and
moral principles that nihilism declares null and void. Principles must be
replaced by the decrees of an all-embracing Party Line.
Id. at 107-08. He adds a thought that nihilism threatened to engulf ancient Greece when
brilliant young men adopted a philosophy of "smash-and-grab" which they got from the
pursuit of unfettered inquiry introduced to them by Socrates and his educational method.
As a reaction to this, Socrates was impeached and executed. Id. at 109.
Socrates had a world-view-he was a citizen of the world and had "virtue" in his
actions which the young nihilists had rejected by turning the Socratic method on itself.
Neorealism in modern law threatens the same for the brilliant young men and women of
the Socratic case method. A more adequate world-view, whether through clinical education or some other method, is essential to maintain the function of legal education I have
proposed-preparing the new generation to the possibility of principled action.
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INTELLECTUAL AND WORLDLY PERSPECTIVES

To complete my thesis that the function of legal education
requires the possibility of action based on principle, I shall propose two sets of perspectives. These are drawn mainly from my
interpretation at this point, but are hardly original. One introduces intellectual perspectives which are possible to learn; the
other suggests worldly perspectives which are possible to experience. Each set, however, must be seen from the other's point of
view. Together, they are whole. If my thesis is correct, both sets
are necessary to prepare the new generation for the possibility of
pri4.nied action in the law. If I have followed my own perspectives well enough-which is, of course, the most difficult task of
all-each perspective should strike a note of recognition in the
other.
A.

Intellectual Perspectives for Inquiry
The cultivation of skills of inquiry requires intellectual competence which becomes one with skills of practice or action. To
this end, there are a limited number of skills which law schools
ought to promote in preparing novice lawyers. The most basic of
these are (1) analysis, (2) criticism, (3) creativity, (4) artistry or
craft, (5) restraint, and (6) systematic comprehension. None of
these is new; each presumes action. No attempt to be allinclusive is required nor is any school of jurisprudence preferred
over any other.
Analytic skill is developed through objective and skeptical
reduction of facts and law into the simplest conceptual parts.
Most law schools take pride in this highly important process. To
state the question in context with the clearest and most economic
use of language is a skill essential to conscious decisions. Analysis
of legal relations permits the most aware introspection. Indeed,
analysis turned on itself can lead to paralysis of decision-as in
nihilism-or to triviality of decision. Skillful analysis does not
stand apart from context or from the action required. The chief
perspective of analysis is skepticism-doubting from many points
of view until the end of doubting is called up from other more
worldly depths and the action resulting is only that which is
consciously necessary according to principle.
Critical skill requires the appraisal or the evaluation of a
legal decision or process in relation to criteria which each person
identifies and clarifies explicitly. This intellectual skill is particularly necessary in avoiding the dangers of blind commitment to
action as a participant-for example, as an advocate or decision-
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maker. At some point it is essential to appraise an appellate
decision, a piece of legislation, a government action, or a position
in defense of a client according to external criteria. Is the decision
logically necessary? Is it sound? Is the legislation designed to
meet demonstrated need but no more? Is the defense believable
as well as logical? Does the action have intellectual integrity?
Does it hide emotion in verbalism either wittingly or unwittingly?
Is the reasoning internally consistent? Is the process comprehensive? This judgmental skill is among the most difficult to learn
and among the most valuable for principled action. Even if disagreement over this or that principle emerges, the capacity for
independent appraisal free from ideology or imposed criteria is
imperative in holding worldly action accountable to explicitly
defined standards. More often than not these standards are law,
and more likely basic or constitutional law. Critical thought also
implies the evaluation of the various alternatives for action.
Creative skill requires more than analysis or criticism. It
suggests synthesis, the construction of alternative modes of handling problems, the ability to foresee and ameliorate future problems of law and society, and ingenuity in inventing legal structures to advance the public good. Law schools, being of a skeptical mold, do not easily expose themselves to the risks of creativity. Lawyers cannot afford to be fancy in their client's interests.
The skill of creativity I refer to, though, is the nurturing of those
inner resources of ingenuity and the use of all relevant knowledge
and discipline in the solution of important legal problems. The
release of open ended, highly disciplined speculation in law
schools is one appropriate approach. The construction of alternative legal systems, with incentives and disincentives and a long
term view, might be another, for survival-organized society may
need to create alternative systems of property, criminal law,
wealth, family, organization, obligation, and liability. Creativity
in law also requires the focus of action. Many draft statutes or
private arrangements have been brilliant creations but have died
for want of roots in the world where they must survive. Legal
innovation requires a healthy respect for the world as well as a
spirit of venture. It also demands use of all the sciences and other
disciplines in the creative work of construction.
Legal artistry requires the conscious cultivation of worthy
intellectual traits, as well as flair. There are many of these traits.
They are unique to the intellectual tradition of law and find kind
reception in the practical world. Freund captures the most essen-
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tial of these: 8
a. Dialetic thinking about two conflicting principles
and the art of getting inside the conflict.
b. Contextual thinking which requires asking what
one means by a question.
c. Ethical thinking about the meaning of just expectations through concepts such as the law of contracts and
public policy.
d. Genetic thinking about how the law responds to
change in the modes of production and distribution,
labor, "progress," and negligence, and to the changing
patterns of life.
e. Associative thinking by metaphor and adaptive or
assimilative processes using concepts and legal fictions,
with the aim of categorizing ideal types in order to assimilate change and continuity.
f. Institutional thinking about the central position of
a procedural framework and the interrelation of ends
and means, such as in negotiating and drafting contracts, which can serve in illuminating international
disputes and constitution-making.
g. Self-critical thinking by abandoning the old in favor
of a fresh formulation, or by preferring change over continuity by a process of overruling, deciding whether to
continue the process of assimilation or to abandon precedent.
The skill of restraint is rooted in the tradition of law. It
contains the most valuable of the culture's human experiences.
It includes the notion of a reasoned limit, knowing where to draw
the line and how to limit the exercise of excessive public and
private power. The notions of liberty, due process, and criminal
and civil liability require fixing standards of conduct beyond
which the sanctions of law are brought to bear. The tradition of
restraint through standards set by reason and experience or
through legal process requires proportionality and balance, the
ability to limit action and response to necessity, the test of reasonableness in context. The skill of restraint is needed for preserving civil liberties, framing legislation, and maintaining the rule
of law. It pervades all substantive law. 9 The skill is essential for
11P. FREUND, The Law and the Schools, in ON LAW AND JUSTICE 108, 110-15 (1968).
1C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 182-88 (2d ed.
1963). "The criteria for determining whether law is right law are very general rules of
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all action which claims the practical effect of saying; "here is the
limit of your authority: and, hither shall you go, but no further."70
The skill of systematic comprehension is the means by which
we observe the doctrinal analysis of legal concepts and processes
as a coherent whole. This skill is aided by legal scholarship, saving the task of comprehension for the bulk of law school courses.
Comprehensive doctrinal analysis thus requires perspectives derived from systematic thinking. A professional should be able to
clarify assumptions and be capable of the coherent construction
of appropriate legal theories through which sustained action may
flow. Systematic legal thinking is necessary if the strategy of
action is not to lose its connection with the underlying principles
in the process of implementation. While all other intellectual
skills are elements of the comprehensive process, we are concerned at this point with the skill of comprehensive inquiry itself
as represented in the work of such major figures as Pound, Ross,
Bodenheimer, and Friedmann. The skill of agreeing or not with
the various works falls within the critical evaluation skill.
B.

Worldly Perspectives
The search for competence in the practical or professional
world implies a range of intellectual skills through which principled action is shaped. Worldly perspectives call for, rather than
shape, action. The law is usually passive and always requires
initiative or response. Competence in legal action, as much of this
essay has suggested, requires a healthy view of the world beyond
the clinical methodology. Holmes first pointed out that people are
willing to pay skilled professionals to employ the power of the
state on their behalf or to predict how it will be used against
them.' A large portion of legal education is implicitly concerned
with such professional competence. I have tried to show that
clinical approaches lead inevitably to the concern for a healthy
world-view, to the capacity to act according to principle in a
world which gives few favors.
procedure, and these rules of procedure do claim for themselves general validity in the
sense of the old natural law." Id. at 183.
"Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1782). This represents one of
the first attempts by an American judge, George Wythe, to enunciate the doctrine of
judicial review. Wythe held the first law professorship at William and Mary College and
followed the Jeffersonian academic tradition, providing theoretical lectures and moot
court arguments dealing with practical matters. See Letter from John Brown, a student
at William and Mary College, to William Preston, his uncle, July 6, 1780, in 9 WM. &
MARY COLLEGE Q. HIST. MAG. 79, 80 (ser. 1, 1900).
"O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
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The most effective worldly perspectives that may be offered
in law schools are skills derived from (1) vicarious participation,
(2) human relations and psychology, (3) clinical participation, (4)
observation of ethics, (5) specialization, and (6) observation of
functions of order, change, and justice. While these skills may all
be viewed as in the clinical mode, I have previously tried to show
why the traditional clinical approach is an insufficient response
to the concern for legal education's function.
The method of vicarious participation places a student in a
mock situation or role through which the experience imitates the
action of law without the risks. The vicarious approach to the
world of practice may be a simple classroom experience where all
students may see themselves on the other end of a Socratic dialogue. It may be a mock situation of trial or appellate practice.
It may be identifying with various roles which a professional will
fill, especially interviewing, negotiating, mediating, counselling,
and advocacy. In a controlled environment the forms of ritual
conflict can be analyzed and understood with minimum harm. In
the mock setting a student may come to understand the effectiveness of argument through withdrawal and reflection. Intellectual
skills, especially criticism, analysis, and craft, are a counter.point
to the vicarious method and necessary for full value of reflection.
Human relations skills and psychological competence provide an introduction to the complex world of human emotion.
Integration of personal identity with various professional roles
opens worldly skills well beyond advocacy or gaming or combat
by trial. By increasing role perceptions to interviewing, mediating, counselling, negotiating, persuading, cooperating, planning,
and arbitrating, the capacity for effectiveness of principled decision is greatly enlarged. The need for integration of a lawyer's
self-perception within the context of human interaction should be
introduced in law school. For the same reason, it is essential that
novice lawyers begin to learn early how to achieve personal security in dealing with human emotions professionally. Not only will
inner security increase professional confidence, it will surely reduce unintended hostility, eliminate unnecessary aggression, and
avoid needlessly provoking other strong emotional responses in
others. Much of the worldly skill of any great lawyer includes such
self-mastery. Human relations skills are an especially fruitful
product of clinical methodology, either through simulated or real
experience. They appear to be essential to a healthy professional
view of the world.
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Participation in traditional clinical action in which a student
handles an actual case for a client under professional supervision
gives limited practical experience. Being on the line or at risk, the
student is motivated to be particularly self-conscious. The intellectual skill of analysis finds use in the careful dissection of a
case, from the first interview to the final judgment. Criticism is
required for increasing professional performance, and criticism
frequently-and properly-takes place independently after the
experience has concluded. The experience can be an important
introduction to the practical world for some students. A worldly
connection is made which demonstrates how principles of law in
action are skillfully used. It may for some become the symbol of
entry to the professional world. For others, it may represent integrative jurisprudence in which law is action and action is a living
fusion of fact, idea, and value. For the broad function of legal
education, however, it is a world-view in embryo, for a student is
required to take a case, act on it consciously, and sustain and
defend that position at risk. The resulting understanding of action, risk, commitment, and responsibility is the beginning of a
healthy professional world-view.
The observation of ethical consciousness in actions planned
or taken is a worldly perspective requiring intellectual skills. It
is nonetheless reflective in that it requires understanding the consequences of actions and the meanings of practical choices. This
perspective is not a study of ethical rules except as the Code of
Professional Responsibility defines ethical professional conduct.
It is the process by which choices are illuminated. Consequently,
though its perspective is distinctly worldly, its function requires
the skills of analysis, criticism, and alternative thinking.
The substantive rules of law and specialization are worldly,
not intellectual matters. A professional competence requires
knowledge of the basic rules as well as the intellectual skills of
systematic comprehension, criticism, and conceptual analysis.
Until better ways are found, the extraction of rules from appellate
cases, the restatements, statutes, administrative actions, treatises, and other legal reference materials will be required. The
perspectives of the clinical and the case methods are similar,
which clarifies considerably the criticism of the former by proponents of the latter. The critics suggest that learning abstract rules
bears little relation to practice, while advocates of rules stress the
necessity of knowing the rules prior to entering practice. Both
methods need to rely on the intellectual skills of reasoning, evaluation, and comprehension. It would be foolish indeed and neither
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practical nor realistic to forego learning rules with the best intellectual skill available in favor of the purely clinical approach.
A functional or structural perspective is most often confused
with intellectual speculation about public policy, the role of law
in society, and political or economic theory. The perspective is in
fact worldly because it covers complex action based on structure
of order, change, and justice. The perspective seeks to work with
institutional relationships. The professional must not only work
within existing structures and science, but must conceive of the
possibility of change. He must understand the meaning of commitment to such action and how such commitment is sustained
with skill and integrity. Legislation, policy changes, treaty negotiations, rulemaking by the regulatory agencies, and the administration of the courts all require understanding of the processes
through which social interests are adjusted and values expressed.
Especially insightful is the practical reality of the process of claim
and response, of reciprocity, of action, and the intellectual tradition of restraint. In this perspective we also find the idea of sanctions or coercion brought to bear for the purpose of ordering or
changing legal relationships or for giving effect to the demands
of justice. Sanctions are the final exercise of power according to
law, and there are many types to be considered.7 2
Many individuals, groups, or institutions participate in the
process of legal education: law students and faculty (as individuals and groups); other students and faculty; administrators; trustees; the American Bar Association; the Association of American
Law Schools; other accrediting agencies; state governments; state
and local bar associations; law school admissions testing agencies; publishers of law books and suppliers of other educational
materials; research institutes; legal services agencies; law school
alumni; and the general public. While law faculties undoubtedly
represent the most powerful group among these participants, they
are subject to pressures of other participants affecting the study
of law.
I have attempted to show that a central function of legal
education is to promote the possibility of principled action in the
I'M. BARKUN, LAW WrTHoUT SANCTIONS 166 (1968). Barkun's conclusion returns us to
the beginning thesis that preparing the new generation in law is essential for survival:
Law provides a means for maintaining change 'withinhumanly acceptable
limits, for allowing innovation by increments while keeping the general
scheme of things within accustomed tracks-for perpetually altering the
status quo while perpetually preserving it.
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professional world. Since the main concern is that the new generation of lawyers avoid both the nihilism of pure act and the fantasies of cynical withdrawal, a healthy world-view must be sought
in law schools. Through both intellectual and worldly perspectives, I believe we can offer to the new generation the possibility
of action based on principle. The role of clinical education in this
process should be extended well beyond its practical origins. In
our journey, I think we shall be joined by our old familiar
travelling companions-the case method and scholarship. Refreshed by the journey, I think the new lawyers will find it possible to act for others in the common good according to principles
called law. It is not convenience but necessity which leads us to
this hopeful conclusion.

EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE BUCK STops HERE
By EDWARD J. KIONKA*
INTRODUCTION

American law schools and law teachers-which for most purposes are pretty much the same thing-are being charged these
days with an amazing variety of sins. Many of these are charges
which we have brought against ourselves, which is a healthy sign.
It is interesting to note, however, that it seems to be mainly our
brethren at the bar who maintain that we are deficient in educating our graduates in matters of professionalism and professional
responsibility.
In fact, not only has it been alleged that we are not doing
enough-it has been decreed that we shall do better. At its midyear meeting in January 1973, the American Bar Association
adopted a new set of Standardsfor the Approval of Law Schools,
substantially in the form recommended by the report of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. However, the
proposed Standards were amended on the floor of the House of
Delegates to provide that henceforth:
[All A.B.A. approved law schools] shall offer .

.

. and provide and

require for all student candidates for a professional degree, instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession.'

It is not yet known, of course, how much of such instruction is
enough, and what forms it may take. If anything other than nominal compliance is required, most law schools will have to undertake to increase substantially their activities in this respect.
The law schools' lack of enthusiasm for education in professional responsibility is not a recent development. Some 40 years
ago Professor Elliott Cheatham wrote:
The subject, What the Law Schools Can Do to Raise the Standards
of the Legal Profession, is not fashionable among law teachers. The
feelings of most of us toward it range from a high of mild interest to
a low of complete hostility. These attitudes find expression in the
*Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.S., 1960,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1972, University of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., 1973, Columbia University School of Law.
'AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS BY THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION § 302(a)(iii) (1973).
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slur the subject is beneath our notice, and again in the assertion it
2
is so important as to transcend our powers.

Other writers have echoed this observation. 3 Why is this so?
In part, ambivalence arises from the schizophrenic nature of
legal education itself. On the one hand, the law school sees itself
as a part of the whole academic enterprise of higher education.
In this sense, it disdains concern with matters relating to the
delivery of legal services; its academic mission is to pass on the
fundamental verities of the law and to lead the exploration of the
frontiers of legal knowledge. At the same time, however, the law
school also serves as the exclusive route to the bar. At least from
the standpoint of the overwhelming majority of law students, the
end product of the process of legal education must be a person
who is adequately prepared to don the professional mantle and
to assume responsibility for the legal health of others.4
Since 90 weeks are obviously insufficient time to prepare the
complete lawyer, the law schools compromise. The justifications
employed are persuasive: We cannot teach all the law, although
we do try to expose students to a great deal of it so that they will
be able to see a legal issue camouflaged in a haystack of raw facts.

We try to teach some of the necessary verbal and mental skills
so that they will know how to dissect a legal problem and how to
'Cheatham, What the Law Schools Can Do to Raise the Standards of the Legal
Profession, 7 AM. L. SCH. REv. 716 (1933).
'Bradway, Making Ethical Lawyers-Some Practical Proposals for Achieving the
Goal, 24 GEO. L.J. 345, 359-60 (1936); Elliott, What the Law Schools Can or Should Do,
in SErON HALL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 33-37 (1956); Fuller, What the
Law Schools Can Contributeto the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 189, 202-03 (1948);
Mathews, The Public Responsibilitiesof the Academic Law Teacher, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 97,
98-99 (1961); Starrs, Crossing a PedagogicalHellespont Via the Pervasive System, 17 J.
LEGAL ED. 365 (1965); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392, 39395 (1971); Thurman, A.A.L.S. PresidentialAddress, in 1962 AALS PROCEEDINGs 63, 66;
Watson, Some PsychologicalAspects of Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, 16 J. LEGAL
ED. 1 (1963); Weckstein, Training for Professionalism, 4 CONN. L. REv. 409 (1971-72).
'In 1970, out of 324,818 lawyers accounted for in the United States, 276,571 (85.1%)
were active in the private sector (practice or private employment). To this must be added
those government lawyers (city, state, and federal) who engage in the practice of law.
These figures are not separately available, but since there were 35,803 lawyers (11.1%)
listed as "legislative and executive" governmental employees and 5.2% of lawyers are
retired or inactive, even allowing for some overlap between the private and public sectors,
it would seem reasonable to assume that something over 90% of all lawyers are engaged
in the practice of law and must deal with professional responsibility issues. It is also
interesting to note that slightly less than half of all lawyers in private practice are sole
practitioners. AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 10-12 (1972).
See Smith, Is Education for ProfessionalResponsibility Possible?, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 509
(1968).
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be advocates, judges, arbiters, and advisers. When asked to summarize what we do, we say that we do not purport to teach our
students "the law," or how to practice law, but merely "how to
think like a lawyer." We teach what we hope is enough to provide
adequate fuel for such thought, and we hope that one learns to
practice law properly by practicing law.
What, then, of education about professionalism and professional responsibility? To say that the law schools as a whole have
officially ignored these subjects would be slightly overstating the
matter. Most have at least made available a course, a seminar,
or a few lectures. ' Occasionally, such things are discussed in law
courses.' Some schools have relied mainly on a presumption that
such education occurs through osmosis.7 As Felix Frankfurter
said, speaking of the Harvard Law School:
There weren't any courses on ethics, but the place was permeated by ethical presuppositions and assumptions and standards.
On the whole, to this day I am rather leery of explicit ethical instruction.'

But whatever a law school's program, most law students and
faculty can testify that the glowing generalities in law school
catalogues about the importance of the role and responsibilities
of the lawyer have rarely been translated in corresponding proportion into the daily life of curriculum and cocurricular programs. 9
'See L.

RESPONSIBILITY: A SURVEY OF CUR(1963).
On the basis of an analysis of the 1972 Directory of Law Teachers, it would appear
that not more than three-fourths of all A.A.L.S. member schools currently offer a course
on "the legal profession" (which is defined to include courses in law and public opinion,
legal education, legal ethics, preventive law, professional responsibility, and the lawyer
as negotiator). A.A.L.S., 1972 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 754-56. At about 72 of the 92
or so schools offering one or more such courses, the courses are taught by law teachers who
have been teaching them for five years or less.
Lamborn found that at 84 percent of the schools offering a course, it was required for
graduation. L. LAMBORN, supra at 4. However, a survey of current law school catalogues
indicates that today only a minority of schools have such a requirement.
Compare Cheatham, The Inculcation of ProfessionalStandards and the Functions of
the Lawyer, 21 TENN. L. REv. 812, 814-20 (1951) with EDUCATION INTHE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBITmES OF THE LAWYER (D. Weckstein ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as BOULDER
II].
LAMBORN, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL

RENT METHODS OF INSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS

'See L.

LAMBORN,

supra note 5.

'Malone, The Sine Qua Non of Legal Education, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 7, 10 (1959);
Thurman, supra note 3, at 63.
PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 19 (1960).
'Malone, supra note 7, at 10.

1H.

[So many of them [law review editors] in listing shortcomings of legal
education, which they were asked to do, referred in varying ways to the

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.

50

Yet our professional consciences continue to prod us to seek
a better answer. We sense that a real gap exists between what
we say a lawyer is in brochures and Law Day speeches and
what the curriculum says he is. The real question is, to what
extent can we justify the crowding or displacement of law materials in an already crowded curriculum in favor of materials on
professionalism?
Faced with these uncertainties, we have naturally resorted to
the time-honored devices used by groups in all civilized societies
when they do not know how to handle a problem-we have held
conferences and conducted surveys. Beginning in 191510 and culminating in 1962 with the most recent comprehensive survey by
the American Bar Foundation," we have tried to determine what
the law schools are actually doing." To the extent that these
surveys are mostly based upon reading law school catalogue descriptions, their validity is open to serious question. However,
even assuming them to be accurate, they reveal a wide variation
in the quantity and techniques of professional responsibility education. Significantly, despite years of experience and experimentation in these matters, there was widespread dissatisfaction with
the quantity and quality of efforts explicit and implicit in the
1962 A.B.F. survey.'" In general, these dissatisfactions stemmed
from doubts as to the relative effectiveness of any given method
or combination of methods of instruction, as illustrated in part
by their diversity and instability. In these surveys, as well as
other writings on this subject, there are frequent overtones of
uncertainty and frustration-uncertainty as to how and how
much, and frustration caused by the desire to have an effective
program without knowing how to do so."
failure of law schools to paint the broad picture of the legal profession.
Thurman, supra note 3, at 66. See also Weckstein, Boulder II: Why and How?, in BOULDER
II at 12; Cheatham, supra note 5, at 814-20; Kingsley, Teaching Professional Ethics and
Responsibilities: What the Law Schools Are Doing, 7 J. LEGAL ED. 84 (1954); Mathews,
supra note 3, at 97-100; Samad, The PervasiveApproach to TeachingProfessionalResponsibility, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. 100 (1965); Stevens, ProfessionalResponsibility-theRole of the
Law School and the Bar, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 203 (1953); Van Hecke, Education for Professional
Responsibility, 17 LA. L. REV. 513 (1957).
1Bond, PresentInstructionin Professional Ethics in Law Schools, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV.
40 (1915).
"L. LAMBORN, supra note 5.
21931 AALS HANDBOOK 97; 1934 AALS HANDBOOK 189; 1951 AALS PROCEEDINGS 167;
1958 AALS PROCEEDINGS 169; 1959 AALS PROCEEDINGS 98; 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy,
CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 21-45, 206-08
3 See generally L. LAMBORN, supra note
5.
4

(1953).

' See 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 21-45, 206-08; L.

LAMBORN,

supra note
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Unsure of where we are and where we ought to be going, we
have held scholarly conferences and published their proceedings. 5 The grandest of these were held at the University of Colorado in 1956 and 1968 and have come to be known as Boulder 116
and Boulder II' respectively. Boulder II represents the culmination of the resurgence of academic interest in this topic which
began with the reactivation of the A.A.L.S. Committee on Education for Professional Responsibility in 1955.18 In addition to these
conference reports and proceedings, which themselves virtually
exhaust the subject in all of its nuances, there are literally
hundreds of articles, books, and book reviews which offer all of
the various views and reviews one could imagine. 9 If the minds
of legal educators remain undeveloped on this subject, it is not
for lack of available nourishment.
Surely at this point in time, standing on the summit of this
mountain of information, we ought to have a clearer view than
ever before of the ways and means of professional responsibility
education. Yet all of us who labor in the vineyards of legal education can take judicial notice of the fact that our historic apathy
and uncertainty have persisted. To be sure, there are a few dedicated enthusiasts, mainly those who attend the conferences and
write the books and articles, but the sparks struck at Boulder
seemingly have not yet kindled a larger flame of interest among
the rank and file of legal educators.
5; Cheatham, supra note 5, at 814-20.
"In addition to BOULDER I and BOULDER II (see notes 16 and 17 infra and accompanying text), we have had the A.B.A.-A.A.L.S. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility (ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958));
the Asheville Conference of Law School Deans on Education for Professional Responsibility (PROCEEDINGS - THE ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY (H. Sacks ed. 1966)); the Seton Hall Conference on Profes-

sional Responsibility (1956); and the University of Chicago Conference on the Profession
of Law and Legal Education (1952); several interdisciplinary conferences (e.g., DAVIS,
EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1948); DeCapriles, A Report on the InterProfession Conference, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 175 (1948)); and several roundtables at A.A.L.S.
annual meetings (see, e.g., Symposium on Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. L. RaV.
409 (1971-72); A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Symposium, 33
TENN. L. REV. 129 (1966)).
"J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1959).
"BOULDER II. Many of the articles presented at the conference may, in addition, be
found in Symposium on Education in the ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Lawyer, 41
U. COLO. L. REv. 303 (1969).
"See 1956 AALS PROCEEDINGS 88; 1963 AALS PROCEEDINGS 144.
"The bibliography included in BOULDER H at 359-401, contains 347 items. This is the
most comprehensive and useful bibliography in this field, although it is not exhaustive.
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Why? Each of us, obviously, will have his own reasons. Professor Cheatham observed:
The wide indifference of law teachers to the subject has many
sources. The feeling comes in part from an objection to Pharisaism.
If the place of the teacher carried with it the title of exemplar, no
one of us would serve. But immaculateness is no more essential here
than is infallibility.
The indifference toward the field comes, in great part, from the
fact we gain more pleasure from the wholly intellectual puzzles than
we do from intricate problems containing broader and more difficult
elements. As a result, we have relegated to the unfashionable all
elements of a lawyer's equipment other than the intellectual, and
tradition and the pressure to conform have held most of us within
the limits of the fashionable.
Lastly, the feeling comes from the belief that law schools can
do nothing about it. Here, I think we have erred in emphasizing the
disadvantages of our position and minimizing the advantages. It is
true our students are mature and on many sides the moulds are set.
It is equally true they are new to law and have a professional motive
and drive that create new habits of study and of thought. We can
as easily direct them to an intelligent consideration of professional
standards as to the Rule in Shelley's Case."

No doubt his observations remain valid today. Perhaps the root
causes of our disinterest are more fundamental and include one
or more of the following:
(1)

An overly narrow view of the meaning of "pro-

fessional responsibility";
(2)
The absence of a conviction that education for
professional responsibility is a proper or necessary func-

tion of the law school;
(3)

Lack of information about teaching methods;

and

(4) Lack of motivation to become personally involved in education for professional responsibility.
Formidable as they may seem, however, these attitudinal

and informational gaps are not impossible to bridge. It is true, of
course, that necessity is the mother both of invention and motivation, and to the extent that more must be done in order to comply
with the A.B.A. Standards, it can and will be done. There are

other and better reasons for shaking off our historic apathy and
"Cheatham, supra note 2, at 718.
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making education for professional responsibility a full-fledged
member of the curricular family.
I. THE MEANING OF "PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY"
In the case of some law teachers, antipathy toward education
for professional responsibility is based in large part upon a misconception as to the meaning of that term. In their minds, "professional responsibility" is limited to the lawyer's duty to refrain
from the more flagrant violations of the Canons of Ethics and
conjures up an image of a wicked reprobate who has stolen his
client's funds or lied to the court. Since, obviously, the law school
cannot teach morality and save souls,21 that is the end of the
matter.
Of course, that is far too narrow a view. There are at least
four components of a lawyer's professional responsibility:"
1. The obligation of professional competence. It is fundamental that the lawyer must possess adequate knowledge, skills,
and self-discipline to undertake to deal with the legal rights of
others.2 : The nature of the lawyer's role requires that he speak for
others in a language they can only dimly understand. The laymen
whose legal rights the lawyer affects can judge his work product
only in a very general way, and often not until long after he has
acted. His adversary in a given matter, if any, is not likely to
point out mistakes or incompetence. In most cases, he sets his
own standards of performance, and he is answerable only to his
own conscience for the quality of his work.2"
2

'Chadbourn, High Ethical Standardsand ProfessionalIdeals-TheProblem of Inculcation at the Student Level, 51 THE BRIEF 17, 18 (1955); Thurman, supra note 3, at 66;
Wirtz, Training for Professional Competence and Responsibility, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 461
(1961). This argument is well refuted in Weckstein, supra note 9, at 14-18.
"Numerous articles discuss the meaning and scope of professional responsibility. See,
e.g., Countryman, The Scope of the Lawyer's ProfessionalResponsibility, 26 OHIO ST. L.J.
66 (1965); Craig, Ethical Responsibilities of the Individual Lawyer, 17 ARK. L. REv. 288
(1963); Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 375 (1954); Hurst, The Legal
Profession, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 967; McDougal, Education for ProfessionalResponsibility,
12 STUDENT LAWYE J. 6 (1966); Nutting, The Emerging Lawyer and Legal Education, 16
AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1966); Ringer, The Lawyer's Obligationto be Competent, 50 A.B.A.J.
235 (1964); Stason, Why a Profession?, 21 LA. L. REv. 153 (1960); Vanderbilt, The Five
Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients and the Public, 40 A.B.A.J. 31 (1954); Wade,
Public Responsibilities of the Learned Professions, 21 LA. L. Rv. 130 (1960). The text
represents this author's own distillation of their components. Also, see generally BOULDER
H; Currie, Reflections on the Course in the Legal Profession, 22 J. LEGAL ED. 48 (1969).
'See King, A Neglected Responsibility, in BOULDER I at 277.
"Watson, Canons as Guides to Action: Trustworthy or Treacherous, 33 TENN. L. REv.
162, 163 (1966).
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The law school can teach this aspect of professional responsibility, if at all, only indirectly. Perhaps it is instilled by the insistence upon high standards of performance in the classroom, in
writing assignments, and on examinations.25 Or perhaps it is
mostly the product of the character development which each student brings to law school, and is little influenced by anything in
the educational process."6 In any event, it may be useful for the
law teacher to bear in mind and profess the attitude that a selfimposed standard of competence is a necessary attribute of a
responsible professional.
2. The obligation to know and follow transactionalrules of
conduct. As most lawyers and law teachers should know, the
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics were
superseded in 1969 by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
now adopted in most states. 2 The new Code is similar to the old
Canons in that it consists mainly of rules governing the lawyer's
conduct in dealing with his clients, other lawyers, and the courts,
usually in the context of specific cases or matters which the lawyer has been retained to handle. For convenience, these will be
referred to as "transactional rules." It is these rules to which most
people refer when they use the term "legal ethics."28 Termed the
rules of "ethics and etiquette," in general they are limitations
on conduct arising out of the fiduciary aspects of the lawyer's role.
There would seem to be no reason why these transactional
rules cannot be taught to law students just as we teach any other
body of legal rules. In effect they are just that-a system of legal
nIn this respect, one wonders whether there has been a general decline in the quantity
and quality of student input into the education process, in spite of (or possibly in part
because of) the increased level of the paper qualifications of those recently admitted to
law schools. If so, what effect will this have upon the self-imposed standards of professional competence of the next generation of lawyers as a whole?
"In this respect, one wonders whether law school grades do not reflect, to an extent,
each student's own standards of professional performance. If so, are they not at least in
part a valid means of assessing a student's attainment of the necessary standards of
professional competence?
rSee Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of ProfessionalEthics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 136 (1966). A new Code of Judicial Conduct has now been
developed and its adoption is being urged. See Weckstein, Thode & Grossman, Round
Table Discussions on the Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785
(1972); ABA Unit Seeks Adoption of JudicialCode by States, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
Nov. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
'Chadbourn, supra note 21, at 19.
"See id.; Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 455
(1972).
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rules which happen to apply to lawyers themselves instead of
their clients. Indeed, they are just as teachable as "the Rule in
Shelley's Case."
While the substantive differences between the old Canons
and the new Code are not great, the Code's organization should
facilitate the teaching of these transactional rules. The Code consists of three parts: (1) nine "Canons," which are very broad, onesentence statements of general principles-e.g., "A lawyer should
assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession"; (2) a series of mandatory "Disciplinary Rules" under
each canon which set forth the minimum level of conduct below
which the lawyer cannot fall without being subject to discipline
(i.e., the professional rules of law); and (3) a series of "Ethical
Considerations" under each canon, higher norms which "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." 30 Thus, for the first
time, recognition is given to the dichotomy between the minimum level of acceptable conduct and the higher ideals which are
enforceable only by the conscience of the lawyer himself. The
Canons confused these, and the Code's distinction between the
two levels of rules should help to make education about the Code
more realistic and meaningful.
3. The obligation to understand and improve the legal
profession.31 Every freshman law student knows that he is an
apprentice member of an elite society-the legal profession. For
some, this is probably a significant motivating factor in their
decision to study law. Clearly, in order to function with maximum effectiveness as a member of this society, one must understand its functions, structure, and goals. What is the "bar"?
What distinguishes the legal profession from any other trade or
business? What are the benefits and burdens of membership in
this exclusive guild? What are the individual lawyer's responsibilities to the group? In other words, who are we?" These are
questions which every law student and lawyer confronts, and the
answers are not deducible by a priori reasoning.
Moreover, the legal profession as an institution is being sub"A.B.A., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).

"Curiously, this aspect of professional responsibility is often ignored in the literature.
But see Arthurs, The Study of the Legal Profession in the Law School, 8 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 183 (1970).
"See id.
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jected to strong pressures for change.3 3 Fee schedules are being
challenged. Group legal services for the poor have given a new
dimension to many legal disputes, and experiments in group legal
services for the middle class are being conducted. Both of these
drastically alter the traditional structures for the delivery of legal
services and will have far-reaching effects on the future practice
of law. Plans are being developed for the recognition and certification of practice specialties. The necessity and validity of bar
examinations are being questioned. Young lawyers are challenging the structure of the bar associations and, in some cases, creating new associations of their own which parallel the existing organizations but have conflicting positions on many issues.'
Most would agree that the lawyer has an obligation to participate in needed reforms of his profession, to promote constructive
change which is in the public interest, and to devote some of his
time to the work of the organized bar. But to do these things well
and in a lawyer-like fashion, the lawyer ought to understand his
profession's structure and history and have a sound working
knowledge of the facts underlying the issues which the profession
must resolve.
Again, as in the case of transactional rules of conduct, the
legal profession as an institution is a subject which surely lends
itself to law school instruction as well as any other.
4. The obligation to facilitatejustice for all. Lawyers, individually and collectively, are the trustees of our legal system. As
such, the burden is upon them to see that the system functions
with maximum efficiency and fairness. They have a duty to work
to achieve constructive law reform and to improve the administration of the courts and all other adjudicatory and legislative
institutions. As the guardians of the sacred principle of due process, they must see that adequate legal services are made available to the poor and the unpopular. 5 Their training and experi"See Weckstein, supra note 3, at 409-11; Weinstein, supra note 29, at 463-66.
"For example, the new Chicago Council of Lawyers, composed mainly of young
reform-minded lawyers, has grown rapidly in membership and has recently obtained a
seat in the A.B.A. House of Delegates, displacing a seat held by the Illinois State Bar
Association.
"See Wirtz, supra note 21, at 463:
A second illustrative question of "responsibility" has to do with the
supplying of representation to those who seek it. The Canons do little more
here than recognize a professional ideal of adequate representation to all
responsible interests. Nor is any absolute rule practical.
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ence are deemed especially good preparation for public service,
and with such expertise goes the duty to answer the call to public
leadership and public service as required.
It is doubtful that this aspect of professional responsibility
can be "taught" in any meaningful way by direct methods. 3 Law
students, especially those beyond their first year, are not receptive to sermons. Some believe that clinical programs may help to
instill these ideals,3 7 although opinions to the contrary are not
without weight. Those who elect to participate in such programs
are usually the students who are most public service oriented, and
it has been observed that the negative aspects of clinical work
with poor clients can have a backlash effect unless the student is
already strongly committed in principle before he undertakes
38
such work.
This is not to say, however, that public service responsibilities cannot be taught at all. For example, faculty attitudes which
support these principles can be expressed at appropriate times,
with the result that students will tend to emulate them. 31 Some
faculty will themselves participate in public service work, law
reform, and extensions of legal services, thereby reinforcing the
role model effect. Perhaps the mere existence of certain kinds of
clinical and minority group programs sponsored by the law school
will be perceived as an affirmation of the law school's commitment to these ideals.
II.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PROGRAM

It is not enough for a law faculty merely to be aware of the
full scope of the principles and ideals of professional responsibility. Nor is it sufficient if they also realize-as they surely
do-that most of their students will encounter professional responsibility problems frequently during their professional lives. If
"Clark, How Far Can Professional Competence and Responsibility Be Taught?, 13
J. LEGAL ED. 472, 477 (1961).

"7E.g., BOULDER II at 223-25; Sacks, Education for Professional Responsibility in the
Law Schools, in PROCEEDINGS, ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1966); Brickman, Contributions of Clinical Programs
to Trainingfor Professionalism,4 CONN. L. REv. 437 (1971-72). But see Simon, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Some CurriculumInnovations in Law Schools, 2 J. OF APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 219 (1966), in SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 573 (R. Simon ed. 1968).
"See generally BOULDER II at 223-68 for articles discussing the pros and cons of clinical
education as a vehicle for education for professional responsibility.
"See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
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a law school is to have a meaningful professional responsibility
program, the faculty must be committed to the idea that law

school is the necessary and proper forum for professional responsibility education. Of course everyone agrees that lawyers ought to
be ethical. We are all for virtue and against sin. In the minds of
many legal educators, professional responsibility issues are not
legal issues but practice-related issues, and therefore are not
within the scope of law school legal education. There is an attitude that law schools should teach law and leave matters of ethics
and morality to the bar, the church, individual conscience, or
others.40

What then are the justifications for allocating more than
nominal resources to the teaching of professional responsibility?
A.

Professionalism

No matter what else we may think a law school ought to be,
the fact is that it is primarily and fundamentally a professional
school. For the overwhelming majority of its graduates, its principal function is to prepare them to enter the legal profession.4'
Therefore, we cannot ignore professional responsibility matters
by use of the fiction that we merely teach law and award law
degrees, claiming indifference to the use which is made of those
degrees following graduation:
We are educating students to be lawyers-not law students. As
a result, it is the legal profession and the public-rather than the
law schools-which suffer if there is a deficiency in education for the
law. 2

Once we admit that certain components of professional responsibility can be the subject of law school instruction, we must
determine the nature and extent of the law school's obligation to
the profession it serves. If we take this obligation seriously, as we
must, is it not fatuous for us to teach extensively the rules of law
and the skills necessary for manipulating them while at the same
time virtually ignoring the professional milieu in which the lawyer must work? Justice Stone, at the dedication of the University
of Michigan Law Quadrangle, stated:
From the beginning the law schools have steadily raised their intellectual standards. It is not too much to say that they have worshipped the proficiency which they have sought and attained to a
"See Chadbourn, supra note 21.
"See note 4 supra.
"2Malone, supra note 7, at 11.
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remarkable degree. But there is grave danger to the public if this
proficiency be directed wholly to private ends without thought of the
social consequences, and we may well pause to consider whether the
professional school has done well to neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the social responsibility which rests
upon a public profession. . . . I have no thought that men are made
moral by mere formulations of rules of conduct. . . . But men serve
causes because of their devotion to them. . . . It is not beyond the
power of institutions which have so successfully mastered the art of
penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to impart a truer
understanding of the functions of those who are to be its servants."

It is difficult to understand the attitude of those legal educators who seem to feel that to teach about professionalism in law
school is somehow undignified or ignoble. Rather, the opposite is
true. Pervasion of the curriculum with concepts of professionalism enhances the status of the law school by emphasizing the
distinctions between it and other schools which merely prepare
students for entry into a trade or business.
B.

Ethics and Substantive Law
Pervasive consideration of many ethical problems in certain
courses can be an important adjunct to the learning of the law.
Some substantive and procedural rules cannot be fully understood or critically analyzed without a simultaneous consideration
of the ethical context in which the lawyer is operating. A student
cannot be taught to "think like a lawyer" without some appreciation for all of the elements which may affect the solution of a
given legal problem."
C.

Ethics and Law Reform
Sometimes rules or subsystems of law in actual operation,
particularly in an adversary context, give rise to ethical problems
which in turn may be part of the justification for law reform."5 For
example, many of the reasons advanced for the adoption of "nofault" automobile insurance plans are premised upon the alleged
existence of widespread violations of professional ethics inherent
in the present tort system." Conversely, proposals for law reform
which appear sound from the standpoint of the law alone may
have deleterious ethical side effects which should lessen the desirThe Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1934).
"Weinstein, supra note 29, at 461-63.
"Id. at 466-67.
"See J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE
(1971).
43Stone,
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ability of that particular plan and stimulate the search for a
better alternative. Certain law reforms, such as facilitating the
access of poorer citizens to legal remedies, are presently being
advanced in furtherance of the public responsibilities of the
profession.47
Thus, proposals for law reform often cannot be understood or
evaluated without full consideration of the ethical, as well as the
legal, effects of the present or proposed law.
D.

Law School as a Socializing Process
Whether we intend it to or not, the entire law school experience serves as the primary socializing influence upon law students." It is natural for law students, most of whom have had no
opportunity to learn about the legal profession from personal experience, to view the law school as a model, at least in terms of
the issues and attitudes which are important to the profession. In
other words, law students come to law school expecting it to
transform them from laymen into lawyers. They expect socialization as well as law. Thus, if they see professional responsibility
issues as unimportant to the law school, they may tend to adopt
the same attitude. 9 If we wish our students to believe that professional responsibility issues are significant in their professional
lives, we must address these issues at some time in the curriculum. Occasional exhortations to "do good" are not enough, and
may actually be worse than useless if students see such statements as hypocritical.
E.

The Necessity of FormalProfessionalResponsibilityInstruction
There are those who suggest that today's law graduates,
being bright and eager, can use a "common sense" approach to
matters of professional responsibility. However, upon even minimal reflection, it ought to be obvious that an intuitive approach
to resolving problems of professional responsibility is totally
inadequate.
Clearly, many legal ethics issues are not self-evident, and
many ethical problems and conflicts cannot be resolved optimally
"Examples might include the creation of special small claims courts and procedures
by which persons may proceed without the need for attorneys, and proposals for "no-fault,
do-it-yourself" divorces.
"Malone, The Lawyer and His Professional Responsibilities,17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
191, 197 (1960).
"See notes 68 and 69 infra and accompanying text.
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without some prior training or experience in wrestling with such
issues. For example, would it be self-evident to a young lawyer
that he should not make direct contact with an opposing party
who is represented by counsel? Or would he know how to go about
resolving the dilemma presented by the client who has relevant
evidence which the law requires to be disclosed to the court or to
opposing counsel, but which the client instructs the lawyer to
conceal? Indeed, the same justification exists for teaching professional responsibility as for teaching any other course in law
school.5 0 It prepares one to recognize the issues inherent in a set
of undifferentiated facts and gives one some practice in solving
problems in a hypothetical context. Perhaps the justification for
studying professional responsibility per se is stronger than for
studying any other single subject because of the pervasiveness of
professional responsibility problems throughout all areas of the
law.
F. If Not During Law School, When?
Given the fact that most law graduates enter professional
roles, and the fact that members of the legal profession, of necessity, must learn to deal with professional responsibility issues,
when should this learning take place-during law school or after?
In the law school setting, professional responsibility can be examined systematically and objectively."' Various alternative solutions to professional responsibility problems can be studied and
tested rationally and without the built-in biases, pressures, or
conflicts of interest which the assumption of a particular occupational role may induce. A variety of relevant source materials can
be brought to the student's attention while professorial guidance
52
is still available.
IlI.

ALTERNATIVES TO A PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM

What are the alternatives to learning systematically about
professional responsibility in law school?
One possibility would be to leave these matters largely to
self-education in practice. For several reasons this is a rather
naive and unrealistic approach. Is it not unreasonable to assume
that a practicing lawyer will voluntarily undertake to research
professional responsibility issues which he encounters in his dayWatson, supra note 24.
JId.
"See BOULDER II at 359-401, which includes a list of most of the available course
materials.
5
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to-day work (not to mention those he does not even recognize)?
The extremely tight schedules of most lawyers in practice, coupled with the unlikelihood of an immediate external reward or
punishment for right or wrong answers, produce strong disincentives to adequate learning." If only the most flagrant misconduct
is customarily punished, since by definition the wrongful act
must be gross and obvious, there is little reason to undertake
independent study. This is equally true of obligations to clients,
other lawyers, the courts, the profession, and the public. As we
have seen before, a "common sense" approach to these issues is
patently inadequate because the issues themselves are not, in
most cases, self-revealing. Even if the issue is discoverable, the
best answer is not necessarily obtainable by common sense reasoning. In addition, the nature of professional responsibility obligations is such that often there is no adversary likely to call
attention to violations, and the client is not likely to be willing
to pay for his lawyer's self-education on issues of professional
responsibility.
Given the current status of lawyer disciplinary processes
(which, however, are improving), a mere reading of reports of
disbarments and suspensions is not likely to provide an adequate
education as to the full scope and extent of the lawyer's ethical
obligations. 51 Certainly in this area experience is not the best
teacher-if the lawyer goes so far as to incur the wrath of the
disciplinary process, its terrible swift sword need fall only once,
after which the ex-lawyer need no longer concern himself with
professional responsibility matters at all.
Some have suggested that professional responsibility be
taught in preparation for the bar examination. The inadequacy
of this approach is also obvious. Professional responsibility obligations will be studied then, if at all, only in a perfunctory way,
and study will be limited to the transactional rules. The amount
sBradway, supra note 3, at 352.
"See Wirtz, supra note 21, at 462:
The current law of disbarment indicates with disheartening clarity that
the profession is today so constituted as to be unable or at least unwilling to
purge the "shyster" from its ranks. Others have suggested that so far as
teaching law students legal ethics is concerned a few good disbarments would
do the job nicely.
See also 0. PHmLPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 207-08; Pirsig, A Traditional Course
in Professional Responsibility, in BOULDER IH at 75, 83-84. But cf. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966).
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of study will be limited by its goal, which is to pass the one
question on the bar examination dealing with legal ethics.5
What about bar association and continuing legal education
programs or publications? These are unlikely to do an adequate
job as they reach only a small minority of the bar, most of whom
are among those least in need of such education. Practicing lawyers tend to become cynical about ethics problems and are more
likely than law students to view such instruction as "preaching"
and tune out."6 Publications can be freely ignored, especially
those parts which cover unfamiliar ground or which deal with
matters having no immediate economic impact on the lawyer's
current affairs. Moreover, the professional responsibility content
of continuing legal education programs has been miniscule. 7 Programs dealing solely with professional responsibility issues are
noteworthy both for their scarcity and for the fact that lawyers
have stayed away from them in droves.58
In spite of admonitions to include more professional responsibility material pervasively throughout continuing legal education
courses, 5 the amount of such material actually taught has been
pitifully small.
Attempts to educate practicing lawyers on matters of professional responsibility may thus be characterized as too little too
late. 1
IV.

A PROGRAM FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION

A major reason-probably the most important reason-for
the overall inadequacy of law school instruction in professional
responsibility is that most law schools have neither a master plan
for incorporating such material into the curricular and cocurricular program of the school, nor a person responsible for
5'0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoy, supra note 12, at 30-33, 39; Bradway, supra note 3, at 353.

'See Watson, supra note 24, at 165.

"See BOULDER II at 313-24.
'See id. at 53, 313-24. One course with which the author is familiar was scheduled as
a part of the Chicago Bar Association Continuing Legal Education Program. It had to be
cancelled when, a few days before the scheduled date, there were only six registrants-four
of whom were from the law office of one of the speakers.
"See BOULDER II at 313-24; A.B.A.-A.L.I. Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, Broadeningof ContinuingLegal Education Urged by Second Arden House Conference, 50 A.B.A.J. 136 (1964); Mathews, Book Review, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 535 (1961).
"See Weckstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics-Evaluated,
33 TENN. L. REv. 176-77 (1966); Mathews, Foreword to J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PuBuc RESPONSIBILITY at 3 (1959).
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preparing or implementing such a plan. What is everyone's business is no one's. By definition, law teachers are concerned about
the law. Those things which do not press themselves upon the
consciousness are of necessity ignored, and most law teachers
have little reason to think about professional responsibility issues. Law teachers share concerns about law with practicing lawyers, but rarely deal with issues of professionalism.
Much has been written about the various methods of bringing professional responsibility materials into the law schoolpervasive infusion into law and perspective courses, a course on
the legal profession, lectures and other cocurricular programs,
and clinical programs. 1 Most agree that some sort of mix of
these methods is best..2
The real problem is to translate these ideas into action and
to coordinate the presentation of these materials in order to insure comprehensiveness without waste or duplication. To do this
the law school needs to have one person to plan and oversee the
entire professional responsibility program of the school-a
"guardian ad educatum." The "guardian's" professional responsibility education duties would include the following:
(1) To make a study of the abundant literature on
the subject of professional responsibility education and
to develop a master plan for a comprehensive program
of such education at that school. History teaches that
no one method has been found to be superior to any
other. There is still room for experimentation, and each
faculty will have its own ideas as to the techniques it
considers to be most appropriate. At the same time, the
literature bears witness to a great deal of experience,
which every faculty should consider.
(2) To present the plan to the faculty, obtain their
input, make revisions, and secure endorsement of the
final plan; and
(3) To oversee the implementation of the total plan
and its component parts.
One especially important function which this person can perform is to educate and raise the consciousness of the other mem6

See generally BouLDER II, and especially the bibliography at 359-401.
"See generally BOULDER HI, and especially Weckstein, A CoordinatedApproach, in
BOULDER H at 188.
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bers of the faculty in order to expand the use of the pervasive
method and to increase the instances of faculty-student communication on these issues. 3 He might arrange a short faculty conference on education for professional responsibility to discuss possible assigned readings and to coordinate by agreement the responsibilities of various teachers for pervasive coverage of the
widest possible range of substantive professional responsibility
problems. A side benefit of this faculty involvement would be an
increased faculty awareness of the role of the law teacher as an
attitude model.
This "guardian" should have ongoing responsibility for a periodic review of the school's professional responsibility program
to determine its success and defects. Periodic testing of students
to find out if they have learned this material and if their attitudes
have changed might be included.
In most schools, the program will include a course or seminar
devoted entirely to professional responsibility. Many (but by no
means all) law schools now offer such courses," but, in general,
they have been less than a total success. Difficulties include lack
of student motivation, less-than-complete teacher credibility,
and less-than-adequate quality and coverage. 5 Most writers have
concluded that the quality and value of such a course is directly
proportional to the teacher's enthusiasm for the subject.6 It
should come as no surprise to learn that those who have been
dragged, kicking and screaming, into the classroom to teach this
course have usually had less than satisfactory results. Conversely,
those teachers who have a missionary zeal for the subject do not
have problems with student motivation, course quality, and the
like.
It is not difficult to understand why most regular members
of the full-time teaching faculty are less than excited about teaching this course. It takes only a short period of experience in law
teaching to discover that most of the awards honoris causa, and
the fringe benefits that go with them, are handed out to those who
excel in teaching and writing about law. In the long run, time
6

See Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale--"The Vanderbilt
Experiment," 15 J. LEGAL ED. 435 (1963).
"See note 5 supra.
"See BOULDER II at 39-111; L. LAMBORN, supra note 5.
"See, e.g., Thoron, A Course in the Dynamics of Professional Responsibility, in
BOULDER II at 88.
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spent on this course is likely to be counterproductive in terms of
one's teaching career.
There are, however, two groups of potential professional responsibility teachers who may well be enthusiastic about the
task. One likely candidate would be a practicing lawyer from the
community in which the law school is located. Many lawyers-especially graduates of the school in question-secretly
carry chalk in their briefcases. The glory of teaching one course
at old alma mater or a sister law school is a powerful form of
psychic income. Among these lawyers are a few who have excellent academic records and very good classroom demeanor, and
are sufficiently conscientious and dependable to teach a first-rate
course with proper guidance. Surely it would not be difficult to
find one or more qualified lawyers with high professional standards and a real concern about professional responsibility issues.
The use of an adjunct faculty member for this course has
several advantages. First, it is not a drain on the work and resources of the existing faculty. Second, it is less expensive to the
law school. The services of a practicing lawyer can be obtained
for far less than the total cost of half the teaching time of a regular
member of the faculty. Third, the course could be offered more
frequently-every semester or quarter and perhaps even in the
summer-enabling it to reach a larger number of students and
thus underlining its importance. (If the course is to be required
for graduation, such additional offerings will usually be necessary.) Fourth, it eliminates the credibility gap which may exist
if the course is taught by a regular member of the faculty." The
practicing lawyer can draw upon his immediate experience for
course material, making it more real and alive, something the law
professor usually cannot do. Fifth, students will perceive that at
least some segments of the bar are concerned about professional
responsibility problems; in other words, the lawyer will serve as
a positive role model.
On the negative side, the problem with using adjunct faculty
for this or any other course is that practicing lawyers sometimes
have a tendency to be out of touch with the school's educational
goals, and may not understand what needs to be done to develop
the course as it ought to be. This is where a second potential
instructor comes in.
"7See Mathews, A Problem Approach, in BOULDER H at 70-71; Starrs, supra note 3.
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The various deans in the law school-"The Dean," and the
associate and assistant deans-often wish to have some teaching
function but may not have the time or inclination to develop a
particular substantive course. One or more of them may have a
special interest in professional responsibility matters, particularly because deans often are brought into direct contact with bar
associations, judges, bar admission committees, and others who
sometimes ask embarrassing questions about professional responsibility training in the law school. Indeed, many legal educators
will intuitively deem professional responsibility matters most
appropriate for decanal concern.
If there is a dean ready, willing, and able to do so, why not
have the professional responsibility course team-taught by him or
her and the practicing lawyer described above? Such dean might
also be the logical person to be chosen as the law school's professional responsibility coordinator. In this way, the practicing lawyer would provide the expertise, realism, enthusiasm, and most
of the work for the course, while the dean would insure that the
course approach and coverage were appropriate to the law
school's overall program. Thus, the course would be assured of
having both the necessary academic and practical components.
Of course, the academic member of the teaching team need
not be a dean if there is another member of the faculty interested
in this subject. The use of the team-teaching device with the
primary burden of the course resting on the practicing lawyer
would enable an interested member of the regular faculty to participate with a relatively minor expenditure of his own time, making the course much more attractive to a law teacher with an
interest in the subject.
The team-teaching concept has been used successfully in
other subjects where instructors with different backgrounds each
make a unique contribution to the course by virtue of their own
special experience and expertise. The nature of education for professional responsibility is such that it is particularly appropriate
for the team-teaching device.
CONCLUSION

Law schools traditionally have faced outward to the profession as well as inward toward the academy. Today it is more
important than ever that this dual stance be maintained. As legal
institutions and the profession itself face new challenges and
demands, tomorrow's lawyers must be especially well prepared to
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respond affirmatively and effectively to the changing needs of the
consumers of legal services. Lawyers must understand who they
are and what the traditional responsibilities of their profession
have been, before they can make intelligent decisions on these
issues, both for the present and the future. The law school can
and must educate them about professionalism, for all other
means of such education are inadequate.
There are many ways to accomplish this education. Some
have been mentioned in passing here, and these and others are
extensively discussed in the literature. However, professional responsibility education at each law school will be no better than
the personal and corporate commitment of the faculty to such a
program. In particular, law teachers must be sensitive to their
role as model lawyers. 8 By hiring a teacher and placing him in
front of a classroom, the law school implicitly represents that he
is at least an acceptable prototype of a lawyer. It is true, of course,
that law teachers try to instill an independence of thought in their
students. But we cannot escape the fact that the minds of law
students are blank slates so far as the issues of professionalism
are concerned. Our attitudes will tend to become their attitudes,
and the greatest danger is that we will communicate too little."
To ignore professional responsibility is to say to the student that
it is not a real professional problem, or that the issues are so basic
that they are self-evident. Neither is true:
The role of the law teacher as a psychological conveyer of attitudes also appears to be of crucial importance. Students new to a
field are generally impressionable with reference to the facts and the
views of that field. The attitudinal overtones which an instructor
reflects or deliberately asserts in his elucidation of methods and
points of law provide cues to the student in how to value the methods and findings that are the primary substance of learning. A cynical or disinterested instructor can make his attitude felt and important to a student just developing an orientation toward law and legal
work. If the identification of student and instructor is a strong
one-that is, if the student's psychological as well as intellectual
needs are well-nourished by the instructor-the transfer of attitude
may prove intractable to time and other influences. A whole faculty,
generally disposed to the completely rationalistic view of law, for
example, cannot help but present an imposing force of influence on
UE. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREEr LAWYER 265-66 (1964); Cheatham, supra note 2, at 719;
Thurman, supra note 3, at 68-69; Weinstein, supra note 29, at 455-59.
"See Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the ProfessionalEthics
of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 587, 598 (1969).
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the molding of attitudes, modes of analysis, and choice of judgments
of students. 0

Surely professional training which assumes that the professional will learn all he needs to know about his profession and its
ethics-however broadly or narrowly defined-by trial and error
in the marketplace is totally inadequate. Such education inevitably will be incomplete and warped.
Law schools as institutions have a responsibility to their profession, not merely to train legal carpenters, but to prepare their

graduates for the professional status which the law degree implies-men and women who understand that they are entrusted

with the design, construction, and maintenance of a cathedral.
That responsibility is abdicated only at the risk of becoming less
than lawyer schools, which carries with it the corresponding risk
that lawyering will become less than a profession.
The raw material exists by which the law school can fashion

a comprehensive program for the infusion of professionalism into
the life of the school. All that is needed is the commitment to that
goal and the effective delegation of responsibility to ensure that
a concrete program is developed and brought into being.

Again, the words of Elliott Cheatham, although written 40
years ago, are fully appropriate today:
Let us make this work an integral part of our wider study of law.
We have been engaged in examining afresh almost every element of
law, except the profession that administers the law-the profession
in which our graduates will be engaged through life. Many of these
other elements of law can better spare university study than can the
profession itself. The zeal of the lawyer in advancing his clients'
interests is constantly modifying the substantive law, and as a
means to this modification much excellent study is devoted by lawyers and by laymen. But a study of the bar itself can scarcely be
hoped for by the active bar, and cannot be carried on with understanding by laymen who do not know the difficulties involved. As I
have already said, it must be made by those whose training gives
them understanding of the work of the bar and whose work does not
inevitably incline them to uphold its inherited position.
This is a propitious time for action. Depression and want in the
midst of plenty have caused wide re-examination of our institutions.
Important political and economic and social changes seem in the
making, and our students will have a hand in the making. Law
reform and professional changes have often gone along with these
7
"Eron & Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 431,
442 (1957). See also Thurman, supra note 3, at 69-70.
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broader movements. One of our successors, writing from the vantage
point of the year 2000, may say ... that the greatest change in law
administration was an improvement in the tone of the profession.
May he add, the law schools had their full share in achieving the
change.7
7

Cheatham, supra note 2, at 720-21.

DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN LAW SCHOOL
EDUCATION AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP*

By

HARVEY

G.

FRIEDMAN**

INTRODUCTION

In the United States today, we are questioning some of the
fundamental underlying assumptions of criminal law and procedure and the administrative apparatus for their implementation.
We continually ask whether the criminal law is relevant to the
control of broad categories of behavior now within its purview,,
and whether instead of deterring crime, the law may be in some
instances a causal factor of criminality.2 We question the validity
of an administrative structure characterized by the label
"assembly-line justice,"3 which is to say no justice at all. This
examination is a necessary and important process which shall
and must continue on all fronts.
Reappraisal of the criminal justice system has revealed a
disparity between prevailing perceptions and reality. This dichotomy is perhaps most apparent with respect to the popular view
that the criminal process entails an open aboveboard contest between well-matched adversaries before an expert judge and a jury
of peers.' Although the nation is seemingly beguiled by the Perry
Mason image of criminal justice, in reality the criminal process
bears little resemblance to the adversative ideal and is more accurately described as a covert administrative process. In sum*The term "discretionary criminal justice" or "discretionary justice," used frequently
throughout this paper, was coined by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. See K. DAVIS, note
12 infra. The term denotes and emphasizes the exercise of administrative discretion on
the part of state officials in the pretrial criminal justice process.
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professors Walter Gellhorn and
Peter L. Strauss of the Columbia University School of Law for their editorial comments.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law; B.A., University of
Miami, 1961; J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1965; J.S.D. CANDIDATE and
Kruelwich Fellow, Columbia University School of Law.
'See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), particularly Part III;
E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965).
"'[Plublic branding as the perpetrator of a specific 'criminal' act is a crucial step in
the individual's progress toward a criminal 'career.' " E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 5.
'THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as KATZENBACH REPORT].

'Watson, On the Low Status of the CriminalBar: Psychological Contributionsof the
Law School, 43 TEx. L. REv. 289 (1965). "First of all, to laymen law is the adversary trial
process." Id. at 294.
'See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS TASK FORCE REPORT 42-45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS REPORT].
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ming up this state of affairs, one commentator expressed the
following view:
The assumption that anyone accused of a crime in the United
States has a right to a full adversary trial of his guilt or innocence-with well prepared advocates for each side, carefully overseen by an able, even-handed judge, searching diligently for the
truth and satisfying all legal rules and safeguards-is fundamental
to the American system of justice and to the populace's confidence
in it. Yet, with few exceptions, this concept has become little more
than a still celebrated myth both in the folklore of the law and in
formal jurisprudence. Not only in Perry Mason dramas, but also in
real-life appellate court decisions, in the body of criminal law and
in urgent legal controversies, .

.

. there exists little in the way of

formal rules, high court pronouncements, or even informed legal or
public opinion to ensure that justice is done in the substitute way
that men and women are actually "tried" every day in American
courts.

The "substitute way" of "trying" a case referred to above is, of
course, the administrative process.
Indeed, most criminal cases are not resolved in the courtroom
but rather in the stationhouse, in the prosecutor's office, and in
the corridors of the courthouse. Today's criminal justice practice
is minimally adversary7 and primarily administrative, with probably 90 percent' of all cases being resolved administratively prior
to reaching the courtroom. 9 At present, plea bargaining in the
hallways of the courthouse is more likely to determine the fate of
the accused than is an adversary battle in the courtroom.
1L.

DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED 32-33 (1971).
According to a study by the President's Crime Commission, only about 8 percent of
the persons apprehended as suspects in index crimes were processed fully through formal
steps of a criminal prosecution. COURTS REPORT 15.
8Guilty pleas alone account for 90 percent of all convictions and a substantial percentage of guilty pleas are the product of plea bargaining. KATZENBAcH REPORT 9. This, taken
together with other forms of administrative disposition such as screening and diversion,
led the writers of the Courts Task Force Report to conclude that over 90 percent of all
cases are disposed of through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. COURTS REPORT 16.
'Although persons pleading guilty, either as a product of a bargain or otherwise, do
go before the court, it is usually no more than an empty ritual ratification of the guilty
plea:
Although the participants and frequently the judge know that negotiation has taken place, the prosecutor and defendant must ordinarily go
through a court room ritual in which they deny that the guilty plea is the
result of any threat or promise. As a result there is no judicial review of the
propriety of the bargain-no check on the amount of pressure put on the
defendant to plead guilty.
7

KATZENBAcH REPORT 9.

The Courts Task Force Report reaches a similar conclusion, although no statistics
were available to demonstrate the point.
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The image of the adversary contest as a hallmark of American criminal justice is perpetuated not only in the lay world but
also in the curriculum of a great number of law schools. Some of
the most popular criminal law casebooks now in use fail to deal
with the problem of the informal criminal justice administrative
process.'" Although we must not lose sight of the litigated case,
we must bring into view the bulk of criminal cases which are
"litigated" informally in the administrative arena. At the present
time, a major part of the criminal process-the administrative
disposition of cases-is largely excluded from consideration in
law school. This omission derives in part from continuing overemphasis on the case method as a pedagogical device and, perhaps
more importantly, from the failure of criminal justice scholarship
to provide a viable alternative teaching method.
Legal education must incorporate the reality of the informal
disposition of criminal cases. To accomplish this goal, data must
be systematically gathered to form the basis for the development
of new teaching methods. Interdisciplinary research centers
should be established to study administrative criminal justice in
full detail, and law schools can and should be in the forefront in
the development of this research capability. Collection of empirical data will lead to the creation of new materials for teaching
criminal law, and, in turn, criminal law scholars will be in a
position to exert influence geared toward the development of a
structured administrative criminal law process. Such a process
will enhance the system of justice by providing a formalized
check upon the exercise of discretion by the state in this important area. Following a brief discussion of the present state of the
criminal justice process and how it is taught in the law schools,
we shall turn to considerations relevant to incorporating this process into the legal curriculum.
I. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
Some of the most important decisionmaking in the criminal
justice system is engaged in by nonjudicial personnel, particularly the prosecutor, who has been called "the most powerful
"According to Professor Pye, "Perkins is probably the most popular casebook now
being used . . . .Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion are covered in one sentence." Pye, Law School Training in CriminalLaw: A Teacher's Viewpoint, 3 AM. CRIM.
L.Q. 173, 174 (1965). A more recent casebook contains more extensive materials on prosecutorial discretion. However, it presents, for the most part, only extreme examples in
which judicial intervention was required and in which there are appellate opinions available. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (1969).
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official in local government."" The most basic example of prosecutorial discretion inheres in the concept of "selective enforcement." Professor Davis describes it in the following words:
When an enforcement agency or officer has discretionary power
to do nothing about a case in which enforcement would be clearly
justified, the result is a power of selective enforcement. Such power
goes to selection of parties against whom the law is enforced and
selection of the occasions when the law is enforced. Selective enforcement may also mean selection of the law that will be enforced
and of the law that will not be enforced; an officer may enforce one
statute fully,
never enforce another, and pick and choose in enforc2
ing a third.1

The importance of prosecutorial discretion remains undiminished
following the enforcement decision. In many respects, the prosecutor is more important than the judge since it is the former who
decides whether a given defendant will go to trial or whether a
guilty plea will be accepted in lieu of a trial. 3
Prosecutorial discretion is exercised through a variety of
techniques, among which the principal ones are the following: (1)
screening: the exclusion of the case from the criminal process; 4
(2) charging:the determination of the formal legal grounds upon
which the case shall be predicated; 5 (3) plea bargaining: the
decision to accept a plea of guilty in exchange for either a lower
charge or a promise by the prosecutor to recommend a lower
sentence than might otherwise be expected;" and (4) diversion:
the determination to halt or suspend formal criminal proceedings
(after the case is screened into the system but before conviction)
on the condition or assumption that the accused will do some"Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiationof Prosecution,23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 770, 771
(1933).

' 2K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 163 (1969). Of course, the

police and corrections officials also exercise extensive decisionmaking power. For excellent
studies of the exercise of police discretion, see J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation:A
Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967); McGowan,
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
13L. DOWNIE, supra note 6, at 185-86.
"CouRTS REPORT

16, 17-26.

"Although the charge process is distinct from the plea negotiation, the two
are closely related by the prosecutor's expectations at the time of charge as
to the likely course bargaining will take, and by the important role bargaining for reduced charges plays in the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion.
KATZENBACH REPORT 11. Charging was not dealt with as a distinct process in the Courts
Task Force Report.
"CouRTS REPORT 42-65.
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thing (undergo treatment, for example) in return. 7 With some
exceptions, 8 the preceding determinations are made unilaterally
by the prosecutor. These critical decisions, affecting the great
bulk of criminal cases, are neither confined, 9 structured, 0 nor
checked"' by anyone (with the exception of the actual plea bargain, in which instance the court's role is generally little more
than a pro forma ratification of the prosecutor's decision)."2 These
decisions are secluded from public scrutiny and, in many instances, from other actors within the criminal justice system, including persons within the prosecutor's own office."
Few modern thinkers would take issue with the fact that
discretion plays an inevitable part within any legal system. Although ideals are often framed in terms of the preeminence of the
rule of law over the notion of discretion, 5 discretion must inevitably exist at every level:
'"Id. at 27-41.
'"In some jurisdictions the police still make some of the discretionary decisions usually
reserved for the prosecutor. This is particularly true in the lower courts. The practice has
been criticized by a number of reports, the most recent of which is the Courts Task Force
Report. The grand jury, of course, has a screening function in some jurisdictions, but the
prosecutor generally controls those functions through his presentments to the grand jury.
The prosecutor has also been forced to commence an action or to stop it through judicial
intervention, but these cases are extreme examples. An interesting selection of such cases
on the control of prosecutorial discretion is presented in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra
note 10, at 1072-99.
'""By confining [discretion] is meant fixing the boundaries and keeping discretion
within them." K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 55. It generally involves rulemaking "to replace
vagueness with clarity." Id. at 57.
2"[1R]ules which establish limits on discretionary power confine it, and rules which
specify what the administrator is to do within the limits structure the discretionary
power." Id. at 97.
2
"Checking" refers to someone inspecting another's decision. Id. at 142-43.
21KATZENBACH REPORT 9.
23

1See K. DAVIS, supra note 12.
"Rule of law may be defined as:
The absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the
influence of arbitrary power [excluding] the existence of arbitrariness, of
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government.
K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 31, quoting from A. DIEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTON 198

(1915).
"Discretion has been defined as:
[Aln authority conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations
in accordance with an official's or an official agency's own considered judgment and conscience. It is an idea of morals, belonging to the twilight zone
between law and morals.
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special
Case, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 925, 926 (1960). On a less abstract plane, discretion has been
defined in the following terms:
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Every governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and discretion. No government has ever been a
government of-laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all
discretionary power. Every government has always been a government of laws and of men."

The dangers in a departure from the ideal of the rule of law are
well expressed on the stone facade of the Department of Justice
building in Washington, D.C., where the words "Where law ends,
tyranny begins" are engraved. With respect to this aphorism,
however, Professor Davis points out that:
[1]n our system of government, where law ends tyranny need not
begin. Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness. 7

American jurisprudence is, nonetheless, filled with forebodings concerning the exercise of discretion. Pound, for example,
noted that:
From beginning to end of a prosecution we must rely upon the discretion of officials. But in criminal law the dangers involved in discretion are obvious. All discretion is liable to abuse, and the consequences of abuse, affecting the general security on the one side, and
life or liberty on the other side, are much more serious than in civil
controversies."

Several serious dangers inhere in the predominant reliance on
administrative decisionmaking reflected in the criminal justice
system. Informality and invisibility in the system of nontrial
administrative disposition give rise
to fears that it does not operate fairly or that it does not accurately
identify those who should be prosecuted and what disposition should
be made in their cases. Often important decisions are made without
adequate information, without sound policy guidance or rules, and
without basic procedural protections for the defendant, such as
counsel or judicial consideration of the issues. Because these dispositions are reached at an early stage, often little factual material is
available about the offense, the offender, and the treatment alternatives. No record reveals the participants, their positions, or the reason for or facts underlying the disposition. When the disposition
A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.
K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 4.
For a comprehensive discussion of the controversy between the exponents of the rule
of law and those who favor a discretionary view of the administration of law, see K. DAvis,
supra note 12.
2
1K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 17.
zld. at 3.
2
'R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 75 (1930).
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involves dismissal of filed charges or the entry of a guilty plea, it is
likely to reach court, but only the end product is visible, and that
view often is misleading. There are disturbing opportunities for coercion and over-reaching, as well as for undue leniency. The very
informality and flexibility of the procedures are sources both of potential usefulness and of abuse.2 9

Even more basic dangers involve concepts of fair warning, notice,
and equality of treatment. 0
The real and apparent dangers inherent in a system of justice
which relies predominantly on informal administrative procedures for the disposition of the fate of offenders who invoke its
machinery deserve our full and critical attention and scrutiny.
Controls must be placed on the exercise of discretion. Certainly
the judiciary has been sensitive to this issue, and landmark cases
of the last decade attest to that concern. 3' Yet these cases, important as they are, turn on issues which form only the tip of the
iceberg of administrative discretion. The great mass of cases disposed of through selective enforcement remains hidden from review. The need for an "administrative law" to regulate discretionary decisionmaking is apparent. 2 Traditional administrative
law, which most often concerns itself with the regulation of economic behavior, in part reflects an attempt to bring discretion
closer to the rule of law. Analogously, a similar body of principles
should be developed with which to regulate the nonjudicial and
low visibility operations of criminal law. In the words of Professor
Goldstein:
REPORT 4.
'Under the rule of law, the criminal law has both a fair-warning function
for the public and a power-restricting function for officials. Both post-.and
pre-verdict sanctions, therefore, may be imposed only in accord with authorized procedures. No sanctions are to be inflicted other than those which have
been prospectively prescribed by the constitution, legislation, or judicial
decision for a particular crime or a particular kind of offender. These concepts, of course, do not preclude differential disposition, within the authorized limits, of persons suspected or convicted of the same or similar offenses.
In an ideal system differential handling, individualized justice, would result,
but only from an equal application of officially approved criteria designed
to implement officially approved objectives. And finally a system which
presumes innocence requires that preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum consistent with assuring an opportunity for the process to run its
course.
Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 544, 547-51 (1960).
"See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"See generally Remington, Book Review, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 505 (1960).
"KATZBACH
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A regularized system of review is a requisite for insuring substantial
compliance by the administrators of criminal justice with these ruleof-law principles. Implicit in the word "review" and obviously essential to the operation of any review procedure is the visibility of the
decisions and conduct to be scrutinized."

How law schools might contribute to such a development is the
subject of the remainder of this paper.

II.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CURRICULUM

The failure to develop an administrative law for the control
of discretionary justice in the criminal process is inextricably
intertwined with the focus of the present day law school criminal
justice curriculum and the failure of legal scholarship to transcend the severe strictures imposed by that curriculum. Traditionally, criminal law has been treated as the poor relation of
legal education, getting short shrift in a single first-year 3-hour
course. Many law schools have acknowledged that the traditional role of criminal justice in the curriculum has not been its
proper one, and as a result criminal law has enjoyed increased
prosperity in recent years.3 4 Yet the major quantitative changes
are still to come as evidenced by the fact that criminal law
courses in American law schools still comprise only 5 to 10 percent of the overall curriculum, while in Europe such education
often exceeds 30 percent.The truly significant changes, however, must be qualitative,
and in terms of quality, criminal justice legal education is sadly
lacking. This shortcoming is not so much a consequence of what
is taught as opposed to what is not taught. To the extent that the
criminal justice curriculum fails to take into account the concept
of "discretionary justice"-the process responsible for the disposition of the great bulk of criminal cases-it must be considered
fundamentally inadequate. Highlighting the need for incorporating the study of the discretionary justice process into the criminal
justice curriculum is in no way intended to denigrate the importance of teaching traditional criminal law and procedure. Substantive criminal law will and should retain a central role in the
teaching process because of the obvious relevance of substantive
"Goldstein, supra note 30, at 550.
"Remington, Growing Involvement in CriminalJustice Administration, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 355.
'Kadish, Roundtable on Criminal Law, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 426, 433 (1968). In 1965,
Professor Pye estimated that only 5 to 7 percent of the total law school curriculum was
devoted to criminal law. Pye, supra note 10, at 178.
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issues to the administrative process concerning the dispensation
of criminal justice:
The issue is not, therefore, whether to continue to teach the
substantive criminal law and criminal process, but is rather how it
ought to be taught and how much emphasis it ought to be given in
relation to . . . discretionary justice."

The teaching of discretionary justice will complement but not
supplant traditional criminal law in the curriculum. Understanding of each will be enriched by exposure to the other.
What, then, are the reasons for the failure to incorporate
"discretionary justice" into the criminal justice curriculum? In
part, it relates to the limited time afforded criminal justice in the
overall curriculum due to the competition with other materials
traditionally considered to be of greater import. Perhaps a more
fundamental reason is the long tradition of the case method as
the primary teaching device in legal education.
The criminal law course, through a study of cases and statutes, has traditionally been employed at least as much for initiating the first-year law student into the rites of doctrinal analysis
as for any other purpose. Yet the case method yields only the
most limited insights into the problems inherent in discretionary
justice. Appellate review is an ad hoc process, unplanned and
unsystematic. Courts do not actively ferret out actual or potential
abuses, and therefore appellate decisions do not necessarily accurately reflect the problems which beset a particular process."
They tell only part of the story, and the law student, learning by
virtue of the case method, can only discover the part of the story
which the cases reveal.18 Even if appellate review were more systematically comprehensive, the assumptions implicit in the decisions made by those who administer the criminal law cannot
always be discerned from an analysis of appellate decisions, but
"Remington, supra note 32, at 506.
""The judiciary, under our conception of separation of powers, is not given the task
of comprehensive substantive revision." Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal
Scholarship, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 266 (1964).
Questions of great significance . . . have been left for decision to
the courts on a case by case basis. Whether an issue is dealt with therefore
depends less upon its significance than upon the accident of whether it comes
to the attention of an appellate court.
Until very recent years issues of major importance to police and correctional agencies were not given sustained attention in the law schools unless
the issues were reflected in appellate decisions.
Remington, The Law, the Law School, and Criminal Justice Administration, 43 Tax. L.
Rav. 275, 282 (1965).
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can only be studied
through analysis of human behavior at an
39
empirical level.
In 1955, Professor Wechsler recognized the bondage of legal
scholarship to the litigated case and suggested that legal scholarship could contribute significantly to the development of the law
by systematically focusing on legislative questions, marshalling
analysis, and research to the legislative problems of its field; it has
important special competence that should be brought to bear on
formulating legislative policies entitled, on the merits, to prevail.
The thesis . . . has especial relevance today, for we are living in an
age that may well prove to be the greatest legislative age in the
entire history of man. 0

What Professor Wechsler had to say in the fifties on the need to
focus on legislative problems remains equally applicable today.
But at least as applicable today is the need to focus on the discretionary justice process. The program for criminal justice scholarship in the seventies will focus on the confining, structuring, and
checking of discretionary justice.
In this context, the problem for legal education goes beyond
over-reliance on the case method to considerations concerning
what is to replace it. An alternative is understandably difficult
to develop because discretion, the central pivot on which these
issues turn, is by its nature elusive and not readily amenable to
empirical analysis. Adequate teaching materials to deal with low
visibility administrative decisionmaking in criminal justice do
not presently exist. The first step is to gather information which
can serve as a basis for the development of teaching materials.
Certainly the myriad studies published by both governmental and private entities are insufficient. While they are utilized
in a variety of new casebooks, these studies can do little more
than point out the problems involved. Such reports, whether published in the form of broad suggestions or more authoritative
black-letter standards, are predicated largely upon educated
guesses modified by the degree of political compromise necessary
to get them into print. Common sense and horse trading are insufficient bases for the formulation of policy in an area in which
fundamental rights of both the individual and society are in
jeopardy.
Problems related to the administration of discretionary justice require application of a methodology which has rarely been
I"Mause, Book Review, 84

HARV. L. REV. 504, 515 (1970).
'"Wechsler, Legal Scholarship and CriminalLaw, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 18, 28 (1956).
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employed by either public or private entities or by legal scholars.
This methodology transcends the scope of present day legal research methods. As Professor Kadish has observed, even the studies conducted by the American Bar Foundation are
only a selected beginning of recording systematically the basic data
with respect to the day to day functioning of the agencies of criminal
justice which are indispensable to any meaningful reform.
Only through such [interdisciplinary and empirical] studies
are revealed the ways in which working administrative adaptions are
made to the criminal law system, such as the short-circuiting process of the guilty plea or the diversion of sentencing determinations
to the prosecutor. And only through such studies can we accurately
perceive the principles and structures of law which have become
functionless or dysfunctional, the gaps between effective legal restraint and the exercise of authority and the implication upon a
subtle and sometimes unpredictably interconnected system of
changes at any single point.'

Pound's observation made 45 years ago that American law
schools could aid in the improvement of criminal justice "with
the facilities already at hand and with the methods of which our
law teachers are already masters"4 is no longer applicable. 3
The task for legal scholarship with respect to "discretionary
justice" is twofold: one, to provide satisfactory teaching materials; and two, to provide an adequate conceptual basis upon which
reforms of the process of discretionary justice may be predicated.
The latter aspect is of especial significance. Unless an "administrative law" is developed for the criminal justice administrative
agencies to curb actual and potential abuses of discretionary decisionmaking, the state may eventually become saddled through
judicial intervention with a correlative of the exclusionary rule.44
Legal scholarship has the opportunity and perhaps the responsibility to add to the development of such an administrative
law as it has the responsibility to produce appropriate teaching
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 431.
"Pound, What Can Law Schools Do for CriminalJustice, 12 IOWA L. Rxv. 105, 106
(1927).
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 433.
"The exclusionary rule, intended by the Supreme Court to affect future police incustody interrogation practices, has not had the desired effect:
In part this is so because many police departments never even learn of
what the court has said in such cases [Escobedo]. In part it results from
the difficulty in translating the requirements of judicial decisions into workable police practices which will conform to such requirements.
Remington, supra note 38, at 284. Of whatever value the exclusionary rule might be in
modifying administrative behavior, it would appear that internal controls are superior to
a negative sanction imposed externally.
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materials. The question then becomes one of determining how
legal scholarship can best proceed to achieve these ends.
III.

INCORPORATING DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE INTO THE CURRICULUM

A meaningful approach to discretionary justice requires "at
the minimum-a facility of interpreting behavioral research
and-optimally-an ability to conduct such research . . .legal
educators should confront this fact and begin to restructure curricula." 45 Legal scholars must develop skills in the area of social
science research, allowing them to work closely with behavioral
scientists and, ultimately, enabling them to employ systematic
data gathering techniques within the law school context.4" Professor Kadish has summed up this proposition in this manner:
Training in social science methodology for law teachers, bringing social and behavioral scientists on to law faculties, close working
affiliation between law schools and social scientists in other departments of the universities, establishment of institutes in connection
with law schools which can provide an organized structure to provide interdisciplinary research of this kind-there are precedents for
each of these methods in the law school world today.
What is important is that they be moved from the periphery to
the center of law school research efforts in the criminal law.
Course work would certainly continue, but the materials would
transcend the study of cases, the statutes, doctrines and principles.
The operational research work of the law teacher would itself become the subject of study, its insights, its discoveries, its methodologies and its consequences, and systematic study of the methodology
and substance of the behavioral sciences would also find its proper
place.
In addition, law schools would cultivate lines of affiliation with
other departments of the universities in education as well as research. Programs of combined education, leading to both the LL.B.
and the Ph.D. whether in sociology, social psychology, criminology
or other fields, offer a potential not yet actually explored."

The Vera Institute of Justice in New York City can serve as
a model of the type institute called for to provide an organized
structure for interdisciplinary research and study at a law school,
and the establishment of institutes similar to Vera might go a
I'Mause, supra note 39, at 515.
""One of the skills that legal scholars in criminal law must develop ... is the ability
to achieve a working relationship with persons in the behavioral sciences." Cohen, supra
note 37, at 269. "Systematic observation, surveys, interviews, experimentation, data
collection-these techniques and methods will have somehow to be brought within the law
schools." Kadish, supra note 35, at 431.
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 431-32.
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long way towards achieving the goals mentioned by Professor
Kadish. s While Vera is not affiliated with a law school, its structure and operational scheme should be examined with a view
towards establishing similar organizations to work closely with or
within law schools. While such organizations require funding,
their spinoff projects can in large part be self-supporting through
consulting and other arrangements.
Instead of consulting independently for criminal justice
agencies, professors might well work through an institute at their
own law school and thus make their work more observable to
students. In addition, a Vera type of operation could bring social
scientists into closer collaboration with the law school (without
necessarily bringing them onto the faculty) and thereby afford
both law students and professors a better opportunity to study
social scientific methodology firsthand. The affiliation of social
scientists with law schools would assure access to the more specialized empirical research knowledge which lawyers generally do
not possess. It would assure as well that the legal scholar will not
be burdened with the more technical methodological aspect of the
studies, thereby making his talents available to identify policy
problems and allowing him to make the necessary value judgments as to the application of the results of the studies
undertaken.
The social scientist can participate not only in legal research
but in the teaching of law as well. Similarly, students from other
disciplines in the university can be brought into the law school
classroom as regular students in the criminal justice curriculum.
The benefits to both the law students and the students from other
disciplines who jointly engage in criminal justice research is
clear.49
1rhe Vera Institute of Justice has been praised by numerous individuals and entities
dealing with criminal justice problems, especially for its pioneering work in release on
recognizance progriams which have successfully demonstrated a viable alternative to
money bail. While the Institute has restricted its activities to New York City, other
projects predicated on the Vera model have been established in cities throughout the
United States. Vera's work with public drunkeness in the Manhattan Bowery Project and
its study of diversion through the Manhattan Court Employment Project have also met
with notable success. A Vera-like organization has been established in Cleveland, and as
is Vera, it is a private foundation unaffiliated with any academic institution. The Vera
Institute is a wholly private research foundation, begun in 1961 through a generous endowment by a private citizen and aided financially by the Ford Foundation. For a detailed
description of the Institute's history, goals, and future plans, see PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TEN-YEAR REPORT 1961-1971 (1972).

"George, The Imperative of Modernized CriminalLaw Teaching, 53 Ky. L.J. 461, 468
(1965).
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The interdisciplinary approach employing social scientists
and their methodology undoubtedly will be the primary tool for
legal education and teaching in the area of discretionary justice
in the future. Other techniques, however, should not be excluded
from consideration.5
While not all law school graduates will become involved in
the criminal justice process, most of those who operate the process are lawyers. The majority of legislators, most judges, and all
prosecutors and defense attorneys are law school trained. The
influence of law schools on the criminal justice process is, therefore, decisive. The lesson the law student must learn through the
criminal justice curriculum is one which can provide the theoretical underpinning necessary for the later development of discretionary justice concepts when the students later serve as legislators, judges, defense attorneys, and, most importantly, as
prosecutors.
The need for infusion of a behavioral science approach into
the criminal justice curriculum should not be confused with the
adoption of a clinical approach. While clinical observations are a
part of the behavioral science methodology, behavioral science
methodology is not necessarily a part of a clinical approach. The
value of clinical education or practice programs as a tool in legal
education is not in issue here. What is desperately needed is the
kind of strictly structured inquiry which is the hallmark of behavioral science methodology. Casual clinical observations involved
in visiting a prison or courthouse are certainly in order but do not
lead to this end. While such exposure may point up the disparity
between the classroom lesson and the real life situation, it should
only be an incidental part of the educational experience. Even
clinical course work (where the student works through a problem)
has negligible value to social scientific inquiry, since general observations of the overall process cannot be validly extrapolated
from such isolated contacts. The best opportunities for valid generalizations are afforded by the rigid controls inherent in a formally structured social scientific inquiry.
'Professor Mueller, for example, has called for the inclusion of comparative law in
the criminal justice curriculum, contending that while foreign law is not necessarily superior to ours, it does offer a vantage point from which to make a better evaluation of our
own process. Mueller, The Teaching of ComparativeLaw in the Course on CriminalLaw,
11 J. LEGAL ED. 59 (1958). Studies of West German criminal law indicate that the prosecutor's discretion can be very limited and still be effective. K. DAvIs, supra note 12, at 19195. Professor George suggests that "one of the best ways to study your own system is to
study another's." George, supra note 49, at 473.
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Also, the benefits of student participation in clinical education must be balanced against the time strictures placed on the
curriculum. Empirical study is ordinarily a long term affair which
often requires followup to determine the reliability and validity
of the results. The law student is not in attendance at the law
school long enough to see most such studies through to completion. Thus, while he should be imbued with the concept of methodology and its applications, pedagogical considerations dictate
that ordinarily he will receive only the end product through the
curriculum. As a result, empirical study will be conducted by the
legal scholar for the benefit of the law student and, of course, for
the benefit of the criminal justice process and society at large.
CONCLUSION

For the most part, the nation's criminal justice process is
predicated not on the adversary model but, instead, on the discretionary justice model. Neither legal scholarship nor legal education reflect that fact. This disparity between what is taught in law
school and what actually transpires in the process must be eliminated if we are to make the criminal justice process effective both
in terms of protecting individual liberties and in terms of maintaining order and security in the society.
At the heart of discretionary justice lies the idea that for
every doctrine or principle of the criminal law there is an underlying mechanical process for its implementation. That process has
both visible and invisible parts. The invisible parts are those
which involve the exercise of discretion by criminal justice officials. Insofar as the exercise of discretion remains unconfined,
unstructured, and unchecked, it has the power to devastate every
principle and doctrine of the law.
Legal scholarship must move forward in preserving those
doctrines and principles of law meriting retention by illuminating
for the law student, in particular, and for the criminal process,
in general, what is now shrouded in darkness. While the case
method does not have to be abandoned to achieve this end, it does
have to be preempted in part and supplemented. Primarily, this
will require the inclusion of social scientific techniques into criminal justice scholarship and education. In the end, the legal
scholar and the law school, through their students, can have a
profound influence on the process of discretionary justice.

NATIONAL MANPOWER MOBILIZATION FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN A DRUG-ORIENTED SOCIETY
By G. 0.

W. MUELLER,* FREDA ADLER**
INTRODUCTION

It is fair to say that the American system of criminal justice
today, including research and education in criminal justice, bears
little resemblance to the system in existence a decade ago. Basically, in 1960, as in 1920, criminal law was, in practice and in
academia, the most neglected field of law in America. Criminal
law practice was in the hands of the least respected members of
the profession. It was practiced by rules which had changed little
since the 1850's, and relevant constitutional standards were seldom honored in practice. In short, criminal justice was devoid of
insights into the functioning and impact of the system. While
academic criminology existed, it was given little opportunity to
apply its precepts and conclusions to the system's operation; its
findings were instead left to the realm of theory. In corrections-then referred to as penology-a seemingly unshakable belief in retribution and general and special deterrence barred
practical entrance of a corrections-oriented approach. Reform
endeavors were not totally lacking, but they remained isolated
instances without penetrating or large-scale effect. Examples of
such reforms are the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Criminal Procedure and the subsequent drafting of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure(late 1920's to 1940's) and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (1950's to early 1960's).'
However, basic functions such as governmental planning and
budgeting for reform were practically unknown. Public attention
to problems of crime and delinquency were restricted to journalistic or sensationalist reports of capital crime and execution,
"gangland" criminality, and police corruption.
In American universities the subject of criminal law was regarded as a noli me tangere by all "reputable" professors. Apart
*Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Law Education and Research Center,
New York University; Director of the Graduate Program on Sentencing and Corrections,
National College of the Judiciary; J.D., 1953, University of Chicago; LL.M., 1955, Columbia University; Dr. Jur., 1971, (h.c., Uppsala).
**Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Research Coordinator of the Section on Drug
and Alcohol Abuse, The Medical College of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia; A.B., 1956,
M.A., 1958, Ph.D., 1971, University of Pennsylvania.
'G. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE SCHOLARS (1969).
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from a handful of exceptions, the subject of criminal law was
assigned, against their will, to teachers who switched to more
agreeable subjects as they advanced in seniority. Criminal law
usually was the only required course within the area of criminal
justice, and it was generally restricted to two semester hours.
Criminal procedure, if offered at all, was optional in the third
year. It was taken by few students, and was dull in its coverage
of 19th century forms of pleading. Subjects related to criminology
were unknown to law schools. Ventures into the realm of real life,
or participation in the practice of criminal justice, were unknown.
The traveler to America who remembers this scene of American crime and criminal justice, and who returns to it today, must
be as startled by the change as the Japanese army sergeant who
recently emerged from the Guam jungles after 30 years in hiding.
This article explores these changes and their ramifications for the
future. In particular, we are concerned with the manpower needs,
both quantitative and qualitative, of tomorrow's criminal justice
system. Four questions need answers, and these questions provide
the focus of the analysis which follows:
(1) What are the current developments in criminal justice, and what trends can we expect in the future?
(2) Depending upon the answer to (1), what manpower
needs will we face 10, 20, or 30 years from now?
(3) Depending upon the answer to (2), how do we train
this manpower?
(4) What social changes should we program into our
training efforts?
I.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE FUTURE

No social phenomenon in America is as intensively discussed
and analyzed as crime. Hundreds of thousands of new careers
have appeared in criminal justice administration. Planning offices have sprung up like mushrooms at every level of government-city, county, state, and federal. The annual expenditure
of federal funds for research, education, and reform in criminal
justice approaches the two billion dollar mark. With the recognition of "crime in the streets" as a paramount American domestic
problem, the nation's foremost private research establishments
have diverted their attention from military logistics and space
research to research and planning in criminal justice. Crime is
recognized as the fulcrum of America's racial problems. It is the
revolt of the disadvantaged who cannot reach the posited ideals
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by legitimate means. It is also the country's "generation gap" and
the rebellion of youth against conventional notions of propriety.
These changes have occurred at a time when the leaders of
American criminological thinking-mostly from the field of sociology-have created the theoretical foundation, premises, and
methodology with which the new breed of legal practitioners have
begun to analyze the system and recognize it as totally inefficient,
wasteful, and inhumane.' Only a catalyst was needed to bring
criminological methodologists together with the young core of
criminal justice specialists from the law schools. Government
participation in the reform movement provided, in part, the
needed catalyst. Governmental participation began in the midsixties with the work of the President's Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice, which released its report in 1967.1 The impact was great. The Law-Enforcement Assistance Administration was created, and has now
become the government's largest and most powerful, but by no
means only, agency concerned with research, planning, and reform in the area of criminal justice. It also serves as a distribution
agency for vast federal resources devoted to these purposes. With
the genesis of this agency, large numbers of young criminologists
from various disciplines have left the area of theory and have
become the first generation to practice what their predecessors
had taught them largely as abstractions.
Planning and reform in criminal justice-and more recently
in the area of corrections-now require the close cooperation of
personnel trained in various disciplines, predominantly law, sociology, and social work, and now more frequently in police science
and administration. The spearhead of reform is, of course, the
spinoff of theory into practice-in other words, action implementation. During their training, students of law and other disciplines are actively involved in action-oriented projects, in socalled clinical education programs which combine planning,
learning, and service to the community, with reform of the system
itself.4
This then, in brief, is the story of the development of the
IN.

MORRIs

& G.

HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970).

'PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

(1967).

'CONFERENCE ON LAW STUDENTS IN COURT, CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL

OF THE FUTURE (1969); COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUIATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBLITY, INC.,
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"current system" of criminal justice education, research, and reform in America. These are its basic ingredients; however, it is
too early to assess their impact in toto. Indeed, for the time being,
critics are justified in pointing out the system's shortcomings:
public expenditure has expanded vastly, yet the crime rate has
seemingly increased significantly (or is it simply that we have
learned to identify crime more readily and to recognize its impact?); victimization through crime seems at an all time high (of
course, 25 years ago there was no victimology5 ); the viciousness
of our penal administration is widely recognized (before World
War II prisons were rarely regarded as objects fit for study). There
is a chance that, like so many political and other public phenomena in America, the interest in crime may simply be a passing
fancy and may be discarded like a used toy in favor of a new
priority, such as protection of the environment.
What evidence have we of permanent and lasting benefits
from reform? Have these reform efforts made any impact on the
legal system? Has law codified our experience for systematic use?
What solid and scientifically acceptable experiences in the use of
the criminal sanction are there before us, and have they been
incorporated into penal codes which genuinely correspond to scientific recognition as well as to popular demand? With all the
clinical training which we are offering our students, are we really
providing for a permanent change in the system, or are we merely
channelling social-action-oriented student energies away from
revolution and into "more acceptable" avenues? Or are we merely
exploiting students as "cheap labor"? Is criminological research
really capable of direct application, or are we spending vast research budgets simply to calm a guilty conscience which has tolerated decades of neglect and exploitation? Answers to these and
a host of other questions are of obvious contemporary importance.
Education and training programs for the future must include
significant changes from established curricula, leading toward
integrated courses of study for personnel preparing to enter, or
already within, the criminal justice system. The combination of
academic study with clinical service and field experience should
provide a continuing closed-loop of input and feedback to enable
educational programs to meet the demonstrable needs of the
system.
'For a description of victimology, see Mueller, Compensation for Victims of Crime:
Thought Before Action, 50 MINN. L. Rv. 213, 214-15 (1965).
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Understanding current trends and future needs of the criminal justice system depends, in large measure, upon the "model"
with which we choose to attack crime. There are many models a
nation could use to deal with socioeconomic problems of deviance
or, more acurately, to ensure norm compliance when a national
need for it is felt. Most contemporary societies are prone to refer
the matter to law enforcement agencies and to rely upon their
traditional methods, including inspection, licensing, reporting,
and coercion. The United States during the second half of the
20th century fits that model. But this model overlooks an earlier,
alternative method for assuring the protection of values that are
deemed significant. This method involves primary reliance on
prophylactic forces of a value-molding, behavior-forming nature,
including the educational system and its opinion-forming appendices, which rely largely on the mass media. Equal reliance
on problem solving through engineering, design, and socioeconomic planning (whether by taxation, public investment, or by
any other means) are strategies whose significance is only now
being realized by criminologists.'
The potential of these alternative approaches to what is currently being regarded as crime control is seemingly unfathomable, but it need not be. Even with an approach to crime control
which relies on the formal agencies of society more traditionally
identified with criminal justice, a nation may still choose among
(1) a prophylactic approach concentrating upon police-preventive
efforts and the early identification of potential offenders, (2) a
reactive approach centering on rehabilitation, or (3) a combination of the two.
Seemingly without orchestration, modern American society
has broken with its tradition of assigning each new socioeconomic
problem to lawmakers and law enforcers, for it now places greater
reliance on "technocrats" and "do-gooders" whose education and
orientation have little, if any, affinity to law. By way of example,
the narcotics problem attracts more interveners with sociomedical backgrounds than lawyers; reckless driving homocides are
prevented more by highway engineers than by state troopers;
sexual criminality is affected more by peer group differential association and by junior high school instructors teaching sex education courses than by prosecutors; and violence has a signifiC. JEFFREY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (1971);
DEFENSIBLE SPACE

(1972).
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cantly greater potential of being controlled by pharmacists than
by jailers. The "people control business" idea is seemingly slipping out of the hands of the legal profession, and planning for
reform already rests with sociologists and systems analysts. At
the same time, the legal institutions which remain are beginning
to recognize that the days of the generalists are numbered.
Technocrats are assuming a larger role in law enforcement, judicial, and correctional systems and in the education of personnel
for these systems. As Selznick observed:
If society cannot depend on an informal, autonomous, selfregulating, person-centered order for the maintenance of social control, it will turn to more explicitly organized agencies and to more
powerful instruments of surveillance and regulation. Not only the
police, but the schools, social work agencies, and perhaps other institutions, will be called upon to serve the needs of social control. 7

The emerging new power centers of social control must be
staffed with personnel capable of fulfilling the functions assigned
to them. Consequently, this moment in history calls for a concerted effort in training and retraining. Unhappily, in constructing educational models we are dealing with several unknowns.
Even if we were to mobilize for a static criminal justice system,
we are not certain:
(1) what approach we favor;
(2) how many people we need;
(3) what their maximally efficient training saturation
should be; and
(4) for what specialties within the system they must
be trained.
Moreover, it is too late to train people for today's problems, for
those who are now doing the job either (1) have been trained
yesterday or (2) hold office and are untrained or undertrained
(the potential usefulness of in-service training is only beginning
to be discovered). Consequently, as regards the future, we must:
(1) predict future crime indices, quantitatively and
qualitatively;
(2) predict the corresponding manpower need, quantitatively and qualitatively;
(3) predict budgets and resources of the future;
(4) allow for modularity (adaptability); and
7

Selznick, Legal Institutions and Social Controls, VAND. L. REV. 79, 83 (1963).
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(5) train the personnel to meet both the quantitative
and qualitative needs of the future.
Each of these tasks is examined in detail in the following section.
II.

CRIME INDICES, MANPOWER NEEDS, RESOURCES, MODULARITY,
AND TRAINING

A.

PredictingFuture Crime Indices
On the basis of currently available research data, it may be
suggested that most of the manpower in criminal justice is currently deployed for dealing with those social problems which are
directly related to, or arising from:
(a) a relatively high national incidence of severe and
violent responses to social stress, resulting in an unbearably high rate of offenses against the person;8
(b) an extremely widespread habituation to expensive
hard drugs, with a seemingly close but as yet undocumented relation to the high incidence of offenses against
property;'
(c) a puritanical penalization of victimless crimes,
resulting in the assurance of a financial basis for the
operation of organized crime intent upon supplying prohibited services (including drugs, alcohol, prostitution,
gambling, abortion, loan sharking, and other
activities) ;,
(d) an immensely high automobile density, resulting
in the potential abuse of motor vehicles."
These four special areas are supplying the United States with
its major crime problems. While it is inconceivable that any effort
can solve all of the United States' crime problems, it is entirely
logical to assume that attacking these four problem areas would
reduce the nation's crime to that level regarded as "tolerable" in
other industrialized societies. This would constitute a "normal"
'NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,

To

ESTA3LISH

JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY-FINAL REPORT (1969).

'See CLEAR Center Study Group, Model Narcotic Drug Legislation, in
CRIMINOLOGY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL 156-72 (1970).
E. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

(1967).
"The United States owns 44 percent of the world's motor vehicles. INFORMATION
PLEASE ALMANAC 82 (1973).
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or "baseline" level of criminal activity with a modest incidence
of violence, of property offenses, and of controlled motor vehicle
abuse.
Finally, some attention must be paid to current and future
types of intervention into the criminal sphere. Models of crime
trends might be constructed which better identify areas in need
of more intense criminal justice attention. Changes in intervention and deployment of system resources might be determined by
application of such models. To illustrate:
(a) Implement no change in existing methods of dealing with the crime problem. The result is not necessarily
negative. It may well be the best possible intervention
method for a given problem;
(b) Refrain from intervention or de-escalate existing
intervention. The result may well be positive, since
some problems simply "disappear," temporarily or permanently, and others may indeed be aggravated by any
attention given them, although the likelihood of "disappearance" of a socioeconomic crime problem is minimal;
(c) Deploy considerable resources for reactively dealing with the crime problem through planning, and in
particular, manpower planning and deployment;
(d) Attack the problem at the source, rather than at
the point at which it symptomatically surfaces. In other
words, attack it preventively.
Predicting future crime indices and implementing an appropriate intervention model is only one facet of the complex task of
this analysis. We turn now to another facet-the prediction of
future manpower needs.
B.

Predicting Consequent Manpower Needs
Over the last decade, specialists in education, criminal justice, criminology, and corrections have increasingly turned futurologists and have attempted estimates of the personnel needs of
our criminal justice system. All these efforts, particularly those
of the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training,'" have been unsuccessful for a variety of reasons:
I'll H. PIVEN &

A.

ALCAEES, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, PILOT STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL

MANPOWER AND TRAINING (1969); JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND
TRAINING, CORRECTIONAL BRIEFINGS, nos. 1-12 (1967-69). See also Mueller, Differential
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(a) they assumed the system to be static;
(b) they assumed training techniques to be static;
(c) they largely assumed recruiting to be directed to
the same personnel supplier groups; and
(d) they continued to think of personnel for the future
in terms of the rigid discipline demarcations of the past.
However, on the basis of the analysis and model predictions already discussed it is possible to plan for quantitative and qualitative manpower needs. Care must be taken to tie these predictions
to the general developmental trends of our society. For example,
let us assume that:
(a) unless major changes occur, unemployment will
increase;
(b) gross national product will continue to increase;
(c) the educational level of the population will increase (e.g., by 1980, 50 percent of the college age population will attend college);
(d) increasingly, females will enter those areas of socioeconomic life which heretofore were regarded as male
preserves.
Consequently, we might predict that (a) crime will become more
materialistic, (b) some criminal offenders will be much better
educated, (c) the gap between educated and uneducated offender
types will increase, and (d) female criminality will begin to approximate male criminality. 3
If it is correct, as we suggested earlier, that our official agencies of social control are becoming more expert and efficient at
their tasks, it could be expected that those processed for different
purposes such as resocialization, incapacitation, or retraining,
will be more precisely identified, labelled, and dealt with. This,
Distributionof PedagogicResponsibilities in the Training of Human Resources for Criminology, in THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL POUCY (1973).
'Thus:
(a) This implies that offenses will be more property oriented and offenders
are more likely to rely on hardware (including computers) for the commission
of offenses;
(b) This might pose a very special challenge to law enforcers, who might
become intellectually and educationally out-gunned;
(c) This could introduce new stresses of any sort upon the correctional and
resocialization system; and
(d) This would necessitate that the entire criminal justice system must be
switched from a male to a male-female basis.
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in turn, will require greater expertise on the part of dispositional
personnel. Should we succeed, for example, in developing prediction methods for violent offenders, and should we consequently
decide to institutionalize only the violent-dealing with nonviolent lawbreakers extramurally-the populations of correctional
institutions would have a totally different makeup than that
known to us today. This, of course, has far-reaching implications
for the jobs of institutional architects, correctional personnel, and
a host of others.
C.

PredictingBudgets and Resources for the Future
In this preliminary context, one can only hint at the budget
problem. To a considerable extent, however, it is the very purpose
of any blueprint to influence national priorities in the allocation
of budgets and resources for crime control, so that even in periods
of potential recession, and perhaps particicularly in those periods, efficient crime control in all spheres can be adequately maintained.
D.

Allowing for Modularity
The manpower to be developed for a totally planned criminal
justice system must have modularity, so that redeployment is
possible whenever, perhaps due to the success of a previous deployment, the manpower has solved the target problem, or whenever unforeseen new problems arise or old ones become aggravated. Manpower retraining is relatively easy in the range of lowskill operations, but it may be more difficult at the professional
level, as the national switch in priorities away from military logistics, hardware development, and space exploration has demonstrated. The training potential must remain as flexible as the
vagaries of manpower needs are likely to be. Thus, in setting
priorities in governmental personnel policy for the criminal justice system, it is unquestionably necessary to develop a group of
alternatives in goal planning. It should be realized that the alternatives are not necessarily competing, for they may well be complimentary to each other, either consecutively or concurrently.
Policy or goal alternatives with respect to governmental activities and their likely consequences, if implemented administratively or legislatively, should become apparent on the basis of
this analysis. Decisions as to when to activate which approach
depend largely upon the foregoing analysis in conjunction with
the effective gathering of information about current conditions
operating within the system.
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Optimal modularity as well as the other recommendations
just discussed all point, to varying degrees, to the need for education and/or re-education of personnel comprising the criminal
justice system. With this in mind, we move to a discussion of
future training needs.
The Training of Personnel
Not one educational establishment in North America has
succeeded in establishing a coordinated university-wide program
for the training of criminal justice specialists capable of effective
functioning in the system as it will appear in the predictable
future.
This is not to say that the evolution of the criminal justice
system did not have an educational impact. On the contrary,
never before have law enforcement and corrections personnel
been as well trained as they now are. Colleges and junior colleges
throughout the United States have established law enforcement
training programs. 4 On the professional level, departments of
sociology, and schools of law, medicine, public administration,
and social work have intensified their efforts to educate persons
capable of functioning in the system. Two American universities
have established schools or departments of criminology on the
postgraduate level, granting special masters and doctoral degrees
in criminology."
But all these efforts have been inadequate for purposes of
dealing with the problems of the future. A radically new, nationally coordinated attack on the manpower problem is required.
The targets or beneficiaries of proposed manpower training programs are the various parts of the criminal justice system. These
include:
(1) criminal justice planning agencies (a totally new
type of agency which until recently did not exist);
(2) a variety of reform groups, both public and private;
(3) law enforcement agencies;
(4) courts and other adjudicative agencies, including
those involved in prosecution and defense;
(5) correctional and after-care agencies and institutions;
E.

"UNESCO, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES-CRIMINOLOGY (1957).
"The University of California at Berkeley, School of Criminology, and the State
University of New York at Albany, School of Criminal Justice.
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(6) diversionary agencies (especially employment and
maintenance projects and therapeutic groups);
(7) related governmental establishments at all levels,
from municipal to United Nations units;
(8) research centers.
Currently, these agencies are only partially manned by personnel properly trained and educated for their jobs. Consequently, such agencies are low in efficiency, as attestable by any
known means of inquiry, whether episodic or scientific. Unhappily, each of these agencies has traditionally been staffed by persons coming from one discipline: courts and adjudicative agencies
by lawyers, research establishments by sociologists, after-care
agencies by social workers, etc.. This, of course, is already changing and should continue to do so in the future.
In summary, it is essential to assess the manpower needs for
dealing with the national crime problem over the next several
decades, and to devise training modalities at the lowest possible
cost and with as much flexibility as possible for constant redeployment. It is as necessary to guard against under education as
against over education." The former as much as the latter represents both a waste of assets and a potential source of frustration
inconsistent with the efficient operation of a criminal justice
system.
These preliminary comments have focused on the current
trends of criminal justice in America. Observations of recent
changes and of needed changes for the future have been linked
to specific recommendations. The remainder of this article is devoted to proposals for implementation. A theoretical framework
for analyzing implementation methods is offered first, and then
an example of applying theory to the formulation of a concrete
strategy is provided.
Ill.

METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION:

A

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For purposes of describing methods of implementing the
foregoing recommendations and, specifically, for attacking the
manpower problem, it is useful to employ the following threelevel structure of the criminal justice system. The center level
consists of a functional organization of criminal justice activities.
The upper level consists of the disciplinary educational expertise
"6See Tenney, Education for Law Enforcement, 4

TRIAL

11 (1968).
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which is needed by specific functionaries of the system. The lower
level represents the targets of criminal justice intervention or
crime prevention in the various spheres. With reference to Figure
1, these three levels are labelled "Channels," "Disciplines," and
"Crime Targets" respectively.
FIGURE 1
M~dkkw

Functional Organization: The Channels
The criminal justice system is here understood to comprise
all activities concerned with crime prevention, control, and offender treatment. These include public and private activities,
line duties as well as housekeeping, planning, and educational
functions. At this moment employment data and expenditure
A.

492
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figures are known only for public employment and governmental
activity. It may be surmised that in some areas, such as law
enforcement, one might double the public manpower and expenditure figures in order to approximate total employment and
expenditure data.'7 The criminal justice functions can be organized in terms of four channels.
Channel I represents the sphere of law enforcement, with
preventive, investigative, oppressive, deterrent, and executive
purposes. The chief functionaries of this channel, obviously, are
the officers of law enforcement. The law enforcement channel is
characterized by an annual governmental budget of
$4,491,285,000, or 59.2 percent of the total national expenditure
for the criminal justice system. There are 548,241 federal, state,
and local employees within the law enforcement channel.
Channel II represents the sphere of criminal law processing,
in terms of the norms of prohibition and processes established by
penal codes and codes of criminal procedure. The functionaries
of this channel, for the most part, are law-trained officers and
paraprofessionals. The criminal law processing channel is characterized by an annual public expenditure of $1,477,955,000, or 19.1
percent of total national expenditures for the criminal justice
system. This figure excludes the cost of private criminal defense
activities. There are 151,365 employees at all levels of government
within the criminal law processing channel (104,687 in the judicial system, 42,976 in prosecution, and 2,175 in public defense).
Channel III deals with individuals who are being retained in
the formal criminal justice system and who, having been adjudicated guilty, are now subject to the dispositional and correctional
authorities of the state. The corrections channel is characterized
by an annual public expenditure of $1,623,745,000, or 21.4 percent of the total national budget for the criminal justice system.
This does not include the cost of private diversion activities.
There are 152,049 employees within the corrections channel.'"
"Approximately 40,000 guards, watchmen and other security personnel are currently
employed in N.Y. City alone, in other words, a number by far exceeding the number of
police personnel. For the nation as a whole, according to a Rand Corporation study, there
may be as many as 290,000 private security personnel employed-compared with a public
payroll (October 1970) of 383,015-at a private annual income of $2.5 billion, as compared
with a public expenditure of $4.5 billion. Burnham, Study is Planned of Guards in City,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1973, at 47, col. 1.
'"U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, L.E.A.A. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
STATISTICS SERVICE, EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

(1969-70) (1972).
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Channel IV represents the newly discovered sphere of diversion and decriminalization: It offers alternatives to the other
three channels in that it deals with deviants after removing them
from the formal system of criminal justice at any given stage of
the process. At this point there is no data available reflecting the
national manpower commitment and dollar expenditure in this
field. It may be surmised that the number of employees in diversion programs, public and particularly private, may have grown
from near zero as late as 20 years ago to a figure comparable to
the number of employees in the corrections channel.
The type and intensity of training obviously will vary with
the job descriptions within each of the four channels. Thus, models must be constructed on the basis of both traditional and expected modes of employment within each channel. For the law
enforcement channel, employment extends from semi-skilled
labor, through blue collar specialization to professional education
in management, law, medicine, computer science, and other disciplines. In contrast, existing models of the criminal law processing channel usually do no more than distinguish between judicial,
prosecutorial, and defense activities. A much more sophisticated
breakdown must be constructed as to function and needed educational input. This would include law professionals, management
professionals, investigators, systems specialists, and the like. The
employment categories in the corrections and diversion channels
are likely to be equally or even more multifarious.
B.

Disciplinary EducationalExpertise: The Upper Level
Each of the four channels of the criminal justice system
needs personnel trained to various degrees of sophistication in
terms of university years of education in various disciplines, and
in combinations of disciplines. Figure 1 identifies eight major
disciplines for potential educational input to the training of functionaries in the system. These include social work, law, education, behavioral-social sciences, medicine, economics, criminal
justice (police), public administration, and politics. It seems impossible to imagine any functionary of any channel of the system
not having a certain amount of sophistication in all of these disciplines. Yet, the functionary's station and purpose within the system are, of course, determinative of the "mix" and intensity of
training needed within the various disciplines.
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The Targets of Criminal Justice Intervention: The Lower
Level

The targets of criminal justice intervention are the crime
problems which our nation-any nation-must confront at this
moment or at any other moment in the future. For purposes of
this article, we have identified seven targets or typologies of criminal justice intervention, of which we have already mentioned the
four extraordinary ones:
(a) The scandalous problem of violence, attributable to
whatever historical forces, is probably this nation's foremost target for criminal justice intervention. The citizens of this nation appear to be armed to the teeth. The
resulting crime index of offenses against the person is
intolerable when contrasted with the experience of any
other civilized society. 9
(b) The spread and consumption of drugs in this nation
appears to be more prevalent than in any other society
known to history. The type of addiction and the cost of
production and distribution of the most widely used
addictives are such that the life style of an addict is very
expensive. The citizenry no longer feels secure in the
possession of their personal property, attributing the
high incidence of property offenses, in part, to the high
cost of drugs.
(c) As a result of a national commitment to the preservation of puritanical standards, some of the major pleasure objects and some apparent necessities in modern
life have been barred from the market economy and
have become black market items. These objects include
not only commercialized vice, gambling, alcoholic beverages, off-hour services of any kind, but also arms and
other products and services which government has
largely eliminated from the market or rendered prohibitively expensive. These prohibitions result in the socalled victimless crimes and, at least since World War
I, syndicates in the nature of organized crime have
formed to supply such items. Thus, victimless crime
"By way of example, the United States reports 16,000 criminal homicides annually;
while England, Japan, and West Germany, with a combined population approximately
equal to the United States, report a total of 250 criminal homicides.
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and organized crime have become but two sides of the
same coin. 20
(d) The widespread use of automobiles in the United
States has resulted in the misuse of the motor vehicle
for criminal purposes. More criminal fatalities are attributable to motor vehicle abuse than to any other
homicidal agencies. 1 Also, virtually any form of crime
is aided by the availability of motor vehicle transportation.
These references to America's four "special crime problems" have
nearly obscured our standard crime problems. These standard
problems comprise a fifth typology:
(e) The type and amount of crime regarded as tolerable
by any democratic nation are measured in terms of
those particular crimes which society attempts to control by conventional law enforcement and prevention.
These crimes include homicide, robbery, burglary, larceny, and other common offenses.
Beyond these five clearly ascertainable, existing crime typologies,
several others are probably in the making:
(f) The United States is the world's most technologically advanced nation, and it is beginning to experience
an influx of technologically determined crime, ranging
from credit card frauds to theft from computer banks
and the theft of government secrets. The potential increase in this type of crime is vast, and is dependent
entirely on further technological development.
(g) Along these lines, it may be suggested that as yet
unforeseen developments may occur which will confront
tomorrow's law enforcement machinery with totally
unpredictable problems, particularly in the area of ensuring the survival of mankind by protecting the environment.
The conceptualization of criminal justice tasks in terms of
target areas, as outlined above, is somewhat novel and represents
the authors' judgment of national priorities. It is entirely conceivable that any concentrated research effort will lead to a reconcep2"E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHouT VIcTIMs-DEvINT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1965).

"W. MIDDENDORFF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO
TRAFFIC OFFENSES

(1968).
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tualization of these targets, with an ultimate return to some of
the orthodox methods of analyzing the gravity of crime problems.
These orthodox methods include the Wolfgang-Sellin Index22 and
the typologies discussed by Ferdinand 3 and Clinard-Quinney. 24 It
is contemplated, however, that for at least the early stages of
manpower research, all representatives of the channels will adhere to the above-outlined target area conceptualization, subject
to later review and reconceptualization.
IV.

EFFECTUATING A MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PLAN:
THE EXAMPLE OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM

The foregoing discussion makes it abundantly clear that construction of a national manpower development scheme for criminal justice is an exceedingly complex problem. This would be true
even if the nation's crime situation were to remain static, but
experience tells us that crime is a most dynamic phenomenon
which can shift focus, direction, emphasis, and intensity due to
factors whose significance is as yet unfathomed. A national plan
would require fairly accurate trend prediction for each of the four
channels, each of the eight disciplinary inputs, and for each of the
seven typological targets. Additionally, the focus of diversion and
techniques of socioenvironmental manipulation must be explored
further as a possible alternative to the criminal justice system.
At this time there is insufficient research and data to estimate the manpower problem with respect to any of the channels,
disciplines, or targets. Simply by way of demonstration, the authors present below a very tentative outline for a blueprint of
educational needs with respect to the target area of drug offenses
and their resulting property offense typology.2"
The current criminal justice approach to handling the drug
abuser has been plagued by ineffective management of the professional persons and other manpower who have recently entered
this problem area. One thing is certain: the legal model alone is
insufficient. We are in need of alternatives based on medical and
"'T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY IN NEW YORK
1IT. FERDINAND, TYPOLOGIES OF DELINQUENCY-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1966).
4

(1967).

M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS-A TYPOLOGY (1967).
"For a discussion of the relationship between crime and addiction, see Chambers,
Moffett & Jones, Demographic FactorsAssociated with Negro Opiate Addiction, 3 INT'L
J. OF ADDICTIONS 329 (1968); Pierce, Delinquency and Heroin Addiction in Britain, 9
BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 108 (1969).
2
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psychosocial intervention in drug abuse.2 1 Consequently, we must
reassess the role of the adversary legal system as the major arena
in which drug abusers and suppliers are affected, and this may
necessitate the development of an eclectic model which includes
pertinent features of the traditional models. All the related disciplines should be involved in the development of manpower for
appropriate use in the various channels. Training modalities in
the areas of law, criminal justice, sociology and social work, economics, politics and public administration, education, and medicine (especially epidemiology) should be geared not only to the
preventive and reactive approaches to drug problems, but also to
the development of "specialist (drug) specialists" within each
field. This would be compatible with a criminal justice system in
which solutions to drug abuse are designed to attack the initial
source of supply (preventive) and to salvage and rehabilitate the
victims of the source (reactive). In order to implement these alternative models, many persons within the criminal justice system,
including generalist lawyers, must be specially trained, and new
areas of expertise must be cultivated.
A.

The Police and Law Enforcement Channel
Although it may be presumed that law enforcement personnel will be decreasingly involved with the addict-as they have
been decreasingly involved with the chronic inebriate-the police, nevertheless, need more sophisticated methods of dealing
with drug users since they will undoubtedly continue to encounter
them on the street and in crisis intervention. Special training of
the police should include some basic information for distinguishing drugged states from the effects of alcohol or from epileptic
states. Some community coordination will also be required for
integrating into the policeman's training a knowledge of the social
services and drug treatment modalities available, and for fostering his working relationship with them. If properly trained in drug
abuse and its effects, as well as in communicating with the public, especially the young, the police might also serve as a valid
social agency and tool of education. Their efforts might be integrated with those of lawyers and other professionals recruited for
this purpose.
"For a discussion of whether society should replace punishment of addicts with treatment see N. KrrrIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971). See also Szasz, The Ethics of
Addiction, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 541 (1971).
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Where the police will be involved in making arrests, particularly of the distributor, they will need more sophisticated legal
training to improve the "quality" of the arrest. This will involve
knowledge of drug laws, the laws of evidence, and of applicable
constitutional provisions. In addition to making advance preparations for particular arrests, police who become involved in the
systematic apprehension of distributors must rely on their knowledge of the drug subculture as it infiltrates neighborhoods. Enhancing the training and sophistication of local police may be
best accomplished by tying them educationally and professionally into the larger network of state and federal law enforcement
personnel.
B.

The Criminal Law Processing Channel
It was not until fairly recently that the legal profession began
to recognize the career potentials of the criminal justice system.
This recognition is largely a product of a growing awareness
among lawyers of the need for defense counsel during many stages
in the criminal process. Lawyers are just now beginning to discover their possible functions in the criminal justice planning and
corrections fields.
It is often estimated that by 1980 there will be a surplus of
200,000 lawyers in America. 7 Yet there are few lawyers who are
properly trained for their current role in the criminal justice system. Depending upon whether one wishes to use a reactive, a
preventive, or a hybrid approach to the crime problem, lawyers
could be trained as either reactive specialists in litigation or
corrections, or as preventive specialists, in which case their training would emphasize disciplines such as urban planning, social
and welfare law, tax and labor law in addition to criminal justice
planning and criminology. The optimum mix of training in these
areas must be determined for each type of justice specialist. Neophyte lawyers could attain some degree of specialization during
the three year law school program, but for some forms of specialization, notably those of an executive nature, some postgraduate
training may be required.', Additionally, many lawyer-specialist
jobs could be performed by paraprofessionals who need less than
three years of formal legal education. In short, we must begin to
21See Rosenberg, Keynote Address to the Association of American Law Schools, THE
COLUMBIA LAW OBSERVER, Feb. 5, 1973, at 1. See also Hine, Lack of Programs Overrules
Job Plans of Aspiring Lawyers, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 12, 1973, § 14, at 1.
"sSee II E. JARMEL & R. YEGGE, CONFERENCE REPORT ON NEW CAREERS (1972).
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acknowledge that functionalism and flexibility, rather than doctrinal structures and disciplinary isolationism, will better serve
the training of legal specialists.
In the specific context of the narcotics problem, the training
of lawyers must increasingly embrace the social sciences. Courses
in the epidemiology of drug abuse must be paired with courses in
drug law. A knowledge of drug law and an increasing sophistication in this area is demanded as more and more new behavior
becomes governed by statutory law. But the reality of changing
times and changing practices in heroin and soft drug abuse are
shifting focus away from certain areas and toward others, and
these shifts will constantly alter the conception of what is and
what is not a legal problem. A system of legal adaptability may
well serve to divert the present oversupply of generalist attorneys
into research roles to be coordinated with the efforts of social
scientists. With this adaptability, legal specialists may begin to
contribute to an understanding of changes in drug abuse.
Geared more to prevention than to reaction, lawyers with
drug expertise can be utilized at the grass roots level to educate
the public and to disseminate intelligent information in schools,
to social agencies and, most importantly, to the police. A vast
pool of manpower would be available if generalist attorneys were
better educated in drug abuse during their law school training.
District attorneys and public defenders, as well as judges, could
benefit from an awareness of supportive social services available
to the first offender or casual drug abuser and from a knowledge
of the drug subculture itself. Such knowledge is crucial if such
actors in the criminal justice system are to make sensible referrals. Moreover, in the area of courtroom litigation, prosecutors
must participate, via legal channels, in local, state, and national
campaigns to attack the primary sources of illicit drug supply and
distribution.
There is a need for specific legislation to provide the courts
with reasonable alternatives to sentencing the drug abuser to
prison. This legislation should permit courts the option of criminal prosecution or mandatory admission to an appropriate rehabilitative program in lieu of prosecution. The offender should
have the option of discontinuing the treatment program and requesting disposition under the court system. Judges will need
training in available treatment options and much more access to
expert opinion and testimony on a nonadversary basis, designed
to establish the truth rather than to further the gamesmanship
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of law. Inservice training and consultant groups can provide a
pool of information and expertise from which judges may gain a
broader understanding of the problems of drug abuse.
C.

The Corrections Channel
Presently, the placement of drug abusers in penal institutions without specific programs directed to their particular needs
creates more problems than it solves. For instance, the disproportionate relationship between the number of prison inmates (240)
attending drug programs in the state of Pennsylvania and the
number of those incarcerated for drug possession and drugrelated offenses (an estimated 3500 inmates within that state's
prison system) underlines the great gap between what is available and what is sorely needed in the reform of drug treatment
at the corrections level. Custody and maintenance of order continue to be the principal tasks of prison staffs, yet few would
doubt that incarceration alone is an insufficient rehabilitative
approach to drug addiction.
Under present conditions, institutions usually do little more
than move the criminal subculture of the street indoors. For
many of the inmates, the drug scene is much like the corner where
they once lived. "Square John" values are ridiculed, heroin use
glamorized, and most of the addict inmates are biding their time
waiting to get back to a "good fix." All this suggests there are
major and inherent difficulties in attempting a therapeutic management of the drug abuser in the present prison situation.
One of the chief problems in correctional approaches to drug
abuse is the fact that prisoners who are undergoing treatment are
ridiculed by fellow inmates who do not cooperate with the "system." Therapy is also hampered by the fact that men are enrolled
in programs-few as they are-not because they seek help with
their drug problem, but usually to impress the parole board with
their intentions to lead a drug-free life. In this sense, many of the
inmates use prison drug programs mainly as a mechanism to get
back on the street. Those inmates who do become "involved"
have expressed doubts about restraints placed upon the therapist
which threaten the professional secrecy of the patient/therapist
relationship.
Besides lack of motivation, fear of ridicule, and distrust of
the therapeutic staff, many of the inmates express a firm belief
that they have been incarcerated for punishment, not for treatment. Since there is a high correlation between positive attitudes
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toward therapy and successful outcome,29 there is little wonder at
the failure of our present system. Research which has been carried
out within institutions demonstrates that treatment has been
clearly unsuccessful and, in the words of one project director,
30
'
results in a "well-adjusted, well-educated dope fiend.
From all of this, it may be concluded that the present system
of corrections has proved an inadequate response to the impulsive, competitive behavior exhibited by drug abusers. There are
certain alternatives to this approach, and many modalities which
should be considered in the treatment of drug abusers. Among
them are residential, nonresidential, and religious therapeutic
communities, group therapy, individual counseling, chemotherapy, and a multi-modality approach. 3 ' Depending upon the degree of the problem and whether or not the offender should be
institutionalized or placed in a halfway-type situation, one of
these modalities should be a viable alternative to prison.
To move in these directions, manpower training for corrections must be completely revamped. By way of example, it is
clear that in the future many correctional facilities will be small,
supervised, community based, residential therapeutic communities. For these, supervisors will need specialized training in the
complexities of operating such facilities and in the resocialization
and rehabilitation of addicts. For the more serious offenders who
must be maintained in prisons, the question of treating drug addicts serving their sentences is crucial. New therapeutic techniques specially devised for a prison setting must be formulated
and implemented. Presently, after-care of released addicts is virtually nonexistent.3 1 Most of them return to the street, and al2Orne & Wender, Anticipatory Socialization for Psychotherapy: Method and Rationale, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1202 (1968).
"Sloane, Cristol, Pepernik & Staples, Role Preparationand Expectation of Improvement in Psychotherapy, 150 J. NERVOUS AND MENrAL DISEASE 18 (1971).
"For additional references on treatment modalities see Brill & Meiselas, The Treatment of Drug Abuse: Experiences and Issues, in L. BREL & E. HARMS, YEARBOOK OF DRUG
ABUSE 128 (1973); R. GLSsCoTE, J. SUSSEX, J. JAFFE, J. BAU & L. BILL, THE TREATMENT
OF DRUG ABUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. (1972).
32The importance of compulsory supervision at this point is well documented by
George Vaillant in his twelve year followup of young, male, New York City addicts after
their release from the U.S. Public Health Service hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. The
high correlation between surveillance and abstention-47 percent of the abstainers have
received at least a year of supervision, as opposed to 9 percent of the persons released who
remain chronic addicts-lead the investigator to conclude that probation and parole are
significant positive factors in the adjustment. Vaillant, A Twelve-Year Follow-up of New
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though there is a paucity of followup information, interviews suggest that they return to drugs almost immediately. In a study of
post-release experience of federal prisoners, Daniel Glaser found
that four-fifths returned to the metropolitan area where they
lived at the time of their last conviction, and approximately half
returned to the same neighborhood within that area.33 Of those
who returned to their old neighborhood, 98 percent contacted old
friends within the first 6 or 7 weeks out of prison. This is a serious
threat to whatever therapeutic gains the addict has made during
his confinement.
These observations suggest that new types of parole mechanisms are necessary, and these, in turn, demand new training of
parole and probation officers. Minimally, such officers should be
able to detect an addict's return to drugs. Moreover, they should
know what drug-free programs are available in the community
and which programs might be best suited to the needs of particular addicts. Above all, parole and probation officers, besides
needing a firm knowledge of the personality characteristics of
drug users and of the drug subculture, must be aware of the best
uses of any ancillary services which are available, particularly
those in medicine, family therapy, and vocational counseling. At
the same time that probation and parole people are functioning
as agents of freedom and liberation, they must be equipped to
achieve a proper blending of permissiveness and coercion in their
dealings with ex-inmate addicts. Such addicts often need to be
coerced or threatened by a return to prison before they will abide
by regulations intended ultimately to help them. Because of this,
and since parole and probation officers are involved in what is
essentially a resocialization process, they also need more training
in the areas of psychiatry and sociology, with specific reference
to the problems of drug abuse.34
D.

The Diversion and Decriminalization Channel
For purposes of this brief survey, it will suffice to point out
that the various modalities, just discussed for dealing with the
drug problem within the criminal justice system, can also be used
independent of that system. Thus, if one agrees that criminalizaYork Addicts: IV, Some Characteristicsand Determinations of Abstinence, 123 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 573 (1966).

13D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 487 (1964).
"4See F. ADLER, A. MoFFrr, F. GLASER, J. BALL & D. HORVITZ, THE TREATMENT
ABUSE: THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE (1973).
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tion of drug behavior is detrimental or at least not helpful to a
solution of the problem, the system should decriminalize drug
behavior or certain types of such behavior. At the very least, it
should divert certain drug offenders into civil or totally extralegal
agencies.
Obviously, the personnel of such agencies needs considerable
expertise in handling drug addicts with the bulk of such training
concentrated in social work, medicine, and other behavioral and
social sciences. But still some knowledge of alternatives within
the legal or criminal justice system and referral thereto must be
part of the training of criminal justice specialists.
E. The Focus of Socioenvironmental Manipulation and Social
Engineering
According to the theories being developed in the area of socioenvironmental manipulation, it is possible to prevent many of
the problems which now plague the criminal justice system. Just
as increasingly high and dangerous speeds can be prevented by
putting governors on automobiles, the theories of social and environmental manipulation suggest that the drug problem may be
prevented before it begins, or, at this late stage, the cause of its
existence may be eliminated. Thus, special governmental efforts
to increase full employment and professional advancement opportunities among those population segments which contain large
numbers of addicts might significantly decrease the addict population. Short of such vast efforts at removing the very criminogenesis of hard-drug addiction, many smaller scale efforts are
possible.
Our government is already experimenting with such socioenvironmental manipulations as crop support for Turkish farmers,
in hopes that they will abandon poppyseed crops in favor of sugar
beets or alfalfa. Potentially this may reduce the heroin flow into
the United States. But such a strategy points to the caution
needed in socioenvironmental manipulation: the crop supports
might admittedly inhibit the illicit import of heroin, only to increase its price to the addict. Some addicts might find their habits too costly to support and choose rehabilitation instead, but
others might simply increase their criminal activity to meet the
inflationary spiral.
Research efforts are now underway to discover antabuse-type
innoculants designed to immunize individuals against heroin
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abuse. But ultimately, a more exact identification of the social
roots of drug addiction is necessary before the techniques of socioenvironmental manipulation may operate effectively to eradicate these roots.
All disciplines promise some contribution to the development of socioenvironmental manipulation. If this approach is to
solve many of the problems now assigned to the criminal justice
system, the people assuming these tasks must be expert in any
of several disciplines, and they must thoroughly understand the
current system of criminal justice, its burdens, and its failures.
CONCLUSION

Our analysis calls for the creation of a vast national effort to
deal with the criminal justice problems of today and those of
tomorrow. The success of the effort seems to depend on a number
of ingredients, including (1) adequate manpower to make projections, (2) adequate manpower for effective planning, (3) adequate
manpower to establish training systems, and (4) funding to effectuate controlled change. At this point, we do not know whether
we have the manpower for the first three tasks. We definitely do
have the national capacity, if not the commitment, to expend
funds for such manpower projects, in preference to the type of
funding prevalent in the last few years. This past funding has
been devoted primarily to developing hardware and to dealing
with problems whose causes have not been properly understood.
To paraphrase the old adage that right must not only be done but
that it must also be seen to be done: government must not only
seem to be done-by the maintenance of vast apparatus to deal
with criminal justice problems-it must also actually be done by
competent personnel who will train more competent personnel to
solve the crime problems of the future.

INNOVATION AND ACCREDITATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION:
COMPATIBLE OR POLAR?
By MICHAEL H. CARDOZO*

Only the bold, and some would say ignorant, dare to defend
legal education as it is generally conducted today. Innovation is
the word of the hour, as it is in all of education. Even a federal
administration devoted to budget cutting provides funding for
innovation through the National Institute of Education, a research arm for the Office of Education.' I think the clamor for
innovation in our law schools misplaces the emphasis, however,
and I have challenged Ralph Nader on this point in public print.'
Harrison Tweed's writing on the wall of the house of the Bar
Association of the City of New York supports his high opinion of
lawyers by stating that "they stack up well against those in every
other occupation or profession." '3 Law teachers likewise stack up
well against other kinds of teachers. The reason they "stack up"
so well is that the product of their work is so well qualified for
their careers. The graduates of our law schools have acquired the
capacity to advise, to draft, and to innovate whenever the society
around them has developed new demands for guidelines, controls,
and methods that will work. The New Deal of 1933 and the Great
Society of 1968 were planned by many but the design was drawn
by lawyers;4 the dismantling of 1973 promptly became a contest
among constitutional authorities. This view of the influence of
lawyers and of their effectiveness in a changing society has its
dissenters, of course,' but it is supported by my observation.
Nonetheless, despite the competence of the products of our legal
education of the past few generations, there is persistent turmoil
in the legal profession over the best way to train those who would
become lawyers.
Typical of the critical observations is Charles Meyers' statement in 1968 that "legal education is too rigid, too uniform, too
*Executive Director, 1963-1973, Association of American Law Schools; Member ALlABA Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education; A.B., 1932, Dartmouth College;
LL.B., 1935, Yale University.
'OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SPECIAL

ANALYSIS, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 106 (1973).
2
r HE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 1969, at 32-33.
'Manning, Introduction: New Tasks for Lawyers, in LAW INA CHANGING AMERICA 11

(G. Hazard ed. 1968) (quoting Harrison Tweed).
'Cf. C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952).
'See, e.g., Stolz, Book Review, 21 STAN. L. REv. 198 (1968).
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narrow, too repetitious and too long."' He suggested some
changes, but predicted that law schools would be reluctant to
embark on them "not so much from a natural resistance to
change as from a quite understandable fear that whatever may
be gained will not be worth the sacrifice of traditional values that
the changes will require," i.e., the development of precision, clarity, and accuracy of thought.' His report has been followed by at
least three other penetrating studies, all suggesting that the time
for change is at hand.' This article will not consider the need for
or the value of the proposed changes, as they are fully covered
elsewhere. I will, however,make a passing comment on the significance of innovation in legal education since the effect of accreditation on innovation is significant only to the extent that innovation itself is significant.
Scattered throughout the literature on legal education is an
effort to define the mission of law schools.9 Although some recognition is given to the need for acquainting students with the history, philosophy, and rationale of the rules of law, respectable
writers seldom say that the mission is to produce students who
"know the rules of law." Much more often we are told that the
mission is to teach students "how to think like a lawyer." To some
commentators this means "to think like a new breed of lawyer,"
one who is more interested in "the needs of people" than of "corporations and government apparatus." A reader would be justified in interpreting the concept of "thinking like a lawyer" as
teaching students how to recognize the kind of question presented
by a set of facts and then to know where to seek solutions to the
problem. In other words, they are being taught how to do something rather than precisely what to do in every circumstance. I
would not be the first to be reminded of the function of swimming
coaches over the years. The uninitiated might think that a swimming coach would be most successful if he could show his charges
the most effective arm strokes and movements with the legs and
'Report of the Committee on Curriculum, 1968 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part One, Section
II, at 8 [hereinafter cited as 1968 PROCEEDINGS].
'Id.
'Training for the Public Professions of the Law, 1971 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part One,
Section II; H. PARKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1972); CLINICAL
EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE (E. Kitch ed., Univ. of Chicago Conf.
Series No. 20, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Univ. of Chicago].
'Report of the Curriculum Committee, 1963 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part One, 81-143;
Kinoy, The Present Crisis in American Legal Education, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1969);
Address by Bayless Manning, American Legal Education: Evolution and Mutation-Three Models, Western Assembly on Law and the Changing Society, June 15, 1969.
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feet. However, the master swimming coach of them all, Robert
Kiphuth, paid little attention to the strokes and kicks. To him,
everything was body building and physical training. The success
of his methods is demonstrated by the record-shattering performances of the swimmers of the present day, all of whom train on a
scale that was never dreamed of during the heyday of Johnny
Weismuller. They are being trained to perform like swimming
machines, just as law students' minds are trained in the mold of
those who have the "lawyerly attributes."
This means that whenever an innovation in mind training
has been developed, law schools must be free to adopt it. There
may be controversy over the probable effectiveness of the innovation. If the faculty of a law school, however, is not free to try the
new methods, the charge of excessive rigidity and uniformity will
be justified. Consequently, it is important to consider whether
any part of the process is an impediment to innovation,and, if so,
how it can be dealt with.
Innovation in a law school may be impeded by many minor
factors, such as innate conservatism among lawyers, lack of adequate funding, anxiety over passing a rigidly uniform bar examination, and so forth. The most obvious potential impediment,
however, is the process of accreditation. This process will not be
described in detail here, as its procedures can be found elsewhere.' 0 It is enough to say that the American Bar Association
(ABA) accredits law schools on behalf of the practicing lawyers,
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) performs a
comparable function on behalf of the academic community, and
both organizations are themselves "accredited" by a nongovernmental body known as the National Commission on Accrediting. In addition, the Office of Education maintains an
"approved list" of accrediting agencies, a list that determines
feast or famine for institutions seeking governmental funding of
any kind." Consequently, not only is the validity of the degree for
further education or for admission to bar examinations at stake,
but also the quality of the education available in a law school may
be seriously affected by the interposition of a federal agency in
the accreditation process.
At every turn, a law school or law teacher contemplating
innovation encounters questions based on the standards preI'M. Cardozo, Accreditation in Legal Education, 49 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1 (1972).
"Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies and Associations, 34 Fed. Reg. 643
(1969).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 50

scribed by the accrediting agencies. 2 If a clinical program or some
other kind of "off-campus study" is projected, the school encounters the requirements of study in the classroom and "in residence." If a school has some kind of "work-study" program or the
so-called "cooperative plans," an added problem arises over the
requirement that most of the classes be conducted in the daytime
and particularly in the afternoon period. While it is true that
many of these standards were adopted for purposes other than to
discourage the kinds of innovations teachers propose, concern
over the effect that nonconformity with standards may have on
accreditation may indeed be an impediment. I think the accrediting agencies in law, however, could dispel that concern with a
demonstration of the facts.
The literature of accreditation deals constantly with the need
to protect society from institutions offering "academic programs
that are superficial and shoddy."' 3 Frequent references are also
made to the obligation of the educational community to enforce
its own minimum standards in the interest of the welfare of society. The references to social responsibility, social needs, and the
demands of society recur constantly in statements about controls
and restrictions needed to protect the public from unscrupulous
purveyors of courses and degrees that have no substance. Seldom
is there any reference to a social responsibility for accrediting
agencies to protect innovative programs from the constriction of
conformity. Indeed, this silence has led students of the subject to
look upon the accreditation process as "a barnacle to educational
development" and "an intrusion into academic freedom."' 4
This is deplorable. If the critics are right, the many criticisms
of the accreditation system are justified. If they are mistaken,
then the system has not been effectively described or accurately
observed by those most concerned with its effects. In legal education, the latter conclusion is closer to the fact. The two agencies
involved do not deserve to be blamed for the uniformity, rigidity,
and narrowness of which Charles Meyers has complained. 5 If the
law teachers believe that the AALS or the ABA are to blame, they
have been misled.
"The Association of American Law School Bylaws and Regulations are published in
its proceedings. E.g., 1971 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part Two, at 210-34. The American Bar
Association Standards are published periodically in separate pamphlets by the American
Bar Association headquarters in Chicago, Illinois.
"See, e.g., F. DICKEY & J. MILLER, A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE ON ACCREDITATION 56 (1972)
(quoting W. Selden).
"Id. at 57; cf. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 15, 1973, at 1.
"See 1968 PROCEEDINGS, at 8.
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I believe that it would be difficult to show that any bona fide
innovation, supported by the faculty of a law school, has been
stillborn because of disapproval by either agency after due presentation and defense in the proper forum. This admittedly is an
impression based on observation, not a conclusion supported by
my research. Three extensive studies of the historic course of legal
education, however, bear out this impression. Robert Stevens has
reviewed 100 years of American legal education; Jerold Auerbach
has commented on the relations between law practitioners and
teachers in the period after the AALS was established; and Preble
Stolz has described the forces advocating and opposing clinical
legal education in the law school context.'" None of these have
shown that the accreditation process has inhibited innovation.
Stevens lists a number of barriers to such innovations as law
teachers might espouse: student disinterest; faculty insistence on
independence; scorn of most forms of legal scholarship by the
practicing profession; and problems of funding. While he has
noted that the "ultimate control" by bar admission authorities
over law school curricula and practices encourages the "march
toward uniformity," he nowhere blames the accrediting activities
of either of the recognized accrediting agencies. Auerbach describes the history of the relations in legal education between the
teachers and the practitioners as essentially a "fight for higher
standards," such as better pre-law school training, full-time
study, better teachers, and longer law study. The question of
teaching technique and curriculum content has not been a significant part of that struggle. The contest, incidentally, seems to
have been won by the advocates of improvement rather than
those who would have allowed the profession to travel a divided
path with some lawyers, who would handle the less "prestigious
and lucrative" practice, trained in admittedly poor (night)
schools, and others trained for the elite part of law practice in
good (day) schools. Today both full-time and part-time legal education have been recognized as capable of producing the one kind
of lawyer society should have: "prepared for all roles that lawyers
play."'" Stolz says that the acceptance of clinical innovation,
"Auerbach, Emnity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners,1900-1922, in LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 549 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn ed. 1971); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870:
The American Law School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn ed.

1971); Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why has it Failed?, in
Univ. of Chicago, supra note 8, at 54-76.
"7The AALS Study of Part-Time Legal Education, 1972 AALS PROCEEDINGS, Part
One, Section II (C. Kelso ed.).
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which is not as new as sometimes thought, has been slow chiefly
because of its low esteem among legal educators and the unevenness and narrowness of its earlier conception. Doubts as to its
efficacy among some teachers, however, have not prevented the
AALS from considering all its recent forms as conforming with
the Articles and Regulations; and the practitioners who dominate
the ABA Council have expressly accepted the recent trend in the
revised ABA Standards.'"
A change as radical as a 2-year law school, of course, would
evidently not conform with any of the present standards for accreditation. The flexibility of those standards for such an innovation, however, would be tested only if it were presented as a
serious plan by an institution actually intending to give it a try.
I like to think that even so dramatic a reversion to a pattern
common in the 19th century would be allowed a rebirth and given
an opportunity to prove its present viability. Both the ABA Standards and the AALS Articles expressly authorize "variances"
when exceptions are convincingly supported by proponents.' 9
Whether the graduates of a 2-year school would be allowed to take
bar examinations would, of course, depend on the flexibility of
that ultimate layer of control, the state authorities on admission
to the bar.
Discouragement of innovation could be the result of some
aspects of the accreditation process. Indeed, the impression that
accreditation imposes rigidity and uniformity may stem from the
realization that the easiest path to accreditation has been the
packaging of a curriculum, faculty, building, and student body
that conforms to a pattern implicit in published standards and
maintained by practically every school already on the approved
list. A second look at the list, however, will reveal exceptions
proving the rule that "sound" innovation must not be impeded.
Single schools have even been added to or left on the list despite
adoption of unconventional learning programs of many kinds.' °
Some of these are clinical; some cooperative; some off-campus,
'"Section 306 of The Revised Standards Proposed by the Council of the Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, drafted in
1972 and adopted in 1973, expressly authorize some "studies or activities away from the
law school or in a format that does not involve attendance at regularly scheduled class
sessions."
"Section 802 of the Revised American Bar Association Standards and section 5-5 of
the American Association of Law Schools Articles (Bylaws) expressly provide for the
authorization of "variances."
"Northeastern University School of Law in Boston and Antioch Law School in Washington, D.C., are good examples.
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even overseas; or classless, exam-less, and even practically gradeless. This flexibility in outcome reflects a willingness by the active participants in the evaluative process to permit experimentation when the innovation seems to have potential "soundness."
Both agencies have maintained a standard that an approved
law school shall have "a sound educational program." 2' Sandwiched among many details about admission requirements, library size, and faculty rights, this general measure of quality
injects a highly subjective element into the process. It obviously
unlocks the door to innovation, since "soundness" in one period
and to one group of evaluators might have seemed wildly impractical and dangerous to their predecessors. The key to an open
door for innovation, therefore, is a council or committee made up
of members who have receptivity to new ideas, and who will let
them be tried when presented by imaginative proponents with
the intellectual capability to present a persuasive case. This may
be governance by men rather than laws, but at least legal educators know that laws, like constitutions, are what the judges say
they are. If the judges of the quality of a law school will bear in
mind a recent admonition of the chairman-elect of the accrediting arm of the ABA, the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, the accreditation process in legal
education will continue to leave open the door to innovation.
Charles Kelso, in the "Introduction" to his Report on Part-Time
Legal Education said that "creativity and educational quality are
more likely to flourish in an environment where there is not too
much insistence on uniformity or conformity. ' 22 That kind of
judging is not a barnacle on educational development; it is more
of an invitation to innovation.
""Soundness" is specified in Section 304(a) of the American Bar Association Standards and in paragraph 7 of section 6-1 of the American Association of Law Schools Bylaws
(Articles).
22
The AALS Study of Part-Time Legal Education, supra note 17, at 29.
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NOTES ON COLLECTIVE PRACTICE
By THE SANTA BARBARA LEGAL COLLECTIVE*
INTRODUCTION

Law communes and collective law practices have been labeled interesting and exciting experiments. They are experiments
in the delivery of legal services to people whose lack of money and
power severely limit their access to any form of legal assistance.
As a law collective, however, we are something far different from
a poverty-oriented, socially-conscious law firm. We are instead an
association of lawyers and legal workers whose primary goal is
social and political reform both within the contemporary legal
system, and within a legal system we envision for the future.
Because of the nature and goals of our practice, we have faced
unique financial, organizational, and attitudinal problems. This
article explores many of these problems and describes our solutions to them.
Writing an article such as this is not easy. Reaching out to
so many unknown people to explain who we are and what we do
presents serious problems. We do not want to emphasize the trivial or uninteresting, but issues of real concern to a collective
practice include many mundane details. It is with these trepidations that we embark on a discussion of how our office actually
functions and how we hope to implement our plans for political,
social, and legal reform.
I. STARTING OUR PRACTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ATTITUDE
The Santa Barbara Legal Collective has been in existence for
2 years.' During that time, we have struggled much, learned a
great deal, and drastically altered our modes of thinking and
methods of practice. Throughout this process we have maintained
and refined our perceptions of the goals and principles which
originally brought us together.
Our decision to practice law collectively was not made over*At the time of this writing, the members of the collective include: Warren Adler,
attorney; Karen Blasingame, attorney; Emily DeFalla, legal worker; Richard Eiden, attorney; Jo Anne Frankfurt, legal worker; Norman Roberts, legal worker; Jeannie Rucci, legal
worker; and Richard Solomon, attorney.
'Most of the collective's members first met during the arson trial stemming from the
burning of the Isla Vista branch of the Bank of America. At that trial some of us were
defense attorneys and some were defendants.
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night. Meeting for several months prior to opening our doors, we
decided upon common goals and the methods for attaining them.
Time and experience have greatly improved our practice. We
have found it is possible, with our structure, to operate an office
efficiently, to perform competent legal work, and to combine legal
with political work in an environment which is nonalienating for
ourselves and our clients. Our practice provides us with an income without charging high fees, and permits us to grow steadily
toward becoming the kinds of people we envision building and
populating a new society.
Politics and social change are our motivating forces. Essential to our politics is the concept that possessing legal skills makes
us no better and no different from all other people. We are not
entitled to take their hard-earned money in the name of professionalism. That is not to say that we do not charge fees. But our
fees are set as low as possible, yet high enough to pay our overhead expenses, and salaries of from $210 to $275 per month. Additionally, we view our clients as our brothers and sisters. We attempt to demystify the law so that when they come to us for help,
they not only have their specific problems resolved, but they also
learn something about the operation of the "system" and what
they might do the next time a problem arises. This occurs not
only in our one-to-one encounters with people in the office, but
also in our lectures and other outreach programs in the community. This fall we are organizing a "people's law school."
In order to accomplish our ideals, it was first necessary to
change our own attitudes. It was essential for us to discuss and
agree that money does not play as large a role in happiness as we
had been taught. We must continually discuss the "professional"
attitude that is developed in law school, as it separates legal
people from other people and fosters an unhealthy and overlarge
ego in lawyers. Self-confidence and the knowledge that we provide competent legal assistance, coupled with the support and
criticism of comrades in and out of the office, take the place of
the traditional "lawyer's ego" and provide us with the security
and aggressiveness necessary to effective lawyering.
Attitude changes do not come from a mere theoretical or
intellectual understanding of what might be a more desirable
attitude. Collective practice means supporting each other in our
individual struggles to overcome personal ties to elitism, sexism,
and professionalism. Various other faults like personal insecurity
and occasional obnoxiousness are often dealt with as group prob-
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lems. We meet often in "criticism meetings" to formulate policies
and programs to correct these faults. We feel criticism should be
carefully considered and thought out before it is voiced. We try
to be gentle and objective, rather than abrasive, and we attempt
to avoid personal attacks. In receiving criticism, we strive to consider each statement carefully, regardless of its nature or source.
We find it better to make criticisms when the situation warrants,
rather than to allow problems to go unresolved while resentments
build. By using these guidelines, we have improved both our practice and our ways of relating to other people.
II.

DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS

Our office is open from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., five days a
week. The week is divided into 10 half-day reception shifts. Since
there are presently eight collective members, five of us do two
shifts each week for one month, while three members have a
month free from reception duty. We change the schedule at the
first business meeting of each month. The receptionist answers
phones, greets people when they come in, and is also responsible
for such tasks as keeping the reception area neat.
We have a regular business meeting every Monday in the late
afternoon. Cases which have come into the office the previous
week are discussed, and an attorney and a legal worker are assigned to each case. A person may be assigned to a case because
she or he is familiar with that area of law, or for the opposite
reason-so that the member may learn that subject area. Working in pairs affords an opportunity for members to educate each
other in specific areas of law. General business takes up the remainder of the agenda. This includes such items as vacation
schedules, new membership applications, office purchases, and
seminars that members might attend. By utilizing self-discipline,
we have learned to cover an amazing amount of material in a brief
and relatively painless meeting once each week.
Every Tuesday evening we hold a "study meeting." The format is loosely structured around topical units lasting 6 to 10
weeks. Every other week we discuss a reading chosen to illuminate a particular point or area of interest, and, generally, for each
meeting one person is assigned to select and provide the reading
and lead the discussion. On alternate Tuesdays, we discuss whatever seems important. At one meeting we discussed this article.
Sometimes it is a local political issue; at other times our Tuesday
meeting is a "criticism meeting." We have just completed a unit
on introductory economic theory and are about to begin a unit on
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women's issues-sexism, feminism, working women, and other
experiences of women in a sexist society.
Perhaps a few more details would help clarify the way the
collective supports us as members. As mentioned earlier, our salaries are all below $300, with the exception of one member who
has a family and receives additional money when needed. While
we all have a commitment to live on low salaries, our general
policy is to allocate money according to needs. And since it is
hard to exist for long periods on such low incomes, we have arranged to provide some necessities at collective expense. Gas is
charged at a local station, and the collective pays for all repairs
on cars. In return, cars are treated as quasi-collective, which
means that while one or two individuals may have primary access
to and responsibility for a vehicle, all cars are subject to appropriation by a transportation-needy individual at an ad hoc "car
conference." We are building up a supply of automobiles so that
soon there will be one for each member; however, in the past we
have had access to only one or two vehicles. Consideration was
given first to those whose needs were greatest, and the sharing
worked relatively well. Medical bills are sometimes paid, and
loans or special grants are given when the need arises. Everyone
decides whether extra money should be appropriated. Food is
purchased and kept in the office refrigerator, eliminating the
need to go out for lunches which might otherwise be a drain upon
our scarce time and money.
III. DIVISION OF LABOR
One aspect of our practice which is necessary to an understanding of the collective's operation is the concept of legal workers. These are people who have had little or no formal training in
law, and who became interested in doing this type of work for
political or practical reasons. After short periods of time in our
office, all legal workers are able to fulfill most of the functions of
practicing attorneys (with the notable exceptions of those functions legally prohibited, such as appearing in court, giving legal
advice, and visiting individuals in prison). An example of this is
a woman in our office who, after having done legal work for less
than a month, prepared a writ of mandate to the California Supreme Court which overturned Santa Barbara's residency requirement for city council candidates.
Admittedly, our biggest fear of an office without traditional
divisions of labor was that the work would not be done as quickly
or as well as necessary. Since attorneys do their own typing, some
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individual pleadings take twice as long to prepare. But having
nonattorneys in the office who also prepare pleadings helps to
offset this time loss. The overall effect, we feel, is that everyone
develops his or her legal skills, and as a group we become more
.effective and efficient than if the more menial jobs were left to
the nonlawyers, as occurs in the traditional mode of practice.
Working together and learning from each other has proven that
an equitable allocation and sharing of the work produces a much
more successful collective effort.
Often the legal workers are asked questions such as: "Why
are you not in law school?" or "Do you plan to attend law
school?" There are obvious advantages to a bar card; however,
since the legal workers are already doing productive work without
one, it is difficult to stop for three years to attend law school. But
we do have an arrangement that promises to solve the dilemma.
There is a program in California whereby students can qualify for
the bar by studying under any attorney who has actively practiced in the state for the past five years. This program includes
in-office work, the reading of law, discussions, examinations, and
reports. Luckily, one of our attorneys qualifies as such a mentor,
and he can assume the responsibility of training and supervising
the study of those members of the collective who want to participate in this program. Thus, a legal worker may obtain a bar card
,without leaving the collective.

IV.

POLITICS AND LEGAL PRACTICE

Since all collective members share a strong belief in the necessity for restructuring society, we devote all of our abilities and
legal skills to that end. Specifically, this means we support the
liberation struggles of Third World people, of insurgent unionists
and farmworkers, of women, children, prisoners, student radicals, and anti-war protestors. In short, we support all people
who are oppressed because they were not born with money and
power. This support manifests itself in many ways, and we often
represent clients in political cases for reduced fees or totally
without compensation.
Relating our politics to our legal practice is a constant concern. Like every other decision made in the office, questions of
legal tactics in specific cases are examined in light of our commitment to advance the causes of justice and social change. This
commitment requires, among other things, that we devote considerable energy not only to decisionmaking but also to refining our
political goals, and to working toward their fulfillment.
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Besides our own study meetings, we maintain extensive correspondence with other like-minded collectives and law offices, in
part through our active membership in the National Lawyers
Guild, an association of leftist legal workers, law students, and
lawyers. If our structure has developed largely from internal, organic needs and intuitions, our substantive practice has thrived
on advice and support from, and the exchange of experiences
with, our comrades in other parts of the country. Additionally, we
depend on friendly local attorneys for answers to questions that
occasionally arise, and their experience and support have been
invaluable.
Finally, our roots and contacts in the community are crucial
to the effective integration of our politics and our legal practices.
It is fundamental to our notion of serving the people that we keep
the needs of the people foremost in our work. There seems to be
little need, at least in our practice, to define "the people" with
analytical precision. We maintain a relationship of trust and cooperation with those elements in the community which we believe
to be vital and progressive. Many of our decisions are made with
their input, and our relationship with them has been generally
productive.
Although our political consciousness is the distinguishing
characteristic of our legal practice, we must still fulfill the obligation to advance the best interests of our clients. This is implicit
in any law office subject to the economic and ethical constraints
of our present legal system. We have eliminated some of the areas
where these obligations conflict by categorically refusing to accept certain types of cases. For example, since a prime defense
tactic in rape cases is to attack the integrity of the prosecutrix,
we will not represent accused rapists. No matter how persuasive
the defendant might be in protesting his innocence, we refuse to
assume his defense since it might require harassment of a woman
and implicitly contribute our support to a system which often
punishes the victim before the rapist.
More difficult problems arise in the areas where the legal
system forces us to advise clients to compromise their own interests. The most common instances involve the criminal defendant
who must be told that taking a case to trial may cost three times
more in legal fees than will pleading guilty to a lesser charge. We
are taught in school that the defendant is offered more protections in the criminal justice system of America than in that of any
other country. Not until entering legal practice did we learn that
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these "paper protections" often exist only to the extent that the
defendant can afford to buy them.
Equally significant, and perhaps more interesting than the
strictures placed upon the criminal defendant, are those imposed
upon the insurgent unionist. Our labor practice is by no means
extensive enough to qualify us as experts in the field. We do,
however, have some experience in representing wildcat strikers.
Emotionally and politically, wildcatters are close to our
hearts-as working people with real and immediate grievances,
and as rebels with powerful feelings of solidarity and class loyalty.
In two recent instances, we have faced irreconcilable contradictions between the short term interests of our clients in accepting
tentative concessions and returning to work, and their long term
interest in controlling their own lives. Ethical dilemmas compounded themselves like figures in an accountant's nightmare.
The decisions, of course, were left to our clients, but as their legal
advisors, we could not ignore the fact that wildcatters have no
place in the rigid structure of labor law. In its application, federal
labor law has its main effect in encouraging the petrification of
major labor unions-all in the name of promoting "industrial
peace." Its ritualistic formulas of "fair" and "unfair" labor practices, its penalties against unions that step out of line, and the
power given to established unions all serve to retard the development of truly independent and representative labor organizations. However, as our practice in this area expands, we hope to
develop a fuller understanding of this area of law to meet the
needs of our clients and at the same time to contribute to an
ultimate political solution of their plight.
V.

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE COLLECTIVE

A pervasive factor of our experience in the collective is its
intensity. Trying to improve our legal work, our politics, and
ourselves, as well as assuming the responsibilities of operating an
efficient law office are not tasks undertaken lightly. Perhaps at
first we underestimated the amount of work required by these
tasks, but our desire and optimism gave us the courage to begin,
and our successes the energy to continue.
Although it may seem incongruous with what has been said
about the amount and intensity of our work, we feel the need to
do even more. As mentioned earlier, we have followed a program
of relating to individuals and groups in the community that we
feel are progressive and whose politics we support. We do legal
work for these people, and we also support them in other ways.
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In essence we see our goal and theirs as one and the same.
Long hours are not uncommon. Weekly evening meetings
and occasional weekend meetings mean that we see each other a
great deal under the pressure conditions of our work. Often, we
are unable to spend as much time with each other socially as we
wish. This loss is felt strongly. We have found that setting aside
time to meet socially is necessary if we are to work together
comfortably.
Were we to single out the largest problem we have encountered, perhaps it would be the enormous amount of responsibility
required to keep the office running smoothly. Many times a problem will be resolved with a decision that begins with, "Well then,
everybody will do the following," and the success of that solution
depends on everyone doing just that. With no management and
no supervising bureaucracy, we must depend on our own selfdiscipline to assure that each and every thing gets done properly.
After so many years of mother and father, teacher, professor,
boss, or sergeant telling us exactly what to do every hour of the
day and night, it takes time and effort to learn to work for ourselves as individuals and as a group.
One of the most critical personal and social problems we face
in the collective is combatting sexism. Sexism is as oppressive in
a law office as it is in any other setting. In our case, outsiders
generally assume that all the women in the office are clerical help,
and all the men are professionals. Regularly, people call when one
of the women is on phone duty, and upon hearing a female voice
ask, "Is anybody there?" Originally, some of the nonprofessional
men seemed to enjoy this, but discussions resulted in an understanding that this confusion was misleading our clients and perpetuating unwarranted stereotypes.
At present, there are a number of ways we combat sexism
internally. First, of course, there is our method of practice. Everyone in the office is equal in all matters; no one person does more
typing or answering of phones. We are all conscious of the gaps
between us in some fields of expertise, and strive, by learning and
teaching, to close them. We also meet regularly in groups to
study, criticize, and support each other in overcoming deepseated personal biases. All of us are aware of the differences in
the socialization processes that men and women undergo. Overcoming the effects of differing socialization requires our unending
attention. These problems and others have confronted us and
continue to confront us. We deal with each one individually, but
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we have learned that a principled discussion which formulates
guidelines for dealing with a problem helps reduce its adverse
effects.
CONCLUSION

One of our concerns in writing this article is frankly propagandistic: we want to persuade at least some lawyers to try the
collective form of practice. We think the American legal profession would benefit from more practitioners working in egalitarian,
nonsexist environments.
What does a collective offer the card-carrying lawyer? Admittedly, most lawyers find it difficult to sacrifice those peripheral privileges earned by hard work and pain in law school. Even
the most sympathetic young lawyers are sometimes put off by the
prospect of spending time typing and sweeping an office floor at
the cost of producing more cerebral legal work.
When all is said and done, collectives have only one advantage over traditional forms of practice: in many ways, they permit
practitioners to be more human. One of the most dread afflictions
of the legal trade-"lawyers' ego"-cannot survive in a collective
atmosphere. The constant struggle against sexism has served to
improve our feelings toward members of the opposite sex-a
benefit which pervades our entire lives. Finally, the feelings of
comradeship cultivated through hard work are of incalculable
value. And most importantly, the opportunity to take only those
cases which our consciences can tolerate enables us to face the
world a bit more joyfully than is too often true among our brothers
and sisters working their ways to partnerships.
Ultimately, though, the benefits to lawyers are only byproducts of the main purpose of collective practice. Without a
commitment to thoroughgoing social change in America, sooner
or later more lawyers will find the sacrifices of collective practice
too great to bear, and the opportunities elsewhere in the profession too tempting to resist. We have found that our political
perspective-which has been developing continuously over the
years-has played a major role in shaping our success. We only
hope that others will share our concerns for justice and change
within the legal system, and that they too will consider collective
practice.

